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BOSTON UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE SCHOOL

THE INFLUENCE OF WILLIAM JAMES ON GEORG WOBBERMIN'S
PSYCHOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

by

Jannette Elthina Newhall

(B.S.Sc., 1924; A.M., 1926, Boston University)

A Dissertation

submitted in partial fulfilment of the
requirements for the
degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

1931

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INTRODUCTION

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INTRODUCTION

1. INTRODUCTION

A. THE PROBLEM OF THE DISSERTATION

1. Statement

The problem of this dissertation is to attempt to discover the nature and extent of the influence of William James on Georg Wobbermin's psychology and philosophy of religion and to consider Wobbermin's criticisms of James's philosophy. The problem is suggested by the fact that Wobbermin is the German translator of James's The Varieties of Religious Experience. It is a significant problem both because it offers evidence of the reception and general range of James's influence in German thought and because it gives an opportunity for the critical study of a distinguished German theologian and philosopher of religion who is regarded by German scholars as in part a follower of James.

2. Limitation

This dissertation will treat only those writings of James and Wobbermin which have specific bearing on the relations of the two men. In the case of James, this will mean that his psychological writings will be considered only in their bearing on his psychology and philosophy of religion. The same will be true of the treatment of James's metaphysical thought, although the distinction is much more difficult to draw in this field since the religious interest pervades

practically all his writing. No special study has been made of James's minor writings except for the purpose of making additions to and corrections of Perry's Annotated Bibliography of the Writings of William James.¹ All the articles which are of special significance for this study are either incorporated in later books by James or appear in the two volumes of collected essays.²

The study has been similarly limited in the case of Wobbermin. His strictly theological writings will be considered only in so far as they indicate the use which he made of the methodology of James or reveal his own philosophical position. His historical writings will be omitted almost entirely since they betray no sign of influence from James. The attempt has, however, been made to present a complete bibliography of his writings, and Professor Wobbermin has been most helpful in suggesting material to the writer.

The dissertation is further limited in the treatment of general literature. No attempt will be made to cover all the literature on James and Wobbermin. With a very few exceptions, the treatment will be limited to German sources. The material on James in English is so extensive that any attempt to treat it completely would prevent the carrying out of the purpose of the dissertation. German source material will be limited to those writings which have special relevance to the problem of psychology and philosophy of religion.

practically all his writing. No special study has been made
of James's place within the context for the purpose of making an
attempt to endow the work of the writer with a historical significance.
The Writings of William James. All the articles which are in
special reference to this study are either incorporated in
later books of James or appear in the two volumes of collected
essays.

The study has been tentatively limited in the case of
Woodbridge. His literary-theological writings will be considered
only in so far as they indicate the use which he made of the
methodology of James or reveal his own philosophical position.
His historical writings will be treated almost entirely since
they carry no sign of influence from James. The essays have,
however, been made to present a complete bibliography of his
writings, and Professor Woodbridge has been most helpful in sug-
gesting material for the writer.

The dissertation is further limited in the treatment of
general literature. No attempt will be made to cover all the
literature on James and Woodbridge. With a very few exceptions,
the treatment will be limited to human sources. The material
on James in English is so extensive that any attempt to treat
it completely would prevent the covering of the purpose of
the dissertation. German sources material will be limited to
those writings which have special value and have no relation
to the history of religion.

B. OTHER INVESTIGATIONS OF JAMES'S INFLUENCE

1. General Literature on James

One of the most significant single pieces of research on James is the Annotated Bibliography of the Writings of William James by Ralph Barton Perry. Perry's study of James's philosophy in the Appendix to Present Philosophical Tendencies³ is also a valuable contribution to the study of James and an indication of some of the lines in which his thought was developed by other thinkers.

The mass of literature on James's pragmatism is altogether too extensive to cite in detail; and most of it is irrelevant to this dissertation. Special mention may, however, be made of A.W. Moore's Pragmatism and its Critics⁴ and of J. B. Pratt's What is Pragmatism.⁵ A. O. Lovejoy has written numerous articles on the subject,⁶ and there are treatments of it in English, French, and German journals.⁷

The volume of Essays Philosophical and Psychological in Honor of William James, published by members of the Columbia faculty after James had delivered the Pragmatism lectures there,⁸ contains little specific reference to James but indicates the pragmatic attitude toward a wide variety of problems.

The systematic account of James and his philosophy, written by G.C. Cell for the new edition of Ueberweg's Grundriss,⁹ is a penetrating study of the development of James's thought and of its significance in American philosophy. The fact that this now appears in the standard German philosophical source-

2. THE HISTORY OF JAMES'S RESEARCH

1. General Introduction on James

One of the most significant figures in the history of psychology

is James, the American psychologist, who is known as the

father of American psychology. His study of James

is found in the Appendix to James's Psychological Principles

is a valuable contribution to the study of James and his

contribution to the study of the history of psychology was re-

viewed by other scholars.

The study of James's research on James's psychology is also

found in the Appendix to James's Psychological Principles

is a valuable contribution to the study of James and his

contribution to the study of the history of psychology was re-

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contribution to the study of the history of psychology was re-

viewed by other scholars.

book should be influential in the future understanding of James by German thinkers.

Book Review of "The Future of the World" by J. H. P. M.

by J. H. P. M.

2. Investigations in the General Field of James's Psychology and Philosophy of Religion

Two studies of James have special reference to our problem, namely, J. Seelye Bixler's Religion in the Philosophy of William James and Karl Busch's William James als Religionsphilosoph.¹⁰

Bixler's book is a valuable internal criticism of the thought of James, based on a thorough understanding of his writings. It is not so much a critique as an appreciation and interpretation. The concluding chapter is a brief suggestion of some aspects of James's influence in American religion. Yet the book in no way touches on the problem of the present dissertation although it has offered the writer helpful general material.

The work of Karl Busch is particularly significant for the present study because it is the writing of a German and for a German public. Busch was a student at Harvard Divinity School where he received an S.T.B. degree.¹¹ He knew James personally and was a frequent visitor at the James home.¹² His writings show a keen appreciation of James's philosophy of religion and also an unusual ability to enter into the spirit of a foreign thinker.

Two German dissertations on James as a philosopher of religion may also be mentioned: W. Harbert's William James'

James's Epistemology and Philosophy of Religion

The studies of James have several special references to our
thinking, namely, 1. James's Epistemology and Philosophy
of Religion and 2. James's Epistemology and Philosophy
of Religion. 10

James's book is a valuable introduction to the
thought of James, based on a thorough understanding of his wit-
ness. It is not so much a critical study as a general study and in-
terpretation. The conclusion of the book is a brief summary of
some aspects of James's influence in American religion. 10
The book is no less famous in the history of the present day
than although it has offered the writer a general in-
terpretation.

The work of Earl Buesch is particularly significant for
the present study because it is the writing of a German and for
a German reader. Buesch was a student of Ludwig Maximilian School
in Munich in 1907-1908. He was James's personal
and was a frequent visitor at the James home. His writings
show a deep appreciation of James's philosophy of religion and
also an unusual ability to enter into the spirit of a foreign
thought.

Two German translations of James as a philosopher
and as a man are mentioned: W. H. Buesch's James

Religionsphilosophie (1913) and W. Paetz's Die erkenntnis-
theoretischen Grundlagen von William James "The varieties of
religious experience."

There has been no previous investigation of the specific field of this dissertation. Earlier works on religious philosophy in Germany, while they refer to William James' translation of the "Varieties of Religious Experience" into German, have not dealt with the influence of James upon Heidegger. John W. Johnson, an American who studied with Heidegger in Göttingen, wrote an article on "Die hermeneutische Methode" for the Heidegger-Jahrbuch in 1934, but James was not mentioned in this connection.

Many brief references to the relation of Heidegger to James are to be found in German literature on problems of religion, but none of them involves a thorough study of the influence of James.

The general topic of James' influence on German philosophy of religion was discussed with Professors J.G. Gail (Bonn) and W.E. Heidegger (Harvard) and both approved such a study. The specific problem of the influence of James on Heidegger was taken up with Professors Arthur Heidegger and Arthur Tiedke (both of Berlin) who also regarded it as significant.

Religious experience
theological grounds for William James "The varieties of
Religious experience" (1902) and W. Paul's "The experience of

3. Investigations in the Specific Field of this Dissertation

There has been no previous investigation of the specific field of this dissertation. Bixler makes no reference whatever to Wobbermin, and Busch, while he refers to Wobbermin's translation of the Varieties, makes no study of James's influence upon Wobbermin. John W. Johnson, an American who studied with Wobbermin in Göttingen, wrote an article on "Die religions-psychologische Methode" for the Otto-Wobbermin Festschrift volume of the Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche,¹³ but James was not mentioned in this connection.

Many brief references to the relation of Wobbermin to James are to be found in German literature on problems of religion, but none of them involves a thorough study of the influence of James.

The general topic of James's influence on German philosophy of religion was discussed with Professors G.C. Cell (Boston) and W.E. Hocking (Harvard) and both approved such a study. The specific problem of the influence of James on Wobbermin was taken up with Professors Arthur Liebert and Arthur Titius (both of Berlin) who also regarded it as significant.

3. Investigation in the German Field

of this Dissertation

There has been no previous investigation of the specific field of this dissertation. Hitherto makes no reference whatever to Wittenberg and Hesse, while the reference to Wittenberg's dissertation of the 1910s, makes no study of James's influence upon Wittenberg. John W. Johnson, an American who studied with Wittenberg in Göttingen, wrote an article on "The religious-psychological methods" for the *Österreichische Zeitschrift für* die Psychologie (1910) and James was not mentioned in this connection.

Many other references to the relation of Wittenberg to James are to be found in German literature on problems of religion, but none of them involves a thorough study of the influence of James.

The general topic of James's influence on German philosophy of religion was discussed with Professor G. G. Zell (1911-1912) and A. E. Fickel (1913) and both approved such a study. The specific results of the influence of James on Wittenberg were taken up with Professor Arthur Haeberle and Arthur Fickel (both of Berlin) who also regarded it as significant.

C. A PRELIMINARY SURVEY OF THE PLAN OF THE DISSERTATION

The problem of this dissertation, the influence of James on Wobbermin's psychology and philosophy of religion, and Wobbermin's critique of James, will be developed through three main stages.

In the first place, a brief exposition of the general system of thought of James and of Wobbermin will be given (Chapters I and II).

Secondly, the dissertation will study the methodology which Wobbermin applies in philosophy of religion and which he recognizes as partially derived from James (Chapter III).

Finally, the relations between the views of James and Wobbermin on pragmatism and pluralism will be considered, with special reference to their bearing on philosophy of religion (Chapters IV and V).

OF A PRELIMINARY SURVEY OF THE PLAN
OF THE DISSERTATION

The purpose of this dissertation, the intention of
James on Hobbes's philosophy and philosophy of religion,
and Hobbes's criticism of James, will be developed through
three main stages.

In the first stage, a brief exposition of the general
aspects of thought of James and of Hobbes will be given
(Chapter I and II).

Secondly, the dissertation will study the methodology
which Hobbes applied in philosophy of religion and which
he resolutely rejected in politics (Chapter III).
Thirdly, the relations between the views of James

and Hobbes on religion and politics will be investigated,
with special reference to their bearing on philosophy of re-
ligion (Chapters IV and V).

D. BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES

Before turning to the critical exposition of the thought of James and Wobbermin and their relations, we wish to give a brief account of the life and general background of each.

1. William James¹⁴

William James, who was born in New York City on January 11, 1842, was the son of Henry James, Sr. and Mary Walsh. He was the oldest of five children. His brother Henry became famous in the field of literature.

James's family life had a profound influence on his thought and character. His father was a keen critic of contemporary religion and a writer of force and sincerity. Starting as a student of theology, he was stirred by doubts which led him to give up the ministry but to devote himself to the search for answers to these questions, which he finally found in the teachings of Swedenborg.¹⁵ While William James never accepted his father's conclusions in theology, he was influenced by the frank and liberal religious atmosphere of the family discussions.¹⁶ A cripple from his student days and having no official position, Henry James, Sr. gave himself to his writing and his home. The family traveled much during the earlier years of William James's life, and lived abroad for a while.¹⁷

William James's education was varied and far from systematic, and he always looked upon it rather contemptuously.¹⁸ He went for short periods to several private schools

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES

Before turning to the critical exposition of the thought of James and William and their relations, we wish to give a brief account of the life and general character of each.

1. William James.

William James, who was born in New York City on Jan-
uary 11, 1834, was the son of Henry James, Sr., and Mary Bulfinch. He was the oldest of five children. His brother Henry became famous in the field of literature.

James's family life had a profound influence on his thought and character. His father was a man of high moral and religious principles and a man of force and authority. He was a student of theology, and was struck by a sense of the reality of the spiritual world. He was interested in the search for a deeper meaning to life, and he was particularly interested in the teachings of Swedenborg. He was influenced by his father's conclusions in theology, and was in-
fluenced by the Unitarian and liberal religious atmosphere of the family. A crisis from his student days and having no official position, Henry James, Sr., gave himself to his writing and his home. The family traveled much during the earlier years of William James's life, and lived abroad for a while.

William James's education was varied and far from systematic, and he always looked upon it rather as a haphazard. He went for short periods to several private schools

in New York and in France. In 1859-60 he studied at the Academy in Geneva, Switzerland, and in 1861 he entered the Lawrence Scientific School in Cambridge.¹⁹ Distinctively philosophical considerations were slow in developing, and James studied in several other fields, only to find each lacking in some way. His early work in chemistry led to an interest in medicine, and he entered the Harvard Medical School.²⁰ Here he came under the influence of Agassiz and was persuaded to go as an assistant on Agassiz's Amazon expedition. While he learned much from this trip, it convinced him that he was not fitted for the life of a field-naturalist. His health was poor and the hardships and drudgery of collecting and classifying specimens were too great.²¹

He returned to his medical studies at Harvard in 1866. But his health grew worse and he finally decided to go to Germany in the hope that the rest and change of climate would benefit him and also that he might be able to study physiology in the German laboratories. He left America in the spring of 1867 and spent the summer in Dresden and Bohemia, struggling with his ill health and with the German language.²² In the fall he went to Berlin and attended a few lectures but his health prevented him from doing any laboratory work. In January 1868, James tried again, but vainly, the treatments at Teplitz. He went to Heidelberg to hear Helmholtz lecture and hoped to spend the summer semester there but again was forced to stop work. He returned to Berlin for a time and then went to Divonne for treatment. This also failed to help

in New York and in France. In 1885-86 he studied at the Acad-
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the fall he went to Berlin and attended a few lectures and
his health improved and he took up his laboratory work. In
January 1892, James tried again, but vainly, the treatment
at Berlin. He went to Heidelberg to meet Heinrich's father
and hoped to spend the summer season there but again was
forced to stop work. He returned to Berlin for a time but
then went to Göttingen for treatment. There also failed to help

him and he returned to America in November, via Paris.²³

James completed his medical studies at Harvard and received the degree of Doctor of Medicine in 1869. He did not, however, wish to practise medicine and was undecided as to what profession he should adopt. For the next three years he had no definite work. His health was poor and his eyes were in such bad condition that he could read only a few hours each day. Nevertheless he managed to cover some most profitable and varied reading.²⁴

In 1872 James began teaching at Harvard, offering jointly with Dr. Thomas Dwight a course in anatomy and physiology. His health improved under regular work and he found teaching highly satisfactory. In 1876 James gave his first course in **psychology**, and in 1878 he contracted with Henry Holt and Company to write a text in psychology which finally appeared in 1890.²⁵

James married Miss Alice H. Gibbons in July, 1878 and had a very happy and helpful home life. Mrs. James read to him and often wrote letters from dictation so that his eyes were spared much routine work.²⁶ They had five children, one of whom died in infancy. Some of the most delightful lines in his published letters are those describing a sabbatical year abroad with a family.²⁷

James's first specific contribution to philosophy of religion was in the form of lectures, published together in 1897 under the title: The Will to Believe and other Essays in Popular Philosophy. These stirred wide-spread interest and

him and he returned to America in November, 1911. He had completed his medical studies at Harvard and he received the degree of Doctor of Medicine in 1911. He did not, however, wish to practice medicine and was regarded as a "half-brother" by the medical community. For the next three years he had no definite work. He finally was put on the staff of the Massachusetts General Hospital and he held rank only as the fourth grade. He was, however, regarded as a member of the medical staff and worked as such.

In 1915 James began teaching at Harvard, offering lectures in with Dr. Thomas Dwight a course in anatomy and physiology. His health improved with regular work and he found teaching to be a relief. In 1916 James gave his first lecture in physiology, and in 1917 he contracted with Henry Holt and Company to write a text in physiology which finally appeared in 1920.

James married Miss Alice E. Johnson in July, 1911 and they were very happy and a typical home life. Mr. James used to him and often wrote that his satisfaction was that his eyes were "bright" and "clear" and that they had five children, one of whom died in infancy. Some of the most beautiful things in his life were the letters he wrote describing a beautiful year spent with a family.

James's first specific contribution to physiology of the nervous system was in the form of lectures, published in 1917 under the title: The Nervous System and Other Organs of the Nervous System. These started with a general lecture on the

criticism and clearly foreshadowed his pragmatic and pluralistic philosophy. He was asked in 1896 to prepare Gifford Lectures, which he finally delivered in two series in 1901-02 after a long struggle with ill health. These lectures on The Varieties of Religious Experience were very influential, particularly in the newly developing field of psychology of religion. James gave the Lowell Institute Lectures in 1906 on "Pragmatism"²⁸ and the Hibbert Lectures in 1908 on "The Present Situation in Philosophy."²⁹ While the last two are intended to outline James's epistemology and metaphysics, they are more satisfactory as an exposition of his philosophy of religion and largely fulfill the promise of the "Postscript" of the Varieties. The Introduction to Philosophy in which James hoped to give a systematic statement of his metaphysics was unfortunately never completed.³⁰

After continued ill health and vain attempts to find relief abroad, James returned to America in August 1910 and died two days after reaching his summer home in Chocorua.³¹

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After continued ill health and vain attempts to find relief, James returned to his home in August 1910 and died two days later reaching his summer home in December.

2. Georg Wobbermin³²

Georg Wobbermin was born in Stettin, the chief city of the province of Pomerania, Germany, on October 27, 1869. His father, Albert Wobbermin, was a teacher in the Realgymnasium of that city. His mother's maiden name was Laura Quandt.

Georg Wobbermin received his early education in the Marienstiftsgymnasium in Stettin, the same school which Albrecht Ritschl had attended fifty years earlier.³³ In 1888 he went to the university in Halle and studied there for two years. From 1890 to 1894 he was a student at Berlin University. Here he received the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in 1894 and became a licentiate in theology in 1895. The honorary degree of Doctor of Theology was conferred on him by Berlin University in 1907.

In giving his Vita Academica at the close of his dissertation, Wobbermin lists his teachers.³⁴ Notable among the names of philosophers are Benno Erdmann, Vaihinger, Simmel, and Dilthey; while the names of Harnack and Kaftan are significant in theology. He himself expresses special gratitude to Harnack, Kaftan, and Dilthey who were particularly helpful to him in the prosecution of his studies. Paulsen and Herrmann should be added as influential although not his teachers.

In 1896-97 Wobbermin took a trip through the Greek Orient, visiting Athens and the islands of Asia Minor, and living

for four months with the monks of the Cloister of Athos. He was married in 1906 to Dora Brockhausen, a woman of unusual intellectual ability, who has helped him greatly in the prosecution of his scholarly work.

Wobbermin began his teaching career as "Privat-Dozent" in Berlin in 1898. In 1906 he went to Marburg as "ausser-ordentlicher" professor but remained only until 1907 when he became "ordentlicher" professor at Breslau. In 1910 he received a call from Yale University, where he had delivered a series of lectures in 1907,³⁵ but he declined this call. He went to Heidelberg in 1915 as the successor to Ernst Troeltsch. Here he remained until 1922 when he was called to Göttingen to succeed Arthur Titius. He is still teaching in Göttingen at the present time, having declined calls to Leipzig in 1925 and to Halle in 1926. He and his wife now live in the Göttingen house which had previously been occupied successively by Titius and by Karl Barth.

Wobbermin's interest in James began in his student days with the reading of the Principles of Psychology.³⁶ He also read The Will to Believe shortly after its publication and made special reference to it in his Theologie und Metaphysik.³⁷ In 1904 he was asked by James to prepare a German translation of The Varieties of Religious Experience. Quite a few letters were exchanged but unfortunately all are lost.³⁸ He did not meet James until the fall of 1907 when he visited Harvard University,³⁹ and this was the only time that the two met.

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Wobbermin has spoken and written widely in the fields of theology and philosophy of religion. He takes an active interest in periodical literature and has written many articles as well as serving as contributing editor for the Theologische Literaturzeitung⁴⁰ and for the Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche.⁴¹ The 1929 volume of the latter journal was dedicated to Wobbermin and Rudolf Otto on their sixtieth birthdays. He was also an assistant editor of the Zeitschrift für Religionspsychologie during the six years of its existence,⁴² and holds the same editorial relation to the new Zeitschrift für Religionspsychologie.⁴³ Wobbermin edited Kant's Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft for the Prussian Academy Edition of Kant's works.⁴⁴ He was editor of the volume on "Religionsphilosophie" in the Quellen-Handbücher der Philosophie series.⁴⁵ He is now editing, with Titius, the Studien zur systematischen Theologie.⁴⁶ His most important books are Theologie und Metaphysik, Monismus und Monotheismus, Der christliche Gottesglaube, and the three-volume Systematische Theologie.

Among Wobbermin's important addresses are the lectures before the International Congress of Religion in Berlin in 1910,⁴⁷ the Yale lectures,⁴⁸ and the address at the general meeting of the Kant-Gesellschaft in Halle in 1927.⁴⁹ He is to lecture at the First International Congress of Psychology of Religion at Vienna in May 1931.⁵⁰ He was invited to lecture at the University of Chicago in 1927 and had expected to take the trip but was finally detained by illness.

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Only the main currents of Wobbermin's thought can be sketched at the present time. Three interests may be cited: the historical, the personalistic, and the methodological, all falling within the larger field of theology. The historical interest is developed in the early studies which he made of primitive Christianity and its documents and in more recent writings on Luther, Schleiermacher, and Ritschl. This interest is in no sense to be confused with a one-sided historicism. His ontological interest takes the form of personalism.⁵¹ This view is seen in the attack on materialism. The essentially monistic character of Wobbermin's personalism is seen in his opposition to James's pluralism. The third interest, that in the problem of methodology as related to systematic theology, is the one in which he feels the particular influence of James. It was with the purpose of developing German interest in the psychological method as applied to theology that Wobbermin translated James's Varieties of Religious Experience.⁵²

It will be the problem of this dissertation to attempt to determine the extent of the influence of James upon Wobbermin's thought and to examine Wobbermin's criticisms of James's epistemology and metaphysics.

The writer wishes to express her gratitude to Professor and Mrs. Wobbermin for their hospitality and for their helpful interest in the writing of this dissertation. Professor Wobbermin has given generously of his time to the reading of

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Kohnstamm has given generously of his time to the writing of

the preliminary manuscript and has suggested certain corrections and improvements. The dissertation owes much to his encouragement.

CHAPTER I

JAMES'S INSIGHT AND REVELATIONS IN PSYCHOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

The preliminary research and the subsequent work in this
field are as follows. The literature on this
subject is as follows.

William James contributed to the development of psychology as a science and as a philosophy of mind. He was a pioneer in the study of the mind and its relation to the body. He was also a pioneer in the study of the mind and its relation to the body. He was also a pioneer in the study of the mind and its relation to the body.

CHAPTER I

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IN PSYCHOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

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CHAPTER I

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William James approached philosophy with a fresh and unique point of view, but at the same time with a good knowledge of modern philosophical history. He had read widely in the years before he took up regular teaching and continued his study both of the literature of the recent past and of current writings, which he reviewed with keen insight. In the spring of 1867, very shortly after his arrival in Germany, he reported some reading in Hegel's Aesthetik¹ and the following year he began Kant's first Kritik.² He was doubtless led to the study of Kant by Charles Renouvier whom he mentions in the same letter.³ In 1896 he gave his first course on Kant at Harvard, and he reports it as giving him much satisfaction.⁴ James felt, however, that

it was English and Scotch writers, and not Kant, who introduced 'the critical method' into philosophy, the one method fitted to make philosophy a study worthy of serious men.⁵

These thinkers were Hume, the two Mills, Bain, and Shadworth Hodgson.

James was generous in recognizing his indebtedness to other thinkers and apt to underestimate the originality of his own conclusions. But he was an ardent exponent of his views against all misinterpretation. He felt that pragmatism was misrepresented by practically all its critics, and he tirelessly repeated and revised his statements of the position,

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while not giving up in the least his conviction of the correctness of his account of truth.

We now turn to a consideration of the specific contributions of James through his writing and teaching.

A. SPECIFIC CONTRIBUTIONS

William James had varied interests and contributed to several fields of thought. We shall not attempt in this dissertation to consider all his writings but rather try to survey only those which bear directly upon the problem of psychology and philosophy of religion. Even this means a wide selection since religion was a central problem for James.

1. Psychology

Psychology was James's first systematic study. In 1867 he wrote from Berlin,

It seems to me that perhaps the time has come for psychology to begin to be a science -- some measurements have already been made in the region lying between the physical changes in the nerves and the appearance of consciousness-at (in the shape of sense perceptions), and more may come of it. I am going on to study what is already known, and perhaps may be able to do some work at it. Helmholtz and a man named Wundt at Heidelberg are working at it, and I hope I live through this winter to go to them in the summer.⁶

James went to Heidelberg in the spring but was unable to remain on account of his health. His interest in the subject continued, however.

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James began teaching at Harvard in 1872 in the Department of Physiology, and physiological psychology soon became his major interest although his first course in that subject was not given until 1876. About this time (James is indefinite as to the date⁷ and Boring says 1875⁸), James informally 'founded' the first psychological laboratory in the world, antedating even Wundt's (1879).⁹ G. Stanley Hall formally 'founded' his laboratory at Clark University in 1883.¹⁰ James was never a laboratory man, and neither health nor inclination led him to spend much time in experimental work. In 1892 Münsterberg came to take charge of this work at Harvard, James having raised the money for a permanent laboratory in Dana Hall.¹¹

In 1878 James began definite work on a psychology text which he expected to complete in two years. Due to ill health and to the slow process of gathering material in so new a science and conscientiously verifying every hypothesis, the Principles of Psychology was not finished until 1890. The Briefer Course was published in 1891. With the final accomplishment of this task, James gladly left the psychological field for philosophy. In writing to Dickinson Miller twenty years later, he said,

I'm sorry you stick so much to my psychological phase, which I care little for, now, and never cared much. This epistemological and metaphysical phase seems to me more original and important.¹²

He had attempted to treat psychology as a "strictly positivistic" science rather than as a metaphysics,¹³ but

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he was forced later to admit that his hopes of 1867 for a true science in the near future were ill-founded.¹⁴ James was rather generally criticized in his own day for this empirical tendency and at the present time the opposite criticism is raised by many. James's great influence upon psychology is accounted for by Boring on three grounds: his winning personality, his opposition to elementarism, and his substitution of the functional point of view.¹⁵ Consciousness he regarded as having four essential characteristics: it is personal, continuous, changing, and free.¹⁶ In commenting on James's essay, "Remarks on Spencer's Definition of Mind as Correspondence" (1878), Perry says,

The central idea of this essay is the teleological character of mind. This idea may be said to be the germinal idea of James's psychology, epistemology, and philosophy of religion.¹⁷

This teleological emphasis is to be found in the description of the self as a "fighter for ends" which appears in the Principles of Psychology¹⁸ and also in the criterion of mental action which James sets up in the same volume. This criterion is that

No actions but such as are done for an end, and show a choice of means, can be called indubitable expressions of Mind.¹⁹

While such a criterion, if applied rigorously, would too greatly limit the scope of psychology, it is suggestive as one method of approaching the distinctively voluntary aspects of consciousness. The concept of activity also played an important part in James's view of the self. In this he was in line with Leibniz, Kant, and Lotze.

he was forced later to admit that his hopes of 1884 for a
true science in the near future were ill-founded.¹² James

was rather generally criticized in his own day for this
empirical tendency and at the present time the opposite cri-
ticism is raised by many. James's great influence upon psy-
chology is accounted for by looking on these grounds: his min-
ing personality, his opposition to idealism, and his sub-
stitution of the functional point of view.¹³ Conscientiousness
he regarded as having four essential characteristics: it is
personal, conditional, changing, and free.¹⁴ In commenting
on James's essay, "Hermeneutic or Speculative Definition of Mind
as Correspondence" (1890), Perry says,

The central idea of this essay is the total-
itarian character of mind. This idea may be
said to be the germinal idea of James's psy-
chology, epistemology, and philosophy of re-
ligion.¹⁵

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No actions but such as are done for an end,
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with Leibnitz, Kant, and Lotze.

2. Psychology of Religion

Except for the essays collected in The Will to Believe, James's next major work was the Gifford Lectures of 1901-02, published under the title, The Varieties of Religious Experience in 1902. This volume is primarily a descriptive study of psychology of religion, though philosophical interpretation holds some place. It is based on the conviction, later stated in the Pragmatism, that "the evidence for God lies primarily in inner personal experiences."²⁰ James defined his original purpose for the lectures in a letter written in April 1900 while he was working on the third lecture.

The problem I have set myself is a hard one: first, to defend ... 'experience' against 'philosophy' as being the real backbone of the world's religious life - I mean prayer, guidance, and all that sort of thing immediately and privately felt, as against high and noble general views of our destiny and the world's meaning; and second, to make the hearer or reader believe, what I myself invincibly do believe, that, although all the special manifestations of religion may have been absurd (I mean its creeds and theories), yet the life of it as a whole is mankind's most important function. A task well-nigh impossible, I fear, and in which I shall fail; but to attempt it is my religious act.²¹

James had hoped to make these lectures combine the psychological and the metaphysical study of religion, but the psychological material grew to such an extent that he had to omit the metaphysical for the most part.²² In the "Postscript" James suggested the pluralistic philosophy of religion which he hoped to develop in later writings.²³

The Varieties found an immediate circle of friends

and critics and has been widely influential. It has been translated into French and German, and the German translation by Wobbermin is an important indication of James's influence upon him. This volume came at a time when thought was awake to the significance of the problems with which it deals. The work of G. Stanley Hall, Starbuck, and Leuba in America, of Sabatier in France, of Höffding in Denmark, and the "return to Schleiermacher" in German thought following the death of Ritschl, all prepared the ground for the reception of this psychological study of religion. James's particular service was to present a psychological interpretation based upon experience (as opposed to much of German speculative thought prior to this time), and yet taking experience as a unity which might have relations to metaphysical as well as phenomenal realities (in opposition to the positivistic tendencies of the Hall School and Feuerbach).

The psychological study of religion is also evident in the first five essays of The Will to Believe and in the article on "The Psychology of Belief" (1889) which was later incorporated with additions into the Principles.²⁴

James regarded will and belief as "two names for one and the same PSYCHOLOGICAL phenomenon."²⁵

Yet there is little doubt that the psychological interest played only a secondary part in James's development of the practical arguments for religious belief. His aim was philosophical, and Perry notes that this side of James's thought was known abroad before his psychological work.²⁶

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Yet there is little doubt that the psychological interest played only a secondary part in James's development of the practical arguments for religious belief. His aim was philosophical, and Perry notes that this side of James's thought was known almost before his psychological work.²⁴

3. Philosophy

James's contributions to philosophy were in three fields: epistemology - represented by his pragmatism; metaphysics - pluralism or radical empiricism; and finally, philosophy of religion.

a. Pragmatism

To say just when and where the pragmatic tendency in James began would be impossible. The article on "Quelques Considérations sur la méthode subjective" which was published in the Critique Philosophique in 1878 indicates, as Perry points out, an early interest in the practical motives of belief.²⁷ There are clear evidences of it in The Will to Believe. It was given explicit form in James's lecture to the Philosophical Union of the University of California on August 26, 1898 on the subject, "Philosophical Conceptions and Practical Results." He there gave credit to Charles Peirce as the founder and christener of this type of thought and acknowledged his own indebtedness to Peirce.²⁸

Pragmatism as a criterion of truth is developed chiefly in a limited period of James's thought and in two of his books: Pragmatism (1907) and The Meaning of Truth (1909).

The position may be stated as follows:

Truth happens to an idea. It becomes true, is made true by events. Its verity is in fact an event, a process: the process namely of its verifying itself, its verifi-
cation. Its validity is the process of its
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The position may be stated as follows:

Truth happens to an idea. It becomes true, is made true by events. The verity is in fact an event, a process; the process namely of its verifying itself, its verification. Its verity is the process of its verification.²⁹

James's opposition to rationalism is evident in this

emphasis on truth as "in the making." Rationalism asserts an absolute and objective truth which is valid irrespective of our activity in attaining knowledge of it. Doubtless James went too far in his reaction against this view of a static truth, and other passages in milder tone can be found. But the point which James seems to have had as his main concern was to prove that there is no eternally ordained and unchangeable order of the universe which man may only apprehend but take no share in creating. Rather he wished to point out that the future is always in the making and that it can in many cases be shaped by the wills of individual men. For instance, the man who believes the world to be evil and acts on that supposition, finds his belief verified; but the optimist is just as truly justified in his belief.

James intended to apply Peirce's pragmatism to religion³⁰ and the moral and religious implications of the theory are evident.

b. Pluralism

Pragmatism as a theory of truth implies a pluralistic and empirical metaphysics. If the world is in the making and if individual wills share in the process, reality is not a single whole, as metaphysical monism teaches, but pluralism is much more probable. This position is defended in A Pluralistic Universe and in Some Problems of Philosophy in particular, but is implicit in all James's philosophical thought. Radical empiricism³¹ is, in one sense, a further break away from the monistic way of looking at things in that it asserts our

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only immediate source of knowledge to be the multiplicity of our own conscious experience. But it is also a return toward some sort of rational unity in that it demands that all of experience be considered and interpreted to the best of our ability. It is radical as opposed to those empiricisms which recognize only sense experience as valid and deny or ignore the significance of emotional, cognitive, and valuational experience.

c. Philosophy of Religion

In its initial statements and throughout its entire course, James's philosophy has explicit religious implications. Pragmatism and A Pluralistic Universe show the religious interest on almost every page.³²

James's particular contributions to philosophy of religion fall under the same categories as his philosophy in general, namely, the pragmatic, the empirical, and the humanistic. His philosophy of religion starts as a statement of a few great faiths and moral demands about the universe. The Will to Believe is a justification of the hypotheses upon which religious faith rests. Every interpretation of the universe is based on some initial hypotheses which cannot be demonstrated with mathematical certainty. The duty of the thinker is to act upon the most rational hypotheses which he can find in each field, revising them as often as necessary to maintain harmony with experience but not refusing credence to the highest claims of human nature unless there is direct negative evidence. In keeping with this principle, James

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presents his "Faith Ladder."³³ The principle here set forth is, in short, that those faiths which are not self-contradictory, and which are recognized as ideals which ought to be realized, should be held as true and acted upon. This may be regarded as pragmatic in the sense of Kant's primacy of the practical reason.

It is only when they forget that they are hypotheses and put on rationalistic and authoritative pretensions, that our faiths do harm.³⁴

Many critics of religious pragmatism are far more dogmatic about their hypotheses than was James.

The empirical attitude in religion meant for James not only a concern for all the elements of present religious experience but also a re-evaluation of the facts of religious tradition.³⁵ James was always a philosopher rather than a theologian in his attitude toward religion, and he had little use for those philosophies which he regarded as trying to **defend** divine attributes against which religious faith and experience rebelled. This is to be seen in his opposition to all monistic philosophy.

James used the term "humanism," which he adopted from Schiller,³⁶ as practically synonymous with personalism so far as it deals with man and his relations to the world. It is a primary concern for the human values and moral demands. Its religious implications are evident in the following quotation:

I myself read humanism theistically and pluralistically. If there be a God, he is no absolute all-experiencer, but simply the experiencer of widest actual conscious span. Read thus, humanism is for me a religion susceptible of reasoned defence ...³⁷

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tellectually. It seems to me that he is no au-
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ponent of what actual existence opens, hence
thus, humanism is for me a religious sentiment
of profoundest value.

James made another distinctive contribution to philosophy of religion in his conception of a finite God. Whatever the final verdict may be on the validity of his conclusions, his criticisms of the traditional conception of God have been very influential. Two facts in particular James found compelling him to the view that God is finite, namely, the fact of finite freedom and the problem of evil. Both are eternal problems in any philosophy of religion which asserts an omnipotent God, and James holds that both cease to be problems and may be accepted merely as facts if God is regarded as finite.³⁸

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B. GENERAL TRAITS

As a preliminary to our study of his influence on Georg Wobbermin, we shall sketch briefly the general traits of James's philosophical thought. Two aspects are of particular importance. In the first place, we find James's intense concern for the adequate consideration of empirical detail. Secondly, there is the keen interest in personality as such, shown most vividly in James's letters, but also in his psychological writings and in his humanism. Both traits, as we have seen in the preceding section, have an influence on James's religious thought, and it is our purpose now to consider them in greater detail.

The earliest development of James's philosophical thought was along definitely religious lines. His first published book in the field, The Will to Believe (1897), was made up of essays, many of which were written during the period when James was working on his psychology texts. The essay on "The Sentiment of Rationality," printed in Mind in July 1879, shows clearly the religious bearing of his thought and the same is true of the address on "Reflex Action and Theism" which was delivered in 1881. Problems of a religious and philosophical nature, growing out of the home atmosphere and his father's theological writings and difficulties, confronted James early, and his son, in editing the Letters, remarks,

The center of his interest had always been religious and philosophical.³⁹

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1. Reaction against Rationalism

Although James was glad to leave the psychological field, its influence upon his methodology is marked. This is seen in the dominance of the empirical tendency throughout his entire thought, as well as in his humanism. Doubtless his training under Agassiz and also such little work as he was able to do in the medical and psychological laboratories enhanced this tendency. His own statements show, however, that the arguments of monistic philosophy largely succeeded in stilling this empiricism until he was "liberated" by the writings of Renouvier. This liberation in 1870⁴⁰ marked the beginning of James's philosophical productivity. It offered him pluralism and freedom as initial possibilities, and with these he could approach experience empirically. He was especially attracted to this field because there were so few exponents of the experience philosophy in English speaking countries.

Freed by Renouvier from the rationalistic superstition,⁴¹ James attacked it with all the energy of his versatile mind. Hegel was, of course, the originator of the rationalistic method in the "bad" sense, and James's arguments were therefore directed to a large extent against him. Nevertheless James holds no one consistent attitude toward Hegel and it is difficult to state his view fairly. On the one hand, he could write an essay "On Some Hegelisms"⁴² ridiculing Hegel, while on the other, he could write to Royce,

My ignorant prejudice against all Hegelians, except Hegel himself, grows wusser and wusser,⁴³

1. Reaction against Rationalism

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Freud by Hegel freed from the rationalistic superstition, James attracted it with all the energy of his voice. This kind, Hegel was, of course, the originator of the rationalistic method in the "new" sense, and James's arguments were therefore directed to a large extent against him. Nevertheless James holds no one completely at arms' length toward Hegel and it is difficult to state his view fairly. On the one hand, he could write an essay "On Some Hegelianisms"⁴¹ in which the Hegel, while on the other, he could write to Royce, "My important prejudice against all Hegelianism, except Hegel himself, known to me and myself."

implying what James seems firmly to have believed, that most of Hegel's followers, with the exception of Royce, were much worse than the master himself. They were abstract and absurd in the conclusions which they drew by means of the dialectic method. Bradley, for instance, finding contradictions at every step and thus reaching the Absolute, particularly stirred James's ire. To Howison's objections to the anti-Hegelian remarks in the Principles, James replied that he did not intend to repeat them in the Briefer Course and then made the very interesting statement,

I am not as low as I seem, and some day (D.v.) may get out another and a more "metaphysical" book, which will steal all your Hegelian thunder except the dialectical method, and show me to be a true child of the gospel.⁴⁴

There are monistic elements in James's later thought which in part fulfill this prophecy.⁴⁵

James defines rationalism as

the way of thinking that methodically subordinates parts to wholes.⁴⁶

James rightly criticized Hegel for holding that the process from the whole to the parts is prior to that from the parts to the whole. The parts are immediately given while the whole, the Absolute, is never so given. Any system which tries to deduce empirical content from some one first principle, no matter how rich, is sure to be abstract and out of relation to living experience. The only valid method of attaining truth about the world in which we live and about ourselves is first to study the data of our experiences as they

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are given and then to relate them to one another and to the whole. James felt that Hegel had real empirical vision but that he passed too lightly from the concrete and particular to an abstract system which was the product of eternal reason. "There is a dialectic movement in things"⁴⁷ and they all belong together in some way. Hegel was right in thinking that

any partial view whatever of the world
tears the part out of its relations,
leaves out some truth concerning it, is
untrue of it, falsifies it. The full
truth about anything involves more than
that thing.⁴⁸

Hegel had "the vision of a really living world"⁴⁹ but his adoption of an intellectualistic logic cancelled his empirical insights.

James was not a radical analyst of experience like Perry and neo-realists in general. His starting-point was a concrete whole, namely, personal consciousness. In his psychology he substituted the conception of a "stream of consciousness" for the older analytic view of separate faculties. His concern was to urge the rights of these lesser unities against any theory which denied the validity of individual experience.

The pragmatic theory of truth was a protest against the rationalistic definition of truth in terms of deducibility from the whole. On the pragmatic theory, truth is a development of the practical consequences of ideas. My idea of a star is true if it leads me to turn my telescope in the direction of that star and to find it. Truth is further defined by James as "the expedient in the way of our thinking"⁵⁰ and as that

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which gives satisfaction. James's theory will be discussed in detail in Chapter IV of this dissertation but some preliminary suggestions may be made.

James has no one definition of what he means by pragmatism. In general he seems to mean that truth is a quality which is added to an idea in the process or at the conclusion of verification. An idea "points toward" a particular object or event. That idea becomes true if, by following the "pointing," I come to the predicted result. James's opponents reply that this is a perfectly correct account of the process by which we arrive at knowledge of the truth or falsity of our ideas, but object to his view that the process as such had anything whatever to do with the truth or falsity of the idea itself. James replies that he is simply defining the meaning of this quality of truth which some of our ideas possess and which rationalists leave as an unanalyzed abstraction.⁵¹

To the criticism that he makes truth merely that which leads to subjective satisfaction - a just criticism of James's first statement of the expediency principle if it is taken literally - James answers that what he means is "in the long run" and in connection with all the rest of our thinking.

Ideas (which themselves are but parts of our experience) become true just in so far as they help us to get into satisfactory relation with other parts of our experience.⁵²

As an account of the testing of truth this is acceptable. It is not based on momentary satisfactions but rather on the need of relating all experiences in some systematic way. It is also a recognition of the fact that our present knowledge is very

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fragmentary and hypothetical. James objects to the analysis of the truth situation into three elements, "the reality, the knowing, and the truth."⁵³ He finds only two factors, reality and knowledge. Truth, he holds, is possible only when there is a knower and actual only when known. This statement of the problem points to a subjectivism which we shall consider later.

2. Radical Empiricism

The skeleton of James's whole philosophy is to be found in his writings prior to 1900. While his thought changed somewhat in details, practically every significant tendency is expressed in The Will to Believe. The three elements which are least evident are the theory of truth as verification, the epistemological aspect of radical empiricism, and the conception of the compounding of consciousnesses.

In the preface to this volume James defines the attitude which characterizes the essays there collected as radical empiricism. He defines the words thus:

I say 'empiricism,' because it is contented to regard its most assured conclusions concerning matters of fact as hypotheses liable to modification in the course of future experience; and I say 'radical,' because it treats the doctrine of monism itself as an hypothesis, and, unlike so much of the half-way empiricism that is current under the name of positivism or agnosticism or scientific naturalism, it does not dogmatically affirm monism as something with which all experience has got to square. The difference between monism and pluralism is perhaps the most pregnant of all the differences in philosophy.⁵⁴

Radical empiricism in this form is what James later called pluralistic empiricism⁵⁵ or merely pluralism. It is his metaphysical position.

Radical empiricism, as James defined it in 1904, and later,⁵⁶ was chiefly an epistemology although James called it also a Weltanschauung.⁵⁷ It makes one very distinctive epistemological contribution. In opposition to Hume's analysis of experience into impressions, it holds that relations

are as truly matters of direct experience as are the objects related.⁵⁸ Thus it avoids the necessity of assuming an Absolute, not given in experience, to account for these relations. The rationalists claimed that the world as given was a meaningless chaos of unrelated entities and that only an Absolute could work the necessary transformation into a coherent system, and Hume remained skeptical. Radical empiricism finds conjunctions as well as disjunctions in experience.

Radical empiricism insists that conjunctions between them [sensations] are just as immediately given as disjunctions are, and that relations, whether disjunctive or conjunctive, are in their original sensible givenness just as fleeting and momentary (in Green's words), and just as 'particular,' as terms are. Later, both terms and relations get universalized by being conceptualized and named.⁵⁹

While there is real plurality in experience, it has meaning and may be ordered by finite minds. Each finite mind is a unity within itself and so capable of mediating the relations which fall within its experience. In its objective relations, it experiences other unitary and rational minds, including the mind of God who is also regarded as finite.

Radical empiricism is an attempt to take seriously just what is actually given in consciousness, no more and no less. The emphasis is to be laid particularly on the "no less," for some current views have been willing to admit much that is given by consciousness while they deliberately overlooked or denied other equally given elements. Taking the empirical attitude seriously, the plurality of things is vividly felt. Monism is the natural accompaniment of a rationalistic attitude

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which tends to subordinate problems to solutions and differences to unity. But the practical is not to be forgotten in favor of the abstract nor the individual lost in the universal as is the absolutistic tendency. Such problems as evil are keenly felt by the empiricist. James writes,

I can't bring myself, as so many men seem able to, to blink the evil out of sight, and to gloss it over. It's as real as the good, and if it is denied, good must be denied too. It must be accepted and hated, and resisted while there's breath in our bodies.⁶⁰

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3. Religious Implications of Radical

Empiricism

Let empiricism once become associated with religion, as hitherto, through some strange misunderstanding, it has been associated with irreligion, and I believe that a new era of religion as well as of philosophy will be ready to begin.⁶¹

These words in the closing chapter of A Pluralistic Universe indicate the weight which James placed upon the religious implications of his metaphysics and epistemology. Radical empiricism, as we have seen, was for James in the first place an attempt to answer those philosophies which claimed God to be omnipotent and absolute. The epistemological argument of radical empiricism has the same fundamental aim that was expressed in the preface of The Will to Believe, namely, to offer an acceptable account of experience which will avoid the pitfalls of monistic philosophy.

For James, the only way of escaping the difficulties and contradictions of monism was to regard God as finite and therefore as not responsible for everything which goes on in the universe. He held God to be

the name not of the whole of things, ...
but only of the ideal tendency in things,
believed in as a superhuman person who
calls us to cooperate in his purposes, and
who furthers ours if they are worthy.⁶²

The rationalist asks, Granting this view of God, how can it be obtained on an empirical basis? God is not an object of direct experience in the usual sense of the word, namely, sensuous. But James shows the inadequacy of so limited a

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conception of experience. Our consciousness is composed not only of sensations, but also of feelings, will, and reason. James's radical empiricism means epistemologically just this fact that our experience includes all that comes to us through any of these avenues and justifies us in testing out all conceptions which arise within it. Any consideration of the psychological history of the race shows that religious experience has been a very real and powerful factor. It is one of the data which must be incorporated into our general scheme of things. This does not mean, however, that all traditional doctrines must stand. Great revision may be necessary before religious beliefs can be fitted harmoniously with the rest of our system of beliefs.

James's revised theism regarded God as a finite being for whom the world is a real obstacle and its final destiny dependent upon the cooperation of human beings.

My 'God of things as they are,' being part of a pluralistic system, is responsible for only such of them as he knows enough and has enough power to have accomplished. ... The 'omniscient' and 'omnipotent' God of theology I regard as a disease of the philosophy shop.⁶⁵

Such a God satisfies James's moral and religious demands for the following reasons. He cannot be held responsible for evil since he does not will it and, not being omnipotent, cannot prevent it. He may be regarded, therefore, as perfectly good; and for James the ethical character of the divine being is the one attribute which must be preserved if he is to be called God.

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called God.

God's finiteness leaves room for human freedom which would be a mere illusion in an absolutistic system. And human freedom in a world as imperfect as this gives dignity and purpose to moral endeavor. Each person feels that his choices and achievements will make a difference in the outcome of the whole. The world is in the making, and James would even go so far as to claim a growing God. Many have held that only an absolutely all-powerful God is worthy of worship and have felt that religious faith could rest only in such a conception. While James recognized the value of the Absolute to "sick souls" he felt that the moral demands were too great to be solved in this way. He said that the only God worthy of worship is the finite God of pluralistic philosophy.

Thus radical empiricism demonstrates what God must be like if he exists; but there may be no God. In meeting this difficulty, James applied his pragmatic theory of verification to the data of religious experience. He said that those ideas are true which work; which bring satisfactory results in the way of relating men to their total environment; and which make significant differences in human experience when acted upon. Belief in God can be shown to have made some very significant differences. The lives of the saints are evidence of the effects of belief in an extreme form, but there are also many individuals who give more normal but equally convincing evidence of the worth of such a belief. Faith in God further helps man to relate himself better to

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the world in which he lives. It accounts, for instance, for such facts as goodness and purpose in the world. The teleological development of nature can be explained as due to the purpose of God. Evil becomes contradictory evidence only on the supposition that God is omnipotent rather than finite. Belief in God "works." Life hangs together better in the long run and is richer and more satisfying with this belief than without it. According to the pragmatic criterion, then, we have justified our "right to believe" for we have shown that such belief makes significant differences. The criticism of this criterion is reserved to Chapter IV. The point which is relevant in the present connection is that our beliefs are tested by a consideration of the data of experience taken as a whole, hence, radical empiricism.

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4. Humanism

In the conception of personality we come to one of the deepest currents in the thought of James. The emphasis on the personal is present in his psychology and metaphysics but is particularly prominent in his philosophy of religion. He treats religion as a matter of personal relations in the concrete. The Varieties is written from this point of view, and toward the end James says,

Religious thought is carried on in terms of personality, this being, in the world of religion, the one fundamental fact.⁶⁴

As against private personal religion, theologies and ecclesiastical institutions are secondary, and James feels justified in limiting his study to the former.⁶⁵ He defines religion in individualistic terms as

the feelings, acts, and experiences of individual men in their solitude, so far as they apprehend themselves to stand in relation to whatever they may consider the divine.⁶⁶

His pluralism as a philosophy of religion is an attempt to preserve the rights and values of the individual from absorption in an Absolute.

James regretted his initial use of the word "pragmatism" for he soon became convinced that Schiller's term, "humanism," was more adequate to express his primary interest in human personality.⁶⁷ Pragmatism suggested simply the practical, whereas he wished to emphasize what was practical for the lives of human individuals and intended to use the term "practical" in a much broader sense than most of his critics

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would grant to him. This fact was influential in his turn to pluralism and radical empiricism in his later years as more adequate expressions of his doctrine; but indication of the attitude is to be found in the Varieties where he says,

So long as we deal with the cosmic and the general, we deal only with the symbols of reality, but as soon as we deal with private and personal phenomena as such, we deal with realities in the completest sense of the term.⁸⁸

James's revised theism is an attempt to explain the reality of God in a form compatible with the demands of the only realities we immediately know - our own individual experiences.

In looking back over this brief outline of James's thought, we see a steady movement toward the simplification and humanization of the interpretation of experience. His pragmatism opposed the abstraction of rationalism and claimed that nothing which made no difference in human life was significant. His radical empiricism and pluralism attempted to carry out completely and honestly the interpretation of what was immediately given in and implied by experience. His pragmatism reiterated the importance of human personality, implicit in all phases of his thought, and offered a more satisfactory point of departure for his philosophy of religion. His philosophy of religion presented a finite God, primus inter pares, who satisfies the moral demands of men and is their co-worker in the creation of a more ideal world order.

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C. JAMES'S INFLUENCE

It is the intent of this section to give a very brief survey of the main lines of James's influence and of the extent to which his writings have become known.

1. Influence in American and English Thought

It is not the purpose of this dissertation to attempt any treatment of James's influence in American and English thought. Yet it is impossible to pass without a word. James's personality won him friends everywhere and his sympathetic interest took him into many fields. His genius as a correspondent is to be seen by even a casual reading of his published letters, many of which are excellent philosophical material.⁶⁹

James kept in touch with the development of pragmatism under Dewey and Schiller, feeling particularly close to the thought of the latter. Shadworth Hodgson and Dickinson S. Miller were also constant stimulus to his productive thinking. His contacts with Royce led to mutual modifications of thought and his statements about the evils of absolutism always excepted Royce from the most objectionable categories. In fact, at one time James was practically convinced by the position as presented by Royce.⁷⁰

Royce, in his Phi Beta Kappa Address in 1911, listed James with Edwards and Emerson as one of the three representative philosophers of America.⁷¹ G.C. Cell, in his article in the new Ueberweg, says that James will be regarded as

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die zweifellos hervorragende Figur, wohl auch die bedeutendste Persönlichkeit in der Geschichte der amerikanischen Philosophie.⁷²

Although there is no "James School" in philosophy, his influence is to be seen in many types of thought. His psychology, with its functional view of the mind, has affiliations with both present-day self-psychology and behaviorism.⁷³ The realistic tendency in his thought is the background of Perry's more extreme neo-realism. Pluralistic personalism has profited by his critique of rationalism as well as by Bowne's. And, finally, in philosophy of religion, the view of God as limited or finite finds support, if not impetus, in the thought of James.⁷⁴

For a survey of James's writings the reader is referred to the bibliography of this dissertation and to the excellent work by R.B. Perry.⁷⁵ Special mention may, however, be made of the fact that many of James's articles were first published in the English journal, Mind. His work and point of view were recognized abroad much earlier on this account.

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2. Influence in Continental Europe

William James was exceptional among American (and perhaps among all) philosophers in the range of his international contacts and friendships. This was partly due to the fact that his poor health necessitated his visiting Europe frequently. It was also in part the result of his linguistic abilities. He could converse easily in French and German, and wrote letters and several articles in the former. He also knew some Italian but called his attempts to talk it "awful gibberish."⁷⁶ Neither the visits nor the language would, however, have been sufficient to account for the relations; they were chiefly due to his personal enthusiasm for varied theories and men and his capacity for friendship.

a. France

James's personal relations with French philosophers were closer than with those of any other country. He early made the acquaintance of François Pillon, editor with Renouvier of the Critique Philosophique, and through this connection his writings received early attention in French journals.⁷⁷ Many of his articles were translated and his books were promptly reviewed. His appreciation is shown by the dedication of the Principles of Psychology

To my dear friend, François Pillon, as a token of affection, and an acknowledgement of what I owe to the Critique Philosophique.

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often visited at the Flournoy home. They shared a common interest in psychology of religion. In 1908 James met Émile Boutroux and found him very congenial. Both Flournoy and Boutroux wrote monographs on James shortly after his death.⁷⁸

James's chief intellectual debt was to Renouvier, and later to Bergson. He corresponded with both and studied their writings carefully. He felt himself to be a disciple of Renouvier and did all in his power to make the great French philosopher better known in America and England.⁷⁹ While he did not agree with Renouvier's doctrine of freedom nor with his manner of writing, he said of him,

He was one of the greatest of philosophic characters, and but for the decisive impression made on me in the seventies by his masterly advocacy of pluralism, I might never have got free from the monistic superstition under which I had grown up.⁸⁰

In addition to the articles to which reference has already been made,⁷⁷ practically all of James's books have been translated into French. The first of these translations to appear was Causeries pédagogiques (1900), containing Part I of Talks to Teachers, translated by Pidoux with a preface by Payot. Part II of the same work came out in 1914 as Aux Étudiants by Henri Marty with the preface by Boutroux. In 1905 the Varieties was translated by F. Abauzit under the title, L'expérience religieuse, with a preface by Boutroux. Baudin and Bertier translated the Psychology: Briefer Course - (Précis de Psychologie, 1910). The Principles has, so far as the present writer knows, never been translated, but A.

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Ménard made a very careful study of it, Analyse et critique des Principes de la Psychologie de William James (1911). The French edition of A Pluralistic Universe is by LeBrun and Paris and is called Philosophie de l'expérience (1910). Some Problems of Philosophy by Picard follows James's originally intended title, Introduction à la Philosophie (1914). Most of the essays in The Will to Believe appeared early in the Critique Philosophique and the volume as a whole was not printed until 1916 (La Volonté de Croire by Loys Moulin). Henri Bergson has written prefaces to two translations: William James: Extraits de la Correspondance (French by Floris Delattre and Maurice LeBreton, 1924) and Le Pragmatisme (by LeBrun, 1925). Some of James's writings on psychical research have been collected and translated by E. Durandean in Études et Réflexions d'un Psychiste (1924). L'Idée de Vérité by Mme. L. Veil and Maxime David (1913) is the translation of The Meaning of Truth. The only significant omission from the French list is the Essays in Radical Empiricism. The most recent addition to the French literature on James is the James-Renouvier correspondence, edited by Perry and appearing in the Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale (1929).

b. Italy

James became interested in the pragmatic movement developing in Italy early in the present century under the leadership of Papini and a group of young thinkers, who published a philosophical journal called Leonardo. In 1905, after an attack of influenza, James took a trip to Athens and went to Italy on his return journey to meet this group. He was persuaded to give an address at the Congress of Philosophy meeting there at the time and spoke in French on "La notion de conscience." James expected great things from this Italian movement, but his hope for permanent values from their work seems to have been misplaced.

The Italian philosophers found much inspiration in James's pragmatism. Many articles were written on it and some of his books were translated. Only a fragmentary list can be given here. The Principles of Psychology was translated by G.C. Ferrari and A. Tamburini (1900-01). Ferrari also translated Talks to Teachers and cooperated with M. Calderoni in the Italian edition of the Varieties (1904). Pragmatism was translated by Papini in 1911.

Several of James's works have been translated into Spanish, Russian, and Japanese. The Ingersoll Lecture on Human Immortality appears in Swedish and Icelandic and the Talks to Teachers in Norwegian. The Varieties appears in six languages, including the Danish edition by Höffding. This indicates the widespread interest in the thought of James.

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it were soon to have been disappointed.

The Italian philosophers found some inspiration in
James's program. Many articles were written on it and
some of his books were translated. Only a fragmentary list
can be given here. The Principles of Psychology was trans-
lated by G. C. Ferraro and A. Tassinari (1900-01). Ferraro
also translated Talks to Teachers and cooperated with A. Gal-
dini in the Italian edition of the Varieties (1904). Prin-
ciples was translated by Pettini in 1911.

Several of James's works have been translated into
Spanish, Russian, and Japanese. The Principles led to an
Italian translation by A. Tassinari and J. Tassinari and the
Talks to Teachers to Tassinari. The Varieties appears in its
original, including the Italian edition by Pettini. This in-
cludes the widespread interest in the thought of James.

c. Germany

James's personal relations with Germany were much less intimate than with France or Italy. Although he spent much time in Germany during his early years, he seems never to have come in close contact with the most significant philosophers of his time. He met Wundt and admired him greatly, but Wundt was far from understanding him. Stumpf was cordial and James corresponded with him, but this was an exception if the published Letters are to be taken as an indication.⁸¹ Simmel and Troeltsch were appreciative of the work of James and the latter wrote,

Das philosophische Werk William James', das mit manchen Traditionen der angelsächsischen Philosophie enge zusammenhängt, hat schon zu seinen Lebzeiten auf den europäischen Kontinent einen starken, man kann fast sagen, einen aufregenden Eindruck gemacht."⁸²

Troeltsch regarded James's philosophy of religion as the first thoroughly American contribution.⁸³ Even Wundt spoke in special praise of this aspect of James's thought, saying,

Wenn man aber den Massstab neuer originaler Gedanken an ihn anlegt, so wird ihn auch der nachsichtigste Beurteiler den Religionsphilosophen, die uns das Jahrhundert nach Kant in Schleiermacher, Hegel und selbst in Schelling geschenkt hat, nicht entfernt an die Seite stellen können.⁸⁴

Wobbermin points out that Heinrich Meier combines Wundt and James in his treatment of the Psychologie des emotionalen Denkens.⁸⁵ Jerusalem, the Austrian translator of the Pragmatism,

took an active interest in James, with whose point of view in epistemology and philosophy he found much in common.⁸⁶ Jacoby, Oesterreich, and Müller-Freienfels have also referred favorably to James, and Jacoby has written several articles on him.

Following James's death, several appreciative articles and monographs on him were written. Karl Busch emphasized the personal side of James particularly in a short article in the Zeitschrift für Religionspsychologie.⁸⁷ His longer study of James's philosophy of religion⁸⁸ is particularly important because of his close association with James. Boutroux's book on James was translated into German in 1912,⁸⁹ and the translation of Flournoy's on the same subject in 1930⁹⁰ is evidence of the continued interest in James.

James's contribution to psychology was immediately accepted and esteemed. But his pragmatism was very generally rejected or ignored. His psychology and philosophy of religion was underestimated because of its affiliations with a pragmatic and pluralistic philosophy. Nevertheless his influence is to be felt, along with that of Leuba, Starbuck, and Coe, in the awakening interest in psychology of religion in Germany in the years following 1907. Wobbermin's translation added greatly to the accessibility of the Varieties and Busch suggests that this aspect of James's thought was even more discussed in Germany than in America.⁹¹ James's name is mentioned in practically every book on psychology or philosophy of religion and the importance of his pioneer work is felt.

Wobbermin suggests⁹² that James has had an indirect influence on the new understanding of Schleiermacher. The method of studying religious experience, set forth in the Varieties, is essentially the same as that proposed by Schleiermacher, but it is more fully developed and better grounded scientifically. The study of James, especially in the light of Wobbermin's interpretation of his relation to Schleiermacher, has influenced a group of younger writers to new research and appreciation of the psychological phase of Schleiermacher's thought. Among these younger men may be mentioned Hofmann, Kessler, Knevels, Wehrung, and Winkler.

James's books were widely reviewed in German periodicals and most of them have appeared in German translations. The Will to Believe (first five essays) appeared in 1899, translated by Lorenz and with a preface by Friedrich Paulsen,⁹³ Lorenz's original intention was to translate only the first three essays but James persuaded him to add the other two for the sake of better balance of thought. The German edition of Talks to Teachers (Psychologie und Erziehung, 1900), was the work of v. Kiesow. The first edition of Wobbermin's translation of The Varieties of Religious Experience was published in 1907, and in 1908 Jerusalem's translation of the Pragmatism appeared. The translation of the shorter Psychology is the work of M. and E. Dürr (1909). Julius Goldstein translated the Pluralistic Universe which was published in 1914 although Goldstein had talked the matter over with James in 1910,

at which time James had suggested cutting certain sections which referred rather definitely to English or American problems.⁹⁴ The Ingersoll Lecture on Human Immortality was translated in 1926 by E. von Astor-Giessen.

James's books are accessible in German libraries, both in translations and in the original, and the evidence from many sources seems to indicate that he is better known than any other American philosopher.

at which time James had suggested cutting certain sections which
had been rather difficult to follow in American problems.
The important features on James' personality was translated in
1930 by E. von Kries-Gessen.
James' books are accessible in German libraries, both
in translations and in the original, and the evidence from many
sources seems to indicate that he is better known than any other
American philosopher.

Alfred Dreyfus, who had been in the French army in 1895 at the age of twenty-two, was a young man of high ability and high character. He was a Jew, and his religion was a source of prejudice against him. He was a brilliant officer, and his services to France were many. He was a man of high moral character, and his conduct was above reproach. He was a man of high intelligence, and his mind was of a high order. He was a man of high courage, and his spirit was of a high order. He was a man of high loyalty, and his heart was of a high order. He was a man of high honor, and his name was of a high order. He was a man of high respect, and his position was of a high order. He was a man of high esteem, and his reputation was of a high order. He was a man of high admiration, and his fame was of a high order. He was a man of high reverence, and his memory was of a high order. He was a man of high veneration, and his name was of a high order. He was a man of high honor, and his name was of a high order. He was a man of high respect, and his position was of a high order. He was a man of high esteem, and his reputation was of a high order. He was a man of high admiration, and his fame was of a high order. He was a man of high reverence, and his memory was of a high order. He was a man of high veneration, and his name was of a high order.

CHAPTER II

WOBBERMIN AS A GERMAN INTERPRETER OF JAMES

Wobbermin, although he had no formal education, was a man of high ability and high character. He was a Jew, and his religion was a source of prejudice against him. He was a brilliant officer, and his services to France were many. He was a man of high moral character, and his conduct was above reproach. He was a man of high intelligence, and his mind was of a high order. He was a man of high courage, and his spirit was of a high order. He was a man of high loyalty, and his heart was of a high order. He was a man of high honor, and his name was of a high order. He was a man of high respect, and his position was of a high order. He was a man of high esteem, and his reputation was of a high order. He was a man of high admiration, and his fame was of a high order. He was a man of high reverence, and his memory was of a high order. He was a man of high veneration, and his name was of a high order.

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CHAPTER II

THEORY OF THE EARTH AND ITS HISTORY

Albrecht Ritschl, who had been the dominant figure in German theology for the previous twenty years, died in 1889 while Wobbermin was a student at Halle. A definite turn of thought back to Schleiermacher was immediately evident. This movement included both followers and opponents of Ritschl as well as many of the younger theologians.¹ One result was a growing interest in the problems of psychology of religion. Schleiermacher had made religious experience the basis of theology, although he had not carried the principle far enough. His treatment left two defects which influenced his German followers in this period. These defects are defined as follows:

Sie liegen einerseits in der ungenügenden Berücksichtigung der Geschichte des religiösen Lebens, zumal der niederen Religionsformen. Und andererseits beruhen sie auf der vorschnellen Einmischung spekulativ-dialektischer Philosopheme.²

That is, Schleiermacher was neither empirical enough, nor philosophical enough in the best sense, but rather reached hasty and somewhat dogmatic conclusions in both fields. Nevertheless his thought offered fruitful suggestions.

Georg Runze is among the earliest representatives of this new movement in German thought. In 1877, twelve years before the death of Ritschl, he wrote a book on Schleiermachers Glaubenslehre,³ and in 1894 published Die Psychologie des Unsterblichkeitsglaubens und der Unsterblichkeitsleugnung as the

second volume of his Studien zur vergleichenden Religionswissenschaft.⁴ Evidence of his continued interest in the psychological approach is to be found in his editorial work for the Zeitschrift für Religionspsychologie.⁵ In Max Reischle the psychological tendency is even more noticeable. His book on Die Frage nach dem Wesen der Religion (1889), while still under the influence of Ritschl, has a distinct interest in psychological methodology.⁶ Wobbermin's first contribution to this general trend is his dissertation on Die innere Erfahrung als Grundlage eines moralischen Beweises für das Dasein Gottes (1894). The content of this work will be discussed later in the present chapter. Gustav Vorbrodt wrote several books and took an active interest in the development of psychology of religion.⁷

In America a contemporaneous but independent trend in the same direction was to be found. James, as we have seen, had published several articles before 1890 which had a distinct bearing on psychology of religion.⁸ G. Stanley Hall's school was also active in the development of psychology of religion. In this connection we need only to mention the names of Burnham, Leuba, Starbuck, Irving King, Stratton, and Ames.⁹ Leuba is most characteristic of the empirical Hall tradition but Starbuck had more influence in Germany at this time, largely due to Vorbrodt's interest in him and his method. The Gesellschaft für Religionspsychologie, founded in Nuremberg in September 1910, was particularly influenced by his statistical methodology.¹⁰

second volume of his Wissenschaft der Religionspsychologie (1909).
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psychological approach is to be found in his editorial work
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für das religiöse Bewusstsein (1904). The content of this work will
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of Borden, Leuba, Starbuck, Irving, Ellis, Stratton, and others.
Leuba is most characteristic of the English Hall tradition
but Starbuck had more influence in Germany at this time, largely
by due to Vorländer's interest in him and his method. The
Gesellschaft für Religionspsychologie, founded in Münster in
September 1910, was particularly influenced by his psychological
methodology. 10

In Germany the chief representatives of the new movement were theologians while in America they were psychologists and educators.¹¹ But neither in Germany nor in America did the movement take a unified form. Wobbermin was particularly conscious of the disparities which he clearly formulated and attempted to overcome. We shall turn now to a study of his contributions to the problem, with special reference to his relation to James.

in Germany the chief representatives of the new move-
ment were the Socialists while in America they were the
Socialists. But neither in Germany nor in America did the
movement have a unified form. Woburn was particularly con-
scious of the difficulties which he clearly formulated and at-
tempted to overcome. He said that now is a season of his con-
tributions to the problem, with special reference to his rela-
tion to the Socialists.

A. THE DEVELOPMENT OF WOBBERMIN'S THOUGHT

Wobbermin's Ph.D. dissertation at Berlin in 1894 was on Die innere Erfahrung als Grundlage eines moralischen Beweises für das Dasein Gottes. While Wobbermin at the present time lays little weight on this early statement,¹² it is particularly significant for our study because of its relation to his knowledge of James. He had read James's Principles of Psychology in 1893 and quoted it on "the psychologist's fallacy par excellence" in his dissertation.¹³ His general thought about the nature of the self and his attitude toward psychological methodology bear strong resemblance to James's position.¹⁴ On the other hand, the dissertation was prior to the Will to Believe and the Varieties of Religious Experience. It shows an original methodological concern with the problems of theology which cannot be attributed especially to James. The influence of Schleiermacher is evident in Wobbermin's treatment of inner experience as the starting point for theology,¹⁵ and the general empirical position is characteristic of Wobbermin's whole thinking.

Wobbermin remained in Berlin as licentiate in theology for a year after receiving his doctorate, and then took a Mediterranean trip. The interlude of research in Asia Minor, however, seems to have had little direct bearing on the rest of Wobbermin's thought. He collected and published in 1898 a series of liturgical prayers found in the Cloister of Athos, Altchristliche liturgische Stücke aus der Kirche Aegyptens,

WILHELM WOBBERMAN'S THOUGHT

Wobberman's Ph.D. dissertation at Berlin in 1905 was

on the theme: Die Entwicklung des Willens als psychologische Funktion

It has been noted that Wobberman at the present time

lays little weight on this early statement, as it is rather

ly significant for our study because of the relation to his

analyses of James. He had read James's Principles of Psychology

only in 1900 and quoted it as "the psychological's last word on

excellence" in his dissertation.¹⁰ His general thought about

the nature of the will and his attitude towards psychological

autonomy bear strong resemblance to James's position.¹¹ On

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for a year after receiving his doctorate, and then took a post-

graduate trip. The interlude of research in Asia minor, how-

ever, seems to have had little direct bearing on the rest of

Wobberman's thought. He collected and published in 1906 a

series of historical papers found in the Glossar of Signs,

Alphabetische literarische Studien aus dem Mittelalter.

which the Theologische Literaturzeitung pronounced

repräsentieren einen Fund von ungewöhnlicher Bedeutung für die Geschichte des Gottesdienstes.¹⁶

This was translated into English by Bishop John Wordsworth.¹⁷ Both this work and the earlier (1896) Religionsgeschichtliche Studien zur Frage der Beeinflussung des Urchristentums durch das antike Mysterienwesen deal with special fields in which the influence of James has no place, and they will therefore be omitted from further study.

Wobbermin's next systematic work was his Theologie und Metaphysik which appeared in 1901 (the year in which James delivered the first of the Gifford Lectures). It bears the subtitle, "Das Verhältnis der Theologie zur modernen Erkenntnistheorie und Psychologie" and is a critical study of various current types of thought. Wobbermin examines first the anti-metaphysical position in theology, the characteristic representative of which is Ritschl. He rejects Ritschl's assertion that theology must be independent of metaphysics, but shows that Ritschl himself was not opposed to all metaphysics but only to the speculative type represented by Schelling and Hegel.¹⁸ Wobbermin next considers the theory of "Empiriocriticism" which is defended in Avenarius's book, Die Kritik der reinen Erfahrung, and shows its materialistic tendency to be untenable. He concludes with a treatment of the concepts of personality and causality (the latter with special reference to the problem of freedom), which are of fundamental importance to theology. In this book reference is made to James's

From the Psychological Laboratory at Harvard

Psychological Laboratory, Harvard University
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138

This was submitted into mailing by a shop John Thompson.
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Principles of Psychology and to his The Will to Believe. The arguments of the latter are cited in defense of Wobbermin's doctrine of freedom.¹⁹

In 1902 Wobbermin published the little book on Der christliche Gottesglaube in seinem Verhältnis zur gegenwärtigen Philosophie, a series of lectures delivered at the vacation course of the Brandenburg Conference for the Church and Theology.²⁰ Here James is spoken of as one of the chief representatives of voluntarism,²¹ and the Varieties, published in June of the same year, is mentioned in the note on James.²² A new and extensively revised edition of the same book appeared in 1907 and in it several quotations from James's Varieties are given. There is, however, no special treatment of James himself other than the brief references that were in the first edition. Yet Wobbermin regarded the general position given here as the exposition of his relation to James's metaphysics.²³ It may be noted that this book has been translated into English and Japanese.²⁴

Wobbermin's German translation of James's Varieties of Religious Experience was published in 1907. He had originally intended to write a comprehensive introduction showing the relation of psychology of religion to the general problems of theology, but he came to the conclusion that he could not do justice to the subject without destroying the unity of James's work and further delaying its appearance in German. His remarks in the preface to the first German edition state his reasons.

Principles of Psychology and to his The Will to Believe. The

arguments of the latter are often in relation to Woburn's

book of Liberty.

In 1905 Woburn published the Little Book on Liberty

which is a translation of his Principles of Psychology and

the Principles of Psychology, a series of lectures delivered at the

University of the City of New York for a year or two

ago. These lectures are one of the most

important of his works, and the Principles of Psychology

has been widely read and is one of the most

valuable of his works. It is a translation of his

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Meine ursprüngliche Absicht, meiner Übersetzung des amerikanischen Philosophen James eine Einleitung vorzuschicken, um in ihr über den Wert der religionspsychologischen Arbeit im allgemeinen zu handeln und zu den wichtigsten Problemen derselben meinerseits Stellung zu nehmen, habe ich aufgegeben, und zwar aus doppeltem Grunde. Zunächst wollte ich das Erscheinen der Übersetzung nicht noch weiter verzögern, nachdem persönliche und berufliche Umstände schon eine beträchtliche Verspätung verursacht hatten. Hinzu kam aber ausserdem die Überlegung, dass die Ausführung meiner Absicht den Rahmen einer Einleitung notwendig überschreiten müsste, wenn sie einigermaßen erschöpfend sein sollte, und dass sie dann also den einheitlichen Charakter des Buches sprengen würde. Ich lasse daher die Übersetzung als solche ausgehen und werde jene meine Absicht in anderer Form nachholen.²⁵

The three-volume Systematische Theologie is Wobbermin's fulfilment of this original intention.²⁶

The translation received prompt attention and appreciation on most points, though the translator was rather generally criticized for the arbitrary omission of James's "Postscript," which suggested his philosophy of religion. A second, slightly altered, edition appeared in 1914, but the controversial "Postscript" was still omitted.²⁷ In the preface to this edition, Wobbermin gives a very generous appreciation of James whom he met in Cambridge in the fall of 1907. His words are well worth quoting.

Als ein eben so selbständiger wie für die höchste Schicht des amerikanischen Kulturlebens repräsentativer Denker erwies sich James fast in jedem Wort, das er sprach. Und als den Grundzug seines Wesens offenbarte er dabei jenen idealistischen Optimismus, den er uns in seinem "Willen zum Glauben" so eindringlich empfohlen hat.

Zwei Momente waren für seine gesamte Weltanschauung die eigentlich entscheidenden. Eine tief innerliche Religiosität, eine Religiosität, die sich auf die religiöse "Erfahrung" gründet und die daher von aller Kritik theologischer Lehrbildungen und kirchlicher Institutionen unabhängig ist. Und daneben die an Carlyle gemahnende Bewertung des entschlossenen, allein durch schöpferische Tätigkeit siegenden Geistes. Auf diese beiden Pfeiler gründete sich ihm die Überzeugung, dass der Mensch sich bei aller Unterordnung unter die Gottheit als Mitarbeiter derselben empfinden und betätigen müsse, da sein letztes Ziel über das ganze Getriebe des endlichen Seins hinausliege.²⁸

Wobbermin mentioned with approval Royce's estimate of James in the Phi Beta Kappa Address²⁹ and always set James high among American thinkers.

Very shortly after the appearance of the first German edition of the Varieties, whose avowed purpose was to arouse interest in psychology of religion,³⁰ the Zeitschrift für Religionspsychologie was founded (Halle, 1908) with Wobbermin as a contributing editor.³¹ In 1914 the Archiv für Religionspsychologie was founded by K. Koffka and W. Stählin as the organ of the "Gesellschaft für Religionspsychologie."³² In addition to these two journals, there was a flood of general literature in the field by such authors as Troeltsch, Kaftan, Bornhausen, Vorbrodt, Pfennigsdorf, Traub, Scholz, Mayer, and many others.³³ Just how much of this lively interest in the problem of psychology of religion was due to the influence of Wobbermin and James it is impossible to say. But it is to Wobbermin's particular credit that he kept more clearly in mind than most of his contemporaries the distinctively

religious aspect of the problem.³⁴

The stir in theological circles, caused by the writings of Haeckel, centered in the period from 1905 to the beginning of the World War. Wobbermin was keenly interested in this problem and wrote several articles, later collected in his Monismus und Monotheismus. He joined the Keplerbund, an organization founded "in the service of truth and in the belief that science is in harmony with philosophy and religion,"³⁵ and active in the fight against Haeckel's materialism and atheistic monism.

In 1913 Wobbermin completed the first volume of his work on systematic theology, Die religionspsychologische Methode in Religionswissenschaft und Theologie. In this book his interest in James is very definite. While Schleiermacher is clearly in mind, he does not receive exceptional attention. The historical movement of theology toward Wobbermin's position is given with justice and poise. In the same year Wobbermin brought together and republished a series of his articles on psychology of religion, Zum Streit um die Religionspsychologie, which he dedicated to the memory of James.

The War was a check to the completion of the three-volume Systematische Theologie, and the second volume did not appear until 1921. In the preface to this volume Wobbermin explicitly announced his major intent as a "return to Schleiermacher,"³⁶ a position only hinted at in the first volume.³⁷ James is still mentioned frequently but in most cases only as carrying out to its logical conclusion the Schleiermacher position. In the third volume (1925) the name of James appears but once and that in an insignificant place.³⁸ Furthermore

the title of the first volume was changed in the second edition (1925) to read: Einleitung in die systematische Theologie: Prinzipien- und Methoden-Lehre im Hinblick auf ihre Geschichte seit Schleiermacher. The same trend toward Schleiermacher is evident in the minor writings of Wobbermin over the same period. He holds, however, that his attitude toward James has not changed and that the influence of James is implicit in his later work, but that explicit use of James material would be irrelevant.³⁹

Wobbermin writes a great many book reviews, particularly in the field of psychology of religion, and has been called upon to write articles on psychology of religion for several sourcebooks.⁴⁰ His recent writings on historical problems and their relation to the present theological situation fall outside the problem of this dissertation and will largely be omitted from our discussion.⁴¹

The title of the first volume was changed in the second edition
(1902) to read: Religion in its Psychological Development. This
title - and especially the subtitle - was chosen for the first
volume. The same first word 'Development' is not
found in the minor writings of Wundt over the same period.
He holds, however, that his attitude toward James has not
changed and that the influence of James is largest in his
later work, but that explicit use of James material would be
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larly in the field of psychology of religion, and has been
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tion tell outside the problem of this discussion and will
largely be omitted from our discussion.²²

B. COMPARISON OF THE THOUGHT OF JAMES AND WOBBERMIN

Wobbermin's interest in James had two chief sources: his own primary concern for the problem of religion, which he felt that James shared; and his conviction that the combined methodology of James and Schleiermacher was the key to a more adequate science of religion. James and Wobbermin have several other points in common and are also far apart on some issues. These points of agreement and difference we shall now consider.

1. Methodology

William James and Georg Wobbermin began their philosophical thinking along very similar lines. James's first work was in the field of scientific psychology. His psychological researches gave him a firm basis for the continued study of the nature of human selves in all their relations. The religious interest, as we have already indicated, was also of deep and lasting importance to him. Even before the lengthy task of writing the Principles was completed, James printed some essays that show the weight he attached to religion in his philosophy. His religious thought, however, did not run in traditional grooves, but found a new empirical basis in the demands of human nature for an adequate explanation of its moral and religious experiences. He recognized the often ignored fact that all our knowledge is based on certain initial acts of faith and used this as an argument for

COMPARISON OF THE THOUGHT OF JAMES AND ROBERTSON

Robertson's interest in James was two-fold: first, his own personal concern for the problem of religion, which he felt that James shared; and his conviction that the combined methodological of James and Robertson was the key to a more adequate science of religion. James and Robertson have several other points in common and are also far apart on some issues. These points of agreement and difference we shall now consider.

1. Methodology

William James and George Robertson began their philosophical thinking along very similar lines. James's first work was in the field of scientific psychology. His psychological researches gave him a first-hand knowledge of the continued study of the nature of human beings in all their relations. The religious interest, as we have already indicated, was as so of deep and lasting importance to him. Even before the lengthy task of writing The Principles of Psychology, James stated some beliefs that show the weight he attached to religion in his philosophy. The religious thought, however, did not run in traditional grooves, but found a new expression in the demands of human nature for an adequate religious life of the moral and religious experience. He recognized the often ignored fact that all our knowledge is based on certain initial acts of faith and used this as an argument for

the "right to believe" in religious propositions which are found to be most satisfying to our moral natures.⁴² The method thus developed is a combination of the psychological gathering of data and the ethical evaluation of those data as indications of the total world view which religion claims to give.

Wobbermin's point of departure is a self-psychology similar to that of James. In his dissertation on Die innere Erfahrung he starts with a detailed and empirical study of what is immediately given in self-consciousness. His conclusion from this examination of experience is

dass der feste aber einzige Punkt, auf den wir dabei zurück- und von dem wir ausgehen müssen, unser Selbstbewusstsein ist.⁴³

Our experience of the external world at first seems to belong in a special objective category, but thoughtful analysis shows that all we know and can assert about this world is what is within our own self-conscious experience.⁴⁴ Self only is immediately given and

in gewissem Sinne alle unsere Erfahrung eine innere ist ...⁴⁵

This may be paralleled by James's statement that

the only form of thing that we directly encounter, the only experience that we concretely have, is our own personal life.⁴⁶

Neither thinker means to assert that the external world is illusory but only to deny that it is immediately given.

Wobbermin's ultimate concern is to discover what the evidence given in immediate self-consciousness means for re-

the right to believe in religious propositions with the
same to be most satisfactory to our moral nature. The
method thus developed is a combination of the psychological
analysis of ideas and the ethical evaluation of these data
as indications of the total world view which religious claims
do give.

Woburn's point of departure is a self-psychology
aimed to give of James. In his investigation on the subject
of religion, he starts with a detailed and explicit study of
the religious life given in self-consciousness. His conclu-
sion from this examination of experience is

From the fact that the religious world, and the
religious life, are not only self-conscious but also
self-aware, and that the religious life is not only
self-aware but also self-conscious.

Our experience of the external world at first seems to belong
in a special objective category, and the religious analysis shows
that all we know and can know about the world is what is
within our own self-consciousness. The religious world is the
self-aware and self-conscious experience.

In James's theory of the religious life, the religious
life is not only self-conscious but also self-aware.

This may be regarded as James's statement that
the only form of knowledge that we possess
is the self-aware, the only experience that we
possess is the self-aware, the only experience that we
possess is the self-aware.

James's theory seems to assert that the external world is a
theory and only to say that it is immediately given.
Woburn's religious analysis is to discover what the
evidence given in James's self-consciousness means for re-

ligion. But this problem can receive no answer until the preliminary methodological question is answered. The first step in this direction is the establishment of a justifiable psychological method which is valid in all fields and not a case of special pleading for religion. Wobbermin discusses the psychological methods of introspection and objective observation, showing the advantages and limitations of each.

Introspection is, of course, conditioned by the fact that it must be based on memory. A conscious process can seldom, if ever, be described while it is going on. But in introspection which follows immediately or reasonably soon after the process under consideration there is no great danger of inaccurate memory. It is, to be sure, possible to add much to our knowledge of the mind by objective observation, but this would have very little significance if it were not for the initial fact of our own conscious experience which is the presupposition of all objective study and which necessarily interprets the data of that study by analogy with its own conscious experiences, past or present. Introspection is the only method of studying the mind as it really is. Other methods necessarily substitute something else as an intermediary, and to attempt to impose these methods on psychology because they are generally accepted by the natural sciences is to do violence to the true nature of mind.⁴⁷ Wobbermin's treatment has much in common with James's in the chapter on method in the Principles,⁴⁸ though James lays more emphasis on the dangers and fallacies of the method of introspection.

light. For this problem and need we must know until the
... method is not a method. The first step
in this direction is the establishment of a justifiable
... method which is valid in all cases and not a case
of special pleading for religion. ...
... methods at the beginning and objective observation,
... the advantages and disadvantages of each.
Intuition is, of course, mentioned by the fact
that it is a method. A complete process of
... is not a method. It is a method. It is a method.
... which follows immediately or reasonably soon after
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of studying the mind as it really is. When methods necessarily
... something else as an intermediary, and so attempt
to imitate these methods as they are generally
if accepted by the natural sciences is to do violence to the
true nature of mind. ...
... in the chapter on method in the philosophy,
... have been made in the last and following
of the nature of intuition.

Having justified the method of introspective appeal to inner experience, Wobbermin takes up the implications of moral experience for religion. Moral experience is a universal aspect of human consciousness and its deliverances are to be trusted.

Dies Bewusstsein, an verpflichtende Normen gebunden zu sein, ist eine der ursprünglichen Ideen der Menschheit, die wir schon bei allen Naturvölkern in gleicher Weise vorfinden.⁴⁹

They are not to be thought of as confined to primitive consciousness, however, but are present in all normal conscious experience.

Soweit wir Menschen kennen, haben sie sittliche Anschauungen, sittliches Bewusstsein. Das Spezifische des sittlichen Bewusstseins besteht in dem unbedingt verpflichtenden Charakter, mit dem ein Wille auftritt.⁵⁰

These facts of moral consciousness have the greatest significance for religion.

Wir finden ..., dass je weiter wir in der Stufenfolge der Völkerentwicklung zurückgehen, um so enger religiöse und sittliche Vorstellungen an einander geknüpft sind, mit einander verschmelzen. Wozu die Menschen sich selbst verpflichtet fühlen, das setzen sie auch als selbstverständlich bei ihren Göttern voraus. So erscheinen diese als die idealen Abbilder jener.⁵¹

Wobbermin does not, however, intend to identify religion with morality as some thinkers have done. They grow from a common root but each has a distinctive content. Morality has to do with the feeling of human obligation while religion has reference to the superhuman and transcendent being whom we call God. Our deepest knowledge of the nature of God is derived

Having justified the method of interpretation suggested
to inner examination, the author takes up the question of
the importance of religion. His argument is as follows:
The object of human consciousness and the self-revelation are in
the first place.

It is the author's aim, as previously stated,
to show that the religious is not a mere
subjective feeling, but a reality, and that it is
not a mere feeling, but a reality, and that it is
not a mere feeling, but a reality, and that it is

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consciousness, however, but are present in all human consciousness
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Religion does not, however, stand in isolation with
morality as some writers have done. They give rise to a common
root and each has a distinctive content. Morality has to do
with the feeling of human obligation while religion has to
do with the feeling of human obligation and transcendence and the will to
God. Our deepest knowledge of the nature of God is derived

from the indications of our own moral nature but this does not mean that God is no more than the vague and confused claims of our moral wills. He is rather the source of the authority of our moral ideals revealed in history through Jesus and the disciples.⁵² Schleiermacher is the most important historical source for this type of thought in theology,⁵³ but, so far as the moral argument rests on freedom, Kant is the thinker to whom Wobbermin refers.⁵⁴

James, as we have already seen, made emphatic use of the moral argument for the existence and nature of God, but there are significant differences between his treatment and that of Wobbermin. James is not so sure that God actually does exist, but he is more certain what God's character must be if he does exist at all. Wobbermin says that our moral experience logically implies a God⁵⁵ while James says that our moral nature demands a God for the satisfaction of its deepest needs. On the other hand, both use the pragmatic argument from religious needs in asserting what the nature of God must be, yet arrive at different conclusions. Wobbermin says that religion demands a God who is an absolute ethical person,⁵⁶ and James asserts that the only God who is worthy of worship must be finite, for otherwise he could not be thought of as ethical in a world which contains so much evil.⁵⁷ They agree that God must be moral and personal but disagree radically on his omnipotence. This difference is fundamental for their metaphysics and will be considered in a later chapter.⁵⁸ The important point here is that both arrive at their views by means

of an empirical study of experience.

The appeal to inner experience is thoroughly justified methodologically. In every field of investigation we are practically limited by our own capacities of experiencing the data which constitute its problem. Moreover, each field is reported to consciousness through definite media which must be taken into consideration in the construction of the respective science. The natural scientist is largely concerned with the data of the senses and would not think of refusing toto genere their contributions. Yet there is a rather general tendency to demand that psychology discard introspection because it is not objective observation of sense experience and we find equally strong prejudice against the acceptance of the claims of moral and religious experience as valid indications of the nature of ultimate reality. Both James and Wobbermin defend the rights of inner experience against such a false empiricism, and the latter says,

Ist es denn nicht wirklich so und muss es nicht so sein, dass die Methode jeweilig durch die Natur des Gegenstandes, also, kurz gesagt, durch den Gegenstand selbst bedingt ist und bedingt wird?⁵⁹

The object which the science of religion must study is the religious experience.

Wie hinter aller Metaphysik das metaphysische Bewusstsein, so steht hinter aller Religion die religiöse Erfahrung.⁶⁰

Sense experience is not the exclusive source of knowledge. No empirical science can, for instance, give any account of values for they lie within the realm of metaphysics. Religious values like other values demand superempirical treatment.

Yet Wobbermin does not intend to defend any one-sided view of the methodology which is suited to a study of religion. He demands a modified combination of the historical and psychological approaches in a unified method, judged by the criteria of religious experience itself. This he calls "die religions-psychologische Methode in Religionswissenschaft und Theologie." In this dissertation it will be referred to as the "religio-psychological" method, a translation which the writer owes to Dean Knudson's usage in The Doctrine of God.⁶¹ Wobbermin holds that the "religio-psychological" method is absolutely fundamental to the construction of a science of religion (theology), thus largely breaking with traditional theologies based on the authority of historical revelation. But the method is in no way to be confused with the merely empirical treatment of psychology which is characteristic of Leuba and the Stanley Hall school in America and of many of the German psychologists of religion. Wobbermin cites with approval Troeltsch's attack on the exclusively empirical tendency,⁶² and regards it as one of the special merits of James that he kept clearly in mind the religious objective of his studies in the Varieties.

James applied essentially the same method to his whole philosophy in what is known as his radical empiricism. This method is a criticism of Hume who left an atomism of unrelated impressions and also of those who tried to answer Hume by postulating an Absolute of some sort in which relations inhere.

To be radical, an empiricism must neither admit into its constructions any element that is not directly experienced, nor ex-

clude from them any element that is directly experienced. For such a philosophy, the relations that connect experiences must themselves be experienced relations, and any kind of relation experienced must be accounted as 'real' as anything else in the system. Elements may indeed be redistributed, the original placing of things getting corrected, but a real place must be found for every kind of thing experienced, whether term or relation, in the final philosophic arrangement.⁶³

This view of experience made the hypothesis of an Absolute unnecessary and seemed to James to harmonize best

with a radical pluralism, with novelty and indeterminism, moralism and theism, and with ... 'humanism.'⁶⁴

In summary we may note three points which stand out particularly prominently in the methodology of James and Wobermin. Both are determined to consider religion in its own right and not as subordinated to any other interest. Both find the study of inner personal experience an indispensable element in the science of religion. And, finally, both appreciate the special significance of moral experience as a clue to the nature and existence of God. Naturally there are differences in the interpretation of each of these points by the two thinkers, but so extensive a common methodological basis and interest is not to be overlooked.

... from any element that is directly
experimented. For when a hypothesis, and
relations that connect experimental data with
theories be experimental relations, and any kind
of relation experimental must be accounted as
'real' as anything else in the system. It would
may indeed be well to say, the relation of
law of things getting corrected, not a real
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perimental, whether term or relation, in the in-
tellectual arrangement.

This view of experience made the hypothesis of an Associate un-
necessary and seemed to leave no room for doubt.

With a radical criticism, with novelty and
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In summary we may note three points which stand out
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ture and existence of God. Naturally there are differences in
the interpretation of each of these points by the two thinkers,
but no extensive methodological differences are there
not to be overlooked.

2. Pragmatism

A further point of comparison between the methodology of James and Wobbermin needs to be made explicit, namely, pragmatism. The pragmatic method as a test of truth by practical consequences and as a theory of relative truth Wobbermin intended to reject, and in this he agreed with most of German thought. The full treatment of this topic will be the concern of Chapter IV of this dissertation. It is our purpose here simply to mention the conflict and to point out that Wobbermin makes the differences greater than is really necessary. He does not take into account James's later writings in which the statement of pragmatism is somewhat modified, and his interpretation of The Will to Believe tends, like that of most critics of the book, to overemphasize the title and lay too little weight on the actual argument presented.

James came to regard his pragmatism as of much less significance than his radical empiricism and it is unfortunate to reject his whole philosophy because of its pragmatic affiliations. Wobbermin himself shows the pragmatic tendency in the weight he gives to "what is necessary for religious faith" in his arguments for the nature of God. His practical, pedagogical reason for translating the Varieties, "to awaken interest . . .," is also somewhat pragmatic.

A further point of comparison between the religious
in Islam and Christianity needs to be made explicitly, namely, the
problem. The religious world as a whole is divided by practical
considerations and as a theory of relative truth. Christianity in-
tended to reject, and in this he agrees with most of the
thought. The full treatment of this point will be the concern
of Chapter IV in the next section. It is the purpose here
simply to mention the conflict and to point out that Christianity
regards the Christian world as a reality, namely, the
fact that the world is not a mere collection of things in which the
statement of principles is somewhat modified, and that inter-
section of the will to believe is the final of most serious
of the book, to emphasize the title and let the title
weigh on the reader's mind.

There came to regard the religious as of much less
importance than his religious position and it is unfortunate
to regard the world's religious position of the religious world
in the world. Christianity itself shows the religious position in
the world as being a fact is necessary for religious faith.
In his arguments for the nature of God, the practical, and
logical reason for the religious position, the religious world
and ... is the religious position.

3. Metaphysics

Wobbermin nowhere gives a unified account of his metaphysics. Certain aspects are developed in his Theologie und Metaphysik, particularly his views of personality and freedom. The polemic writing, Monismus und Monotheismus, is a negative presentation of his metaphysics as a criticism of materialism. We shall consider first his critique of materialism.

The problem of materialism was recognized both by James and by Wobbermin. James was especially aroused on the subject because he was so often accused of being a materialist himself. He developed his theory of radical pluralistic empiricism in a period when practically all influential philosophers were monistic and rationalistic. James hated all Absolutes, whether idealistic or materialistic, with their tendency to erase differences and to solve problems by referring them to the Whole. James believed in the place of reason in the reordering of experience but objected to a rationalization of experience which attempted to subordinate its concrete multiplicity and to blot out its contradictions. The materialistic claim he felt to be particularly inadequate. The materialist does not know what the matter is which he posits as the ultimate reality. On the other hand, the philosopher of experience has a very intimate knowledge of the experiential order which he claims as ultimate. The abstract and vacuous character of Matter is vividly portrayed in a note to O. W. Holmes, Jr. in which James says with humorous disgust,

Robertson now gives a unified account of his work. Certain aspects are developed in his *Philosophy and Method*, particularly his views on causality and freedom. The polemic with *Montagu and Montagu* is a negative presentation of his metaphysics as a criticism of materialism. We shall consider first his critique of materialism. The problem of materialism was recognized early by James and by Robertson. James was especially aroused on this subject because he was so often accused of being a materialist himself. He developed his theory of radical pluralistic experience in a period when practically all influential philosophers were materialistic and rationalistic. James noted all this, whether idealistic or materialistic, with their tendency to stress either sense and to solve problems by reducing them to the whole. James believed in the place of reason in the reasoning of experience but objected to a rationalization of experience which attempted to subordinate its concrete multiplicity and to give out its contradictions. The materialist claim he felt to be particularly inadequate. The materialist does not know what the matter is which he posits as the ultimate reality. On the other hand, the philosopher of experience has a very intimate knowledge of the experiential order which he claims as ultimate. The abstract and vague character of matter is vividly portrayed in a note to G. W. Holmes, Jr. in which James says with humorous directness:

Why I'm blest if I'm a Materialist:
 The materialist posits an X for his ultimate principle.
 Were he satisfied to inhabit this vacuous X, I should not at present try to disturb him.

But that atmosphere is too rare; so he spends all his time on the road between it and sensible realities, engaged in the laudable pursuit of degrading every (sensibly) higher thing into a (sensibly) lower...⁶⁵

James further objected to the materialistic view on moral grounds. In his early essay on "The Psychology of Belief" he said that no philosophy which denied man's higher nature and which was fundamentally pessimistic could endure.⁶⁶ As a pragmatic statement of mere faith this has little weight, but if it is based on the logical implications of moral experience, as, for instance, in the treatment of Wobbermin and even more cogently in that of Sorley,⁶⁷ it is of utmost importance for the philosophy of religion.

Wobbermin approached the problem of materialism directly through the controversy over Haeckel. Since boyhood he had been interested in Haeckel's work. While he was still in the Gymnasium, his science teacher had given him the Natural History of Creation to read. This book left a lasting impression, and Wobbermin determined then to test his faith by seeking answers to the problems raised by Haeckel.⁶⁸

Wobbermin acknowledges his indebtedness to Haeckel for his general interest in the whole question of natural science and its relation to religion. It was this interest also that played a large part in his choosing theology as a profession.⁶⁹ He rightly regrets the meager interest that religious people have given to the questions of science.⁷⁰ It is not a little

Why I'm afraid I'm a Materialist:
The materialist position is X for the ultra-
materialist.
Were he satisfied to know that this vacuum
X, I should not at present try to describe
it.
But that vacuum is too large, too wide,
all his time in the road between it and
little reality, engaged in the logical but
not of beginning every (logically) higher
thing from a (sensible) lower....

James further objected to the materialistic view on
moral grounds. In his early essay on "The Psychology of Re-
ligion" he said that the philosophy which denied man's inner
nature and which was fundamentally pessimistic could endure.
As a pragmatic statement of mere faith this has little weight,
but it is based on the logical implications of moral ex-
perience, as, for instance, in the statement of Wobbermin and
even more especially in that of Solovy.
Hence for the philosophy of religion.
Wobbermin approached the problem of materialism direct-
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been interested in Haeckel's work. While he was still in the
Gymnasium, his science teacher had given him the Material His-
tory of Creation to read. This book left a lasting impression
and Wobbermin determined then to test his faith by seeking an-
swers to the problems raised by Haeckel.
Wobbermin acknowledged his indebtedness to Haeckel for
his general interest in the whole question of natural science
and its relation to religion. It was this interest also that
played a large part in his choosing theology as a profession.
He rightly regards the deeper interest that religious people
have given to the questions of science. It is not a little

due to this fact that the battle of science and religion has been so intense. There has been ignorance on both sides. Wobbermin determined to keep abreast of scientific thought as far as was possible in connection with his theological work. The essays in Monismus und Monotheismus show that he succeeded to an unusual extent in carrying out this aim.⁷¹

The battle over the theory of evolution and the naturalistic denial of validity to religion came to a head as a result of Haeckel's lecture in the Sing-Akademie in Berlin in 1905 and the reply of Wasmann early in 1907. The Keplerbund published articles in Unsere Welt, its newly founded journal, attacking Haeckel most vigorously and in some cases unfairly. The most exaggerated of these attacks was that of the zoologist, Arnold Brass, curator of the Keplerbund. He directed his criticism against the famous "falsification" of the embryo drawing, and went so far as to question all Haeckel's work because of this incident. Wobbermin defended Haeckel's general sincerity against unjustly sweeping criticisms, while of course deploring the "falsification" incident.⁷²

The scientific-philosophic issue in Haeckel's argument was clearly analyzed by Wobbermin. Haeckel started from a confusion of genetic with value judgments. He felt, like many scientists, that when he had given a genetic account of the origin of any character he had said all there was to be said about it. An explanation of what caused it (empirically) was regarded as an adequate answer to the question of meaning and value. James, in the Varieties, points out that all our thoughts and feelings,

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whether religious or scientific, have an organic foundation.

But he puts the critical question,

How can such an existential account of facts of mental history decide in one way or another upon their spiritual significance?⁷³

It is only by ignoring the origins of scientific conceptions that they can be given unique authority. Wobbermin takes much the same position when he says,

Haeckel vermengt ... genetische Beurteilung ... und Wertbeurteilung,⁷⁴

and shows the naiveté of Haeckel in thinking that the analysis of several thousand worms can stand significantly over against the experience of a single man. The error of Haeckel's method is the attempt to interpret personal life and values by means of a merely quantitative criterion. On the basis of "empirical" investigations Haeckel, like Leuba, believed that he had disproved the objective validity of religion. But Wobbermin replies that religion cannot be so measured and that its value cannot be determined by reference to its primitive forms alone.

Für die religiöse Beurteilung ist das Entscheidende nicht, wie der Mensch geworden ist, sondern was er ist, genauer: was er werden kann und werden soll, wozu er veranlagt und wozu er bestimmt ist.⁷⁵

Any view which claims that the world of natural science is the whole and final world leads to self-contradiction and logical absurdity.⁷⁶ It necessarily leaves out such facts as personal consciousness and God, for they cannot be deduced from the material conditions.⁷⁷ But epistemological considerations such as

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dass alles Naturerkennen die Existenz eines denkenden Bewusstseins bereits zu seiner Voraussetzung hat,⁷⁸

a fundamental proposition of Kant's, led Wobbermin to regard the empirical world as only relative and phenomenal.⁷⁹ He posited God as absolute reality and value,⁸⁰ and as ethical personality.⁸¹ Haeckel's impersonal view, on the contrary, is a partial denial of his own evolutionary principles.

Denke ich das Wesen Gottes nicht bewusster und persönlicher Art, so ordne ich es damit der höchsten Organisationsstufe, die schon in der Lebensentwicklung der empirischen Welt erreicht wird, unter.⁸²

Wobbermin shows that this is just what Haeckel does.

Haeckel's skepticism is also evident in his view of teleology, and Wobbermin's position is seen in contrast. Haeckel held that the evolutionary development and especially the facts of dysteleology disproved the claim of religion that the purpose of God was being realized in the process. It must be admitted that the fact of evil is a difficult problem for religion. But Wobbermin has at least a partial answer to the objection to purpose raised by Haeckel. While it may be that purpose (Zweck) cannot be demonstrated with certainty (purpose being a conscious experience of a person and hence only indirectly accessible to others), an end (Ziel) can be objectively proved. Ends are being attained in evolution and there is no doubt

dass die Welt lebender Wesen ein zusammengehöriges Ganze darstellt, das sich aus ersten primitiven Angängen in fortschreitender - zielstrebigere - Weise zu immer höheren Organisationsstufen entfaltet hat.⁸³

Das ist die Natur der Sache, die wir hier zu betrachten haben. Es ist eine Natur, die sich nicht ändern lässt, sondern nur in sich selbst weiterentwickelt. Das ist die Natur der Sache, die wir hier zu betrachten haben.

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Evolution is in essence teleological and so far forth no refutation of religious faith.⁸⁴

A further difficulty arises from the monistic interpretation which Haeckel gives, based on a naturalistic reading of Spinoza.⁸⁵ Although the Christian world view is, according to Wobbermin, monistic, it is a metaphysical rather than an empirical monism.

Jede monistische Betrachtung der empirischen Wirklichkeit - die materialistische wie die spiritualistische - bedeutet eine Vergewaltigung, weil eine Verkürzung des gegebenen empirischen Tatbestandes.⁸⁶

The justification for this claim upon both materialistic and spiritualistic monism Wobbermin finds in the necessarily dual character of the empirical order which is made up of both nature and minds (persons).⁸⁷ The attempt to reduce the latter to the former by the use of "scientific method" is the error of the materialists, and the psychological method must be substituted for the treatment of those objects which are not within the realm of natural science.⁸⁸

Empirical monism is thus rejected by Wobbermin, but he holds to a type of personalistic monism as the necessary philosophical interpretation of the empirical multiplicity of the world of experience, values, and religion. His arguments are given chiefly from the theological point of view and presuppose somewhat dogmatically the assertions of Christian faith. Admitting the dualism of empirical reality, he denies it any final validity but finds it included in and subordinated to

Evolution is in essence teleological and as for faith no rational foundation of religious faith.⁸⁴

A further difficulty arises from the somewhat inconsistent position which Haeckel gives, based on a naturalistic reading of Spinoza.⁸⁵ Although the Christian world view is, according to Wobbermin, non-rational, it is a metaphysical rather than an empirical monism.

Let's not allow ourselves to be misled by the fact that Haeckel is a materialist - his materialism is not the materialism of the naturalists - but the materialism of the spiritualists - he is a spiritualist in the sense of the spiritualists.

The justification for this claim upon both materialistic and spiritualistic monism Wobbermin finds in the necessarily dual character of the empirical order which is made up of both nature and mind (paradox).⁸⁶ The attempt to reduce the latter to the former by the use of "scientific method" is the error of the materialists, and the psychological method must be attributed for the treatment of those objects which are not within the realm of natural science.⁸⁸

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dem Monismus des Glaubens an jenen Gott, von dem, durch den und zu dem alle Dinge sind.⁸⁹

Wobbermin himself regards the following statement from Monismus und Monotheismus as a particularly important account of his total view.

Es ist ein Monismus, der nach rückwärts den Dualismus der empirischen Wirklichkeit zur Voraussetzung hat und der zugleich nach vorwärts den Pluralismus einer Vielheit persönlicher Geister, die in die Lebensgemeinschaft mit Gott eingehen, in sich schliesst. Begründet aber sind beide, jener Dualismus und dieser Pluralismus, in dem ethischen liebesswillen des geistig-persönlichen Gottes, der nach christlichem Glauben das eigentliche Wesen Gottes in seiner tiefsten Tiefe erfasst ausmacht. Der so gedachte - weil so erlebte - Gott ist ja keine starre Einheit, sondern hat das reichste und vollste Leben in sich, dessen Entfaltung und Auswirkung die ganze Mannigfaltigkeit der Wirklichkeit verständlich macht, so sehr sich das auch im einzelnen unserer Einsicht entzieht.

Das für uns eigentlich Wichtige und Entscheidende ist dies, festzuhalten, dass Gott die allein absolute Realität ist, dass also die gesamte empirische, die naturhaft vorzufindende Wirklichkeit nicht absolute, sondern nur relative Wirklichkeit hat.⁹⁰

The comparison of this whole section with the thought of James raises some very important problems. James is an avowed pluralist and Wobbermin claims to reject this pluralism completely, but the above statement makes concessions to pluralism. It grants a dualism of the empirical order which, when fully explained, would differ little from pluralism in that realm. And it further grants a plurality of personal lives which develop in a community under the ethical will of

dem Namen des Elbans an James
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sah.

Woburns himself regards the following statement from James

and Woburns as a particularly important account of

his total view.

James, in his statement, says that
the first thing that struck him
was the fact that James was not
a native of the country, but
that he had come from the
United States. James, in his
statement, says that he had
come to the country in 1848,
and that he had been in the
country for about 10 years.
James, in his statement, says
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avowed Unitarian and Woburns is a Unitarian to reject this
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Unitarianism. It grants a number of the Unitarian order which
when fully explained, would differ little from Unitarianism in
that realm. And it further grants a number of personal
views which develop in a community under the ethical will of

a personal God. So far James would be in almost complete agreement. But when God is claimed to be "the absolute reality" which "includes" other persons whose lives are "unfoldings" of his unitary nature, James can no longer follow and the issues are clear cut.

Wobbermin's phraseology suggests that his view is an Hegelian absolutism, but nothing is further from his intentions. He is even unwilling to describe his system as idealistic because of the Hegelian connotation given to the term in current German thought.⁹¹ He calls his position a theistic personalism. It is to be regarded as monistic in the sense of traditional theism which holds God to be perfect in power, knowledge, and goodness, and therefore to be the only absolute reality. His view is in no sense pantheistic, and he shows that even mysticism is explicable in non-pantheistic terms.⁹²

Three factors are united in Wobbermin's theism. He says,

Mein ontologisches Interesse drückt sich aus in einer Gesamtweltanschauung, die Transzendenzgedanken mit Immanenzgedanken durch theistischen Personalismus verbindet.⁹³

God is thought of as transcendent over the empirical world, as

ein über die ganze empirische Wirklichkeit schlechthin erhabener Gott.⁹⁴

But his relations to the world are not adequately expressed by the conception of transcendence alone.

Andererseits ist eben dieser Gott kein weltferner oder weltfremder Gott, sondern ein die Welt, zumal die Geschichte, lebendig durchwaltender Gott.⁹⁵

Equal weight must be laid on immanence and transcendence, and

a personal God. For James would be in almost complete agreement with him when he is speaking of the "absolute reality" which "binds" other persons whose lives are "unfolding" of his unity nature. James can no longer follow and the issue is clear cut.

Wheeler's philosophy suggests that his view is an Hegelian one-sidedness, but nothing is further from the truth. He is even unwilling to recognize that system as idealistic because of the Hegelian opposition given to the fact in which James has no part. He calls his position a "realism" but it is to be regarded as nominalistic in the sense of traditional thought which holds God to be present in every knowledge, and goodness, and therefore to be the only absolute reality. His view is in no sense nominalistic, and he knows that even nominalism is explicit in non-nominalistic terms. These facts are noted in Wheeler's treatise.

James

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James would be said on James' and Wheeler's

there seems to be a contradiction between the God who rules in majesty over the world and the God who is expressed within its living process.⁹⁶ The contradiction is solved only by the conception of divine personality to which the other two elements are subordinated.

Der Gott des christlichen Glaubens, der Gott, der die höchste Macht über alle Wirklichkeit lebendig durchwirkt, er ist ein geistig-ethisch-persönlicher Gott. Ethisches Personleben ist das Grundwesen dieses Gottes.

Personal theism might also be used to describe James's conception of God, but with the following differences. James held God to be transcendent in the sense of being higher than the human worshiper, but did not regard him as all-powerful.⁹⁸ In some of his thought, James believed God to be an extensive (though not all-inclusive) consciousness which is in immanent relations with men.⁹⁹ He agreed with Wobbermin that God must be thought of as ethical and personal but could not accept the view that God was absolute.

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the living presence. The contradiction is solved only by
the conception of divine personality to which the other two

elements are subordinated.

Der Gott der christlichen Gläubigen, der
Gott, der die Welt erschaffen hat, der
Welt der menschlichen Existenz, der
ein ganz anderer, persönlicher Gott,
Christus, der Mensch, der die Welt
erschaffen hat.

Personalität ist ein Begriff, der auch in der Philosophie
verwendet wird, aber mit der folgenden Bedeutung. Jesus
sah Gott als einen, der in der Welt ist, der die Welt
erschaffen hat, der die Welt der menschlichen Existenz, der
ein ganz anderer, persönlicher Gott, Christus, der Mensch,
der die Welt erschaffen hat. In dem Sinne, in dem Jesus
sah Gott als einen, der in der Welt ist, der die Welt
erschaffen hat, der die Welt der menschlichen Existenz, der
ein ganz anderer, persönlicher Gott, Christus, der Mensch,
der die Welt erschaffen hat. He agreed with Kierkegaard that God must
be thought of as eternal and personal but could not accept the
view that God was absolute.

SUMMARY

We have found James and Wobbermin agreeing on an empirical psychological method as the only sound basis for the construction of a science of religion. They both give special, though different, emphasis to moral data in their methodology. They differ on pragmatism as a criterion of truth and as a methodology. Both regard the conception of personality as of prime significance, and join in the argument against materialism. While James is not final in his metaphysical statements, his general view seems to be idealistic, as is Wobbermin's. But they differ in that James holds to a final pluralism while Wobbermin's ontological view is monistic. Both are, however, personalistic. In brief form we may say that James presents a psychology of religion which Wobbermin adopts as the method for attaining a philosophy of religion; and that James presents a philosophy of religion - pragmatic-pluralistic - which Wobbermin largely rejects or ignores.

In the following chapter we shall consider the problem of methodology as it is developed by Wobbermin on the basis of the combined methods of James and Schleiermacher, leaving the discussion of metaphysical issues to later chapters.

Summary

We have found James and Wobbeson's approach to the problem of religious psychology as the only sound basis for the construction of a science of religion. They both give equal, though different, emphasis to moral data in their methodology. They differ on pragmatism as a criterion of truth and as a methodology. Both regard the conception of personality as of prime significance, and join in the argument against materialism. While James is not final in his metaphysical statements, his general view seems to be idealistic, as is Wobbeson's. But they differ in that James holds to a final pluralism while Wobbeson's ontological view is monistic. Both are, however, personalistic. In brief form we may say that James presents a psychology of religion which Wobbeson adopts as the method for attaining a philosophy of religion; and that James presents a philosophy of religion - personalistic-idealistic - which Wobbeson largely rejects or ignores.

In the following chapter we shall consider the problem of methodology as it is developed by Wobbeson on the basis of the combined methods of James and Scholasticism, leaving the discussion of metaphysical issues to later chapters.

CHAPTER III

THE "RELIGIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL" METHOD IN PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

CHAPTER III

THE "FARMING-SCHOOL" METHOD IN
TEACHING OF RELIGION

The problem of the present chapter is the study of the theological method which Wobbermin developed as a synthesis of the methods of Schleiermacher and James. Since Wobbermin regards his chief debt to James as this methodological one, it is of particular importance for our study.

Wobbermin felt that the great need of theology during the last fifty years or more¹ was a unitary method. This he tried to develop by a combination and extension of the point of view of James and Schleiermacher. James broke away from the traditional rationalistic philosophy and adopted a frankly empirical method which had much in common with the psychological approach of Schleiermacher, though the two men differed widely in their application of the principle. Schleiermacher was a theologian before everything else and regarded himself as only a dilettante in philosophy.² In contrast, James's interest was in philosophy and he was in no sense a theologian. Wobbermin, like Schleiermacher, is primarily a theologian, but with greater metaphysical interest than Schleiermacher.

This contrast in interests between Wobbermin and James leads to a terminological difficulty. Wobbermin's aim in the study of religion is theological; James's philosophical. Yet to a certain extent the two can be identified. Our initial problem, then, is to state how the terms will be understood in this dissertation.

The history of the present chapter is the study of
the theological school which was developed as a result
of the method of Schleiermacher and James. A third subject
will be the study of the method of Schleiermacher and
James as it is applied to the study of religion.

It is of course a fact that the great need of theology during
the last thirty years has been a unity of method. This has
been developed by Schleiermacher and James as the basis
of view of James and Schleiermacher. James broke away from
the traditional rationalistic philosophy and adopted a new
method which has been in common with the philosophy
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but with greater metaphysical interest than Schleiermacher.

This contrast in interest between Schleiermacher and James
leads to a fundamental difference. Schleiermacher's view of the
study of religion is theological; James's is philosophical. It
is a common contention that the two can be identified. One method
proves, then, is to state how the terms will be understood
in this discussion.

For Wobbermin theology is, taken in its widest sense, "die Wissenschaft von der Religion."³ Theology is only the science of religion, however, and not to be confused with religion itself. Religion is the actual experience of individuals, and any study of religion, whether theology or philosophy of religion, must be based upon the data derived from religious experience. This is an essential methodological thesis for Wobbermin as well as for Schleiermacher and James. So far there is no real difference between philosophy of religion and theology. They are normative disciplines which aim to discover the truths to which religious experience points and to explain these in relation to the rest of experience.

Their point of departure, however, is unique. Philosophy of religion is more general and inductive, starting with the data of religious experiences of every kind and testing them in relation to the rest of experience. Its study may be limited to one historical religion but this is not necessarily so. Theology, on the other hand, is primarily concerned with the historical revelations of a particular religion and seeks to interpret and criticize the beliefs which it involves. It is more interested in the experiences of historical individuals than in those of contemporaries. The latter serve chiefly to illustrate and confirm normative experience. Some theologians tend to put theology in the place of philosophy and claim that the religious tradition reveals self-evident metaphysical truth.⁴ But many regard theology as dependent upon phil-

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experience in the place of philosophy and ethics and
the religious tradition reveals self-evident methodological
truth. But many regard theology as dependent upon philo-

osophy for the final justification of all its concepts. Wobbermin was particularly concerned about an adequate metaphysical basis for his theology. He opposed the anti-metaphysical teaching of Ritschl and held that "Theologie ohne Metaphysik ist unmöglich."⁵ A large part of Wobbermin's writing is philosophical rather than theological in the narrower sense, and he uses philosophy of religion and theology practically interchangeably in many cases.

It will be the intent of this dissertation to study the philosophy of religion presented by James and Wobbermin, leaving to one side as far as possible strictly theological questions, i.e., those referring to scriptural interpretation, creedal matters, etc. The term "theology" must necessarily be used frequently in the statement of Wobbermin's views but it is to be taken in this general philosophical sense unless special note is made of the narrower meaning.

Another distinction needs also to be made. The psychological method is adopted by James and Wobbermin but neither is primarily interested in psychology of religion. Wobbermin says,

Das Interesse, das ich an der Religionspsychologie habe, ist ein durchaus theologisches.⁶

And James's original intent in the Varieties was to use a psychology as a propaedeutic to a philosophy of religion. Though the amount of material which he found forced him to delay the philosophical treatment, there is no doubt that it was

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his chief interest.⁷ The present chapter deals with psychology, but as a methodology rather than as an independent science.

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A. HISTORICAL SKETCH OF METHODS

There are many methods of studying religion. Wobbermin cites four which stand in opposition to his own: dogmatic traditionalism, constructive rationalism, historicism, and psychologism.⁸ Historicism and psychologism are the strongest current tendencies in German theological thought and have received special treatment at Wobbermin's hands.

Just before the beginning of the World War, Wobbermin started his attack on historicism and psychologism. His book on Richtlinien evangelischer Theologie zur Überwindung der gegenwärtigen Krisis is a recent statement of his position, and he says in the preface that he originally intended to include in the title a suggestion of the "Kampf gegen Historismus und Psychologismus" which the book embodies.⁹ Karl Barth's early treatment of the "dialectic theology" had the same aim, according to Wobbermin, but his recent writing shows a turn back to dogmatism.¹⁰

Wobbermin's "religio-psychological" method is to be distinguished both from historicism and from psychologism. It intends to give equal weight to historical and psychological factors (a principle advocated by Schleiermacher)¹¹ and thus to avoid the one-sidedness of either theory alone.

A. HISTORICAL ASPECT OF PSYCHOLOGY

There are many methods of studying religion. Whether in the form of a religion or in the form of a scientific study, which stands in opposition to his own: scientific method, comparative religion, historical, and psychological. The historical and psychological are the strongest current tendencies in German theological thought and have received special treatment in Weber's hands.

Just before the beginning of the World War, Weber started his attack on historical and psychological. His book on Religion and Economic Ethics was published in 1904. In this book is a recent statement of his position, and he says in the preface that he originally intended to include in the title a suggestion of the "Economic History of Religion" which the book would contain. But he has decided to leave the title as it is, and the book is now a thin book to the Weberian, and his recent writing shows a thin book to the Weberian.

Weber's "Religion and Economic Ethics" method is to be distinguished from other historical and psychological methods. It intends to give a new method in historical and psychological studies (a principle advocated by Emil Durkheim) and this to avoid the one-sidedness of other theory alone.

1. Historicism

Historicism, as defined by Wobbermin, is the view that history is the final and exclusive answer to the questions of theology.¹² The influence of Ritschl is to be seen in this exclusively historical tendency, for his own treatment was rather strictly limited to historical sources.¹³ Wobbermin ascribes to Troeltsch also a degree of historicism. But Harnack is the most important representative of historicism in recent times, and Wobbermin cites his lectures on Das Wesen des Christentums as typical.

Harnack erhebt ja hier ganz ausdrücklich den Anspruch, rein als Historiker die letzten Fragen nach Wesen und Wahrheit ... in zureichender und erschöpfender Weise zu beantworten.¹⁴

Schleiermacher and James opposed such historicism. But they went too far in the other direction and failed to give due significance to the meaning of history for the religious life.¹⁵ In spite of the emphasis given to the "religio-psychological" method, Wobbermin intends throughout to combine historical with experiential data. This is brought out explicitly by his designation of his method as that of the "religio-psychological" circle, which will be discussed later in this chapter.¹⁶ In the period of most distinct James influence, Wobbermin's writing was more psychological and in the last few years the historical has

Historicism, as defined by Woburn, is the view that history is the final and exclusive answer to the questions of the past. The influence of historicism is to be seen in the relatively historical tendency. For his own treatment was rather strictly limited to historical sources. Woburn's approach to the study of history is a matter of historical fact, but historicism is the most important representative of historicism in recent times. and Woburn's view on the history of historicism.

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predominated but neither has been treated as the exclusive approach to philosophy of religion.

Wobbermin distinguishes two meanings of history: in the first place, history means the actual living process of events as they are experienced, and this he calls Geschichte; secondly, history means historical research, the scientific study of the facts of history (Geschichte), which he calls Historie.¹⁷ The latter is relative and hypothetical, bearing somewhat the same relation to the original events that an idealized portrait bears to the real person portrayed. Wobbermin's objection is against the treating of Historie as final and authoritative. He appeals to Geschichte as one of the two necessary methodological moments. James shares this interest in the living stream of history (Geschichte) and finds in it a pragmatic test of the validity of religion.

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2. Psychologism

Psychologism needs to be clearly distinguished from the method used by Wobbermin. It may be defined as

die Überschätzung und einseitige Geltendmachung der Prinzipien der empirischen Psychologie.¹⁸

Schleiermacher was charged with teaching a limited psychologism, and the same objection has been raised against Wobbermin in so far as he adopted the methodology of Schleiermacher and James. Both Hegel and the Barthians are critics of the place given to feeling in the theology of Schleiermacher. But, while he makes feeling central, it is a "feeling of absolute dependence on the God revealed in Jesus Christ," and the object of dependence gives at least a partial balance between subjective and objective factors.¹⁹

While subjectivism is a danger in the application of psychological methodology, empiricism is more serious a danger for the cause of religion. American psychology of religion, with the exception of the contributions of James, carries empiricism too far. Leuba is an extreme example of this tendency. He has written many articles and several books on the problem.²⁰ He intends to make a purely empirical study of the psychological data and to state unbiased results. His empirical study reveals that mystical states, for instance, can be induced by the use of hashish or other drugs. These mystical experiences may have the same form as those claimed to be

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revelations or direct experiences of God. The conclusion that Leuba draws is that empirical psychology has shown the natural causes of the experiences and therefore proved religious faith in divine causality an illusion.²¹ In reply it may be said that no sane philosophy of religion has held that religious phenomena were independent of the rest of our experience and offered no traceable relation to its universal cause-effect order. What it has claimed is that empirical causes are not metaphysical causes and that metaphysical causes are the expression of what the world really is.

It is possible to carry through a purely empirical study of religious experience, but Wobbermin raises the question as to what the results may be expected to be.

Empirische Psychologie hat es allein mit dem menschlichen Bewusstsein zu tun.²²

Wobbermin's definition is too narrow, excluding as it does the justifiable psychological study of non-human consciousness, but it suggests the important fact that empirical psychology can give no metaphysical conclusions. It can report descriptively on religious experiences of God but it cannot tell anything further about the religious object since that object is non-empirical. Even to deny its existence is to make a metaphysical judgment. For the study of religion, at least, psychology cannot be limited to the empirical in the ordinary scientific sense.²³

A difficulty arises here, for James and Wobbermin call their own methods empirical. The term is used in two differ-

ent senses. When we speak of empirical sciences we mean those sciences which deal with the objects of sense experience. The object of religious experience is not given in any sense experience and so empirical science is not qualified to deal with it. Furthermore, human psychology comprises more than is given by the senses (e.g. thoughts), and the introspective method is a necessary addition to the objective method of empirical science even for general psychology. Empirical is used, in the second sense, to designate the whole content of experience, the stream of consciousness, as it is immediately given. When Wobbermin claims an empirical basis for religion, he is using the term in this latter sense. James has the same meaning in mind in his radical empiricism. It is no demand for radical limitation to sense experience. Rather it is the demand that every factor in conscious life, whether derived from the senses or from some other source, be considered in the final account. The implications of this latter view for religion are evident. Religion is a part of the experience of the race and its claims must be considered.

Between the extremes of historicism and psychologism, we find a middle ground which James and Wobbermin tried to develop. Their position conserves the emphasis of psychologism on the multiplicity of experience and that of historicism on the traditional basis of religion and its historical development.²⁴

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Between the extremes of historicism and psychologism, we find a middle ground which James and Weberstein tried to develop. Their position conserves the emphasis of psychologism on the authority of experience and that of historicism on the traditional basis of religion and its historical development.

B. THE SCHLEIERMACHER-JAMES CONCEPTION OF METHODOLOGY

In the combination of the thought of Schleiermacher and James, Wobbermin finds the basis for his unique setting of the problem of methodology in philosophy of religion or systematic theology. We now turn to an examination of this methodology.

1. Historical Sources

Although James and Schleiermacher use a common methodology in the treatment of problems of religion, the rest of their thinking runs in quite different directions. Wobbermin sketches their historical backgrounds in the preface to the second German edition of the Varieties. Schleiermacher, he says, was particularly influenced by Kant's critical thought and James by modern psychology.²⁵ This is, of course, intended merely as a partial statement but even then it does not do full justice to James. Wobbermin tends to overemphasize his psychological work. James was, it is true, greatly influenced by modern psychology in which he was himself a pioneer, but it would be quite incorrect to regard this as his chief intellectual heritage. He has been called a restater of Kant because of his own critical demands regarding the study of experience. His thinking is in the same critical line as Schleiermacher's, although James felt himself to

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be more influenced by the British empirical tradition than by Kant. The French philosophers, Renouvier and Bergson, were also very influential in the development of James's thought, a fact that is entirely overlooked by Wobbermin. In them James found support for the anti-intellectualism which was the root of his pragmatism, pluralism, and radical empiricism.

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2. The Problem of Methodology

The methodology which is presented by Schleiermacher and developed by James is psychological. It aims to find and test the distinctively religious factors which are given in experience. In contrast to the treatment of the problem by empirical psychologists both in Germany and in America, Schleiermacher and James lay the emphasis on the religious rather than the psychological part of their problem, on the content rather than on the method.

Schleiermacher's conception of the problem is stated as follows by Wobbermin:

Das religionspsychologische Denken (muss) in Bewegung gesetzt werden, um das spezifische Religiöse in seinem Unterschied von andersartigen Elementen und Factoren des menschlichen Seelenlebens zu erfassen und um dann weiter die entsprechende Frage nach dem spezifisch Christlichen der historisch als "christlich" bezeichneten Erscheinungen des religiösen Lebens zu beantworten. 26

Wobbermin takes up this general problem outlined by Schleiermacher and finds additional support for his methodology in the thought of James.

Neither James nor Schleiermacher carried out to its completion the method which they advocated and their solutions of the problem were therefore unsatisfactory. We shall consider first the general traits of the Schleiermacher-James method and then Wobbermin's own method which is an attempt to overcome their limitations and present a valid unified method for the study of religion.

a. Feeling versus Intellect

In contrast to most thought on religion, Schleiermacher and James set feeling above intellect as the source of religion in human experience. Schleiermacher's famous definition of religion as the feeling of absolute dependence has been regarded as vicious subjectivism but it is a significant antithesis to the rationalistic derivation of religion, for instance in Hegel.²⁷

Schleiermacher's limitation of the specifically religious to the feeling of absolute dependence is, however, too arbitrary and narrow. As Wobbermin rightly points out,

das Gefühl erschöpft sich nicht im Abhängigkeitsgefühl.²⁸

Wobbermin regards the feeling of dependence as the fundamental religious feeling but would add to it two other feelings, that of security (Geborgenheitsgefühl) and that of longing (Sehnsuchsgefühl);²⁹ and Titius, in criticizing Wobbermin, says that two more are involved, namely, the feeling of obligation (Verpflichtungsgefühl) and the feeling of aspiration (Strebensgefühl).³⁰

James also gives feeling an important, though not an exclusive, place in his thought. He says,

I do believe that feeling is the deeper source of religion, and that philosophic and theological formulas are secondary products.³¹

His study in the Varieties was an attempt to fathom this feeling source in a fresh and unconventional way.

A. Feeling versus Intellect

In contrast to most theories of religion, Scheler's theory and James' feel feeling above intellect as the source of religion in human experience. Scheler's theory's famous definition of religion as the feeling of absolute dependence has been rejected as vicious subjectivism but it is a valuable anti-rationalist contribution to the rationalistic derivation of religion, for instance in Hegel's Scheler's theory's limitation of the specifically religious to the feeling of absolute dependence is, however, too arbitrary and narrow. As Scheler's theory is too arbitrary and narrow, the feeling of absolute dependence is too arbitrary and narrow.

Scheler's theory's feeling of dependence as the fundamental religious feeling but would add to it two other feelings, that of security (Vertrauensgefühl) and that of longing (Sehnsucht), and that of love (Liebe), an emotional feeling, as a third. These two more are involved, namely, the feeling of obligation (Verpflichtungsgefühl) and the feeling of aspiration (Streben).

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His study in the Varieties was an attempt to follow this feeling source in a free and non-conventional way.

b. Experience

Feeling is too narrow a source for religion and it is experience as a whole which Schleiermacher and James essentially mean to claim as its source.

Experience is taken by both men to mean conscious experience. A philosophy of religion, they hold, can be attained only through a study of the data of human experience. Schleiermacher emphasizes the fact that religion is a matter of immediate personal self-consciousness.³² His definition of piety brings out the same point.

Die Frömmigkeit ist ... weder ein Wissen noch ein Tun, sondern eine Bestimmtheit des Gefühls oder des unmittelbaren Selbstbewusstseins.³³

Although Schleiermacher uses feeling in this connection, he makes it synonymous with immediate self-consciousness, which is a significant elaboration of his view. This definition interests Wobbermin particularly because it makes the self or the person central and states that piety is necessarily an experience of selves.³⁴

James is equally convinced of the personal character of religion, and the experiential basis for all philosophy of religion. This conviction for him is based on the general conclusion that the one indubitable truth is "that the present phenomenon of consciousness exists."³⁵ From this point, he holds, all thought must start. Wobbermin formulates much the same thesis in the specifically religious field when he says,

There is no doubt a source for religion and it is
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same people in the specifically religious field when he says,

Die religiöse Erfahrung: das ist also für die theologische Arbeit das eigentliche Objekt, von dem aus über das Verhältnis von Religion und Metaphysik und ... von Theologie und Metaphysik zu sprechen ist.³⁶

Religious experience offers the immediately relevant data for the study of religion and any attempt to ignore it or to discount its value because it is religious is unjustified.

James's study in The Varieties of Religious Experience is psychological, a description of definite cases in which the distinctively religious phenomena occur. He draws chiefly upon extreme cases, giving as his reason the statement that there is no essential difference in quality between the mild cases and the extreme and that in the latter the characteristics are more easily discerned and described.³⁷ James is rather generally criticized for this choice, and Wobbermin goes so far as to add to his translation of the Varieties the subtitle, "Materialien und Studien zu einer Psychologie und Pathologie des religiösen Lebens."³⁸

Wundt criticized James for omitting the institutional aspects of religion. James's reply to this criticism was given in advance. In the second chapter of the Varieties he pointed out that personal religion is the fundamental fact and that churches and theologies depend upon personal founders and thinkers.³⁹ James's work is admittedly limited in scope, but within its field it is of very great significance for the study of religion along empirical lines.

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James's Study in the Varieties of Religious Experience

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c. The Specifically Religious

The peculiar problem of psychology of religion, as Wobbermin has said, is to discover the specifically religious elements in the conscious life of man. This was Schleiermacher's chief interest but it remained for James to define the problem more clearly. According to Wobbermin, James found the specifically religious element to be the consciousness of the presence of the divine.⁴⁰ It is to be questioned, however, whether James ever made any one element primary. Busch seems to be nearer right when he refers to James's statement that there is no distinct religious emotion but that the "religious sentiment" is

a collective name for the many sentiments
which religious objects may arouse.⁴¹

The specifically religious attitude meant for James that solemn and reverent response which the individual makes to the whole of life and the cosmos.⁴²

For Schleiermacher, as we have already suggested, the specifically religious was the feeling of absolute dependence. He talked of intuition and of feeling and felt that the essence of the religious consciousness lay in them but, according to Wobbermin, his conclusions remained uncertain and hesitant.⁴³

c. The Specifically Religious

The present study of psychology of religion, as we have seen, is to discover the specifically religious elements in the conscious life of man. This was Binswanger's chief interest but it remained for James to define the problem more clearly. According to Binswanger, James found the specifically religious element to be the consciousness of the presence of the divine. It is to be questioned, however, whether James ever made any one element primary. Binswanger seems to be nearer right when he refers to James's statement that there is no distinct religious emotion but that the "religious sentiment" is

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Wobbermin recognized the importance of the problem set by Schleiermacher and James and also the incompleteness of their development of it. There were errors and omissions in the thought of both, as he saw them, and he took as his purpose the correction and fulfilment of their program. He criticized Schleiermacher's doctrine of feeling as too limited and also felt that he had an insufficient appreciation of history.⁴⁴ James, according to Wobbermin, did not succeed in fully transcending the limitations of "scientific" empiricism. Wobbermin wished to make very clear that the empiricism which he adopted from James was no one-sided doctrine of sense experience.⁴⁵ We shall find in Wobbermin's emphasis on the transcendental his attempt to correct empiricism. Wobbermin further criticized James for excessive interest in abnormal, subconscious, and spiritualistic phenomena,⁴⁶ and it is true that these factors played a rather large part in the Varieties.

C. WOBBERMIN'S METHOD

The synthetic method which Wobbermin developed on the basis of the thought of Schleiermacher and James was an attempt to give to the scientific study of religion a unitary methodology in exchange for its many and fragmentary methods. He complains that theologians have been content to construct opposing systems without troubling themselves about their colleagues' contributions, at least so far as method is concerned.⁴⁷ Wobbermin, on the other hand, wishes to see the scientific spirit applied in the field of philosophy of religion to the end that a single inclusive method be used by all in their study and that the present one-sidedness of conflicting methods be overcome. He feels that the psychological method which he presents is both unitary and inclusive of the many points of view represented by the other methods, and that it may therefore safely be substituted as the necessary basis for a science of religion.⁴⁸

While method is important, Wobbermin has been criticized for laying too great weight upon it. Knudson says the method is secondary and "a reflection of one's philosophical and theological standpoint."⁴⁹ Wobbermin's insistence that psychology of religion be treated as transcendental psychology because its object is super-empirical is a partial attempt to meet this criticism.

The Wilsonian method which has been developed in the course of the history of scientific psychology and which was an attempt to give to the scientific study of religion a unitary methodology in exchange for the many and fragmentary methods. The assumption that psychologists have been content to contribute opposing systems without trying themselves about their own theories' contributions, at least so far as method is concerned. Wilson, on the other hand, wished to see the scientific spirit applied to the study of psychology of religion to the end that a single inclusive method be used by all in their study and that the present one-sidedness of conflicting methods be overcome. He feels that the psychological method which has prevailed is both faulty and inclusive of the many kinds of view represented by the other methods, and that it may therefore safely be substituted as the necessary basis for a science of religion.

While Wilson is important, his method has been criticized for being too great weight upon it. Wilson says the method is secondary and a reflection of one's philosophical and theological standpoint. Wilson's insistence that psychology of religion be treated as transcendental psychology because its object is super-empirical is a partial attempt to meet this criticism.

1. Definition and Statement of Method

Wobbermin had some difficulty in finding a satisfactory terminology to designate the method which he presented. He first called it the method of transcendental psychology, but objections and misunderstandings led him to change to the form, "religio-psychological." He has used this title since 1913. A third terminology, however, has been derived from his analysis of the method, namely, the method of the "religio-psychological" circle. Wobbermin intends to use these three titles synonymously and advises his readers who dislike the term "transcendental" to substitute for it "religio-psychological."⁵⁰ There are, however, differences in emphasis which make it necessary to consider the three methods separately.

a. The Method of Transcendental Psychology

In his address at the World Congress for Liberal Christianity and Religious Progress, given in Berlin in August 1910, Wobbermin presented his theory of a transcendental psychological method, previously suggested in an article in the Zeitschrift für angewandte Psychologie.⁵¹ He chose the terminology, as he states in his Zum Streit um die Religionspsychologie, to distinguish his own point of view from the merely empirical and psychological treatment of religion in the above-mentioned journal.⁵² As Wobbermin shows in his Congress address, the general conception of psychology of religion both in America and on the

I. Definition and Statement of Purpose

Wobbe's aim was to bring psychology to bear on the study of religion. He first called it the study of transcendental psychology. But objections and misunderstandings led him to change to the term "religio-psychology". He has used this term since 1912. A third terminology, however, has been derived from the analysis of the method, namely, the method of the "religio-psychological" circle. Wobbe's intention to use these three terms synonymously and advise his readers who dislike the term "transcendental" to substitute for it "religio-psychological". There are, however, differences in emphasis which make it necessary to consider the three groups separately.

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Continent at that time was that of a thorough-going empiricism which necessarily excluded all that was specifically religious and turned out to be what Wobbermin regarded as nothing but general psychology gathering data in a new field.

The term "transcendental," borrowed from Kant,⁵³ is used, then, as a protest against the attempt to treat religious experience purely empirically. The transcendental method is a critical evaluation of religious experience for the purpose of ascertaining its objective validity.

Die transzendente Betrachtung hat ihr entscheidendes Interesse nicht an den Faktoren des individuellen Seelenlebens in ihrer subjektiven Individualität, sondern an dem in diesen und durch diese hindurch zum Ausdruck kommenden allgemeingültigen Objektgehalt.⁵⁴

Wobbermin's emphasis on the psychological approach as a method for studying religion rather than for its own sake is evident in this statement. There is, of course, a justifiable psychological study of religion on the purely empirical descriptive basis, but the method which is used in philosophy of religion has as its aim not the individual and subjective or the objective in the sense in which the term is used by empirical science, but rather the universal and metaphysically objective. This meaning is implied by Wobbermin when he calls his method transcendental. The presupposition of the science of religion is that there is "eine religiöse Wahrheit."⁵⁵ The task of verifying this presupposition naturally goes beyond the psychological into the metaphysical realm,⁵⁶ but a psychological analysis of the religious consciousness from the point of view of

its interest in truth is a necessary step in the discovery of what is specifically religious. Among the many different expressions of the religious life a common element is found in the view of the religious goal as transcendent.⁵⁷ The notion of a transcendent goal does not, however, distinguish religion from any other kind of search for truth. What is unique in religion is the conviction

dass eben das Transzendente, das ihr Ziel ist, die letzte und höchste Wahrheit bedeutet.⁵⁸

Wobbermin was criticized for confusing psychological and metaphysical issues in this treatment and claiming to remain on the psychological level when he was really offering a critical epistemology.⁵⁹ He maintained, however, that just this was necessitated by the nature of the subject and therefore intended by his transcendental method which combines the empirical and the super-empirical.

General criticism of the concept of transcendental psychology led Wobbermin to change his terminology although he felt that there was no change in his own meaning. When he had first adopted the phraseology in opposition to empirical psychology, he had intended it as a synthesis of the Kant-Schleiermacher position with that of James,⁶⁰ and he still maintained that fundamental position. However, he came to feel that James's psychology remained more or less on the pragmatic level and that Schleiermacher's was a better start in the direction of a transcendental analysis of religious experience.⁶¹

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Religion, 10

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b. The "Religio-Psychological" Method

In 1913 two books by Wobbermin appeared which are of particular importance for our study, his collection of the previously published articles on psychology of religion with a new comprehensive introduction and entitled Zum Streit um die Religionspsychologie, and the first volume of his systematic theology, Die religionspsychologische Methode in Religionswissenschaft und Theologie. In the latter book Wobbermin speaks but once of the transcendental method, applying it to Schleiermacher, but adding that it might as well read "religio-psychological."⁶² In the former book the separate essays appear in their original form and maintain the transcendental terminology but the introduction expresses Wobbermin's willingness to change in every case to the term "religio-psychological."⁶³

The meaning of the "religio-psychological" method may, as Wobbermin says, well be expressed by a slight change in the famous words of Augustine, "deum et animam scire cupio." To describe the method, they should read, "animam et deum scire cupio," for it is through psychological knowledge of the human mind that knowledge of God is obtained.⁶⁴ In another connection Wobbermin says,

Die Religionspsychologie ist die gewiesene und unersetzliche Basis für alle religionsphilosophische Arbeit.⁶⁵

Although this method is characteristically psychological, Wobbermin does not allow his readers to overlook the fact that it is psychology of religion.⁶⁶

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The meaning of the "religio-psychological" method may, as Wobbermin says, well be expressed by a slight change in the famous words of Augustine, "Deum ex altioribus rebus cogitare". To describe the method, we should say, "cogitare ex altioribus rebus", for it is through psychological knowledge of the human mind that knowledge of God is attained.¹⁰³ In another connection Wobbermin says,

Die Religionswissenschaft ist die Kenntnis und Untersuchung der religiösen Wirklichkeit aus der Sicht der Psychologie.

Although this method is characteristically psychological, Wobbermin does not allow his readers to overlook the fact that it is psychology of religion.¹⁰⁴

c. The Method of the "Religio-Psychological" Circle

Wobbermin used the expression, "der religionspsychologische Zirkel," in the 1910 article in which the general transcendental method was developed but did not lay special weight on it until later in his thinking.⁶⁷ This particular putting of the methodological problem is now rather generally regarded as Wobbermin's most distinctive contribution to the field.

The concept grows out of the two-fold task which Schleiermacher set for theology, namely, to give equal weight to the religious experience of the individual and to the historical factors.⁶⁸ Thought about religion moves between these two foci. The starting point is the individual inquiring about the meaning and objective validity of his own religious experience. But it is only by going beyond the individual experience that these questions can be answered. Wobbermin describes as follows the methodological circle which results.

Wir wollen zur Beurteilung und Normierung des eigenen religiösen Lebens auf Grund der geschichtlichen Tatbestände die Kriterien reiner Religiosität gewinnen, und wir können doch diese geschichtlichen Tatbestände, nämlich die Ausdrucksformen des religiösen Lebens in der Geschichte der Menschheit, nicht anders als nach Massgabe unserer eigenen religiösen Erfahrung, also unseres eigenen religiösen Bewusstseins, verstehen und auslegen.⁶⁹

This is not, however, a vicious circle for truth is attained throughout the process. The individual gains new insight and higher standards for his religious life through his search for

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and the collective validity of his own religious experience. But

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questions can be answered. Wobbeson's solution is to follow the

methodological circle which is:

1. The religious experience of the individual is the starting point.
2. The historical factor is the context of the religious experience.
3. The religious experience is the basis of the historical factor.
4. The historical factor is the basis of the religious experience.
5. The religious experience and the historical factor are inseparable.
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This is not, however, a vicious circle for truth is attained

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historical verification, and at the same time adds greatly to the understanding of history by interpreting its theories in living experience. One learns to understand the religious experience of others through observing the same characteristics in one's own experience.⁷⁰

Yet religion does not lose its absolute value because it is thus mediated through finite experience. The "religio-psychological" method does not mean

die eigene religiöse Erfahrung zur entscheidenden Instanz der Glaubenslehre zu machen.⁷¹

Religious experience is only one factor in the "religio-psychological" circle. Those who have made experience the sole criterion have offered no means of distinguishing between false and true experiences. Wobbermin escapes from such subjectivism by introducing the historical factor as of equal or superior significance. The religious experience of the individual is to be interpreted and tested by Scripture. Scripture is to be understood after analogy with our own religious experience but that experience is never to be taken as constitutive. It is only a methodological aid, indispensable to be sure, to the understanding of Scripture but subordinate to it.

Die eigene religiöse Erfahrung muss ...
grundsätzlich der Heiligen Schrift untergeordnet werden.⁷²

In his reaction against psychologism, Wobbermin went rather too far in the direction of authoritarianism. But this attitude is not characteristic of his whole thought. Quite recently he has emphasized the demand that theology be scientific.

statistical verification, and at the same time also to the understanding of history by interpreting the theoretical findings. One learns to understand the religious experience of others through observing the same statistical evidence in one's own experience.

Yet this does not lose its scientific value because it is based on the same statistical evidence. The "scientific" method does not mean

the same religious experience and evidence.
Scientific method for understanding religious experience.

Religious experience is only one factor in the "religious-scientific" process. There are many more experiences and scientific factors have offered no means of distinguishing between false and true experiences. Religious experiences from such sources are introduced as the statistical factor as of equal or greater significance. This is the experience of the religious factor to be interpreted and tested by scientific methods. This is to be understood after dealing with our own religious experience but this experience is never to be taken as constitutive. It is only a statistical factor, and it is necessary to be sure, for the understanding of scientific and religious factors.

The above religious experience is not scientific.
Scientific method for understanding religious experience.

In his research on religious psychology, Wundtman went rather far in the direction of scientificism. But this attitude is not characteristic of his whole thought. He is not really a scientist. He has organized the system that theory is scientific.

He finds no conflict between science and religion but points out that theology deals with God, man, and the world, while the sciences deal only with the world and man. Knowledge of God is partly derived from the Bible and partly from personal experience. This is just what is meant by the "religio-psychological" circle. He objects, for instance, to Barth's thought because Barth makes no distinction between these two sources and also because of his extreme authoritarianism which would lead to belief in verbal inspiration if carried out. Wobbermin, as a theologian, raises Kant's question in a new field by asking, What can we know in religion? He is not to be regarded as an authoritarian.⁷³

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M. A. C. B. I. E. R.

2. Relation to James

We may now ask how much of this point of view Wobbermin really owes to the influence of James. The general psychological approach is compatible with James's position in The Will to Believe and The Varieties of Religious Experience. But this is neutral evidence.

Let us first inquire as to the other possible sources for this trend of thought. As we have already seen, Schleiermacher himself believed in the psychological approach to the problems of theology and came very near to Wobbermin's demand that this psychology be transcendental. The influence of Schleiermacher on Wobbermin in this direction was undoubtedly the first important one.⁷⁴ Julius Kaftan, Wobbermin's teacher at Berlin, emphasized the empirical as opposed to the dogmatic and purely historical aspect of theology and also showed a special interest in problems of psychology of religion.⁷⁵ Wundt's genetic study of religion and Troeltsch's Apriorism were influential though they received much criticism. Just how much, then, can be credited to the influence of James?

In the first place, James's Varieties was the earliest comprehensive study of psychology of religion.⁷⁶ It influenced Wobbermin sufficiently to lead him to project a systematic treatment of the problem of psychology of religion as an introduction to his translation, an intention which he was, however, unable to carry out at that time. He regards the influence of James as implicit in all his later study of systematic theology and

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of Schleiermacher.⁷⁷ During the period from 1902, when the Varieties first appeared, to 1913, when Wobbermin published the first volume of his Systematische Theologie, his relation to James was very prominent in his writings. He felt that James's application of the psychological method to the study of religion was more satisfactory on the whole than that of Schleiermacher.⁷⁸

From 1913 on there is a gradual turn away from James, or at least away from any explicit use of James, and back to Schleiermacher. The second volume of the Systematische Theologie, which appeared in 1921, announced as its purpose:

Zurück zu Schleiermacher! und: von Schleiermacher aus vorwärts!⁷⁹

James was still mentioned frequently, but the problem of his relation to pragmatism was constantly in the foreground. Wobbermin rejects pragmatism, and appears to be really troubled by this aspect of James's thought. From this time on James's name is almost wholly dropped. It is mentioned by once in the third volume of Systematische Theologie (1925)⁸⁰ and is omitted in every case where the "religio-psychological" method is discussed and referred to Schleiermacher.⁸¹

Several explanations of this change are possible. In the first place, Wobbermin's treatment of James in Das Wesen der Religion shows that he was increasingly dissatisfied with James's empiricism.⁸² He had at first felt that James's method was a successful escape from the narrow empiricism of most psychologists of religion but he later came to doubt this conclusion. This consequently meant a change in his view of James's

success in presenting a transcendental psychology. Schleiermacher's analysis came much nearer to Wobbermin's.⁸³ Furthermore, the two-fold aspect of the method of the "religio-psychological" circle shows the direct influence of Schleiermacher,⁸⁴ while James very largely omitted the historical side of the study. His interest in James centered, therefore, in the new light which James threw on the psychological side of Schleiermacher's teachings.

Another ground for the change seems to lie in James's philosophical development of his early thought. Wobbermin's interest was aroused by the psychological method of The Will to Believe and the Varieties, but James's later writings were increasingly remote from the thought of Wobbermin and his interest was largely exhausted with the translation of the Varieties and the meeting of German criticism. James's philosophy had an unfavorable reception in Germany and Wobbermin's motives for making a translation of the Varieties were widely questioned.

Wobbermin himself feels that his attitude toward James has not changed and that the influence of James is implicit in his present treatment of Schleiermacher and in his systematic theology.⁸⁵ We may conclude that James's influence on Wobbermin's methodology is that of an original impetus and a constant undertone but that it is not a continued source of intellectual guidance.

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Wetmore's belief in his own philosophy is to be opposed both to pragmatism and pluralism, two of the most characteristic features of the thought of James. In this chapter we shall consider the problem of pragmatism, leaving the discussion of pluralism until Chapter V.

Pragmatism is treated by James primarily as the method of finding metaphysical truth and as its criterion. While related to his psychological method of describing consciousness explicitly, it goes beyond the merely psychological. James accepts the psychological method as a necessary basis for the normative science of religion but regards the pragmatic method as an independent account of the nature of truth.

CHAPTER IV PRAGMATIC METHOD IN PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

Wetmore's interpretation of James is based almost entirely on impressions derived from the latter's Psychology, The Will to Believe, and The Varieties of Religious Experience. Although some few references are made to later writings, they are used merely in confirmation of Wetmore's earlier interpretation of James's philosophy and methodology. He has not read the Lectures in Radical Empiricism, Some Problems of Philosophy, and James's Letters. In our treatment of James special reference will be made to the earlier works, but later writings will also be used wherever they seem to offer the best support of the meaning. This is justifiable because James's fundamental concepts remained practically constant from the time that he adopted pluralism under the influence of Hegelism. In The Will to Believe, his pluralism is stated and pragmatism is not explicitly stated, although without the latter the former is

CHAPTER IV

FRANKLIN METHOD IN ETHICS OF RELIGION

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A. THE MEANING OF PRAGMATISM

James's pragmatism has been rather generally misunderstood, and his own statements of the view vary rather widely so that a unified conception of what he really meant is difficult to attain. In the first place, pragmatism is for James a philosophical methodology which serves as a protest against abstract intellectualism. This method is defined as

the attitude of looking away from first things, principles, 'categories,' supposed necessities; and of looking towards last things, fruits, consequences, facts.²

The rationalism which James meant to attack by means of this methodology had surely underemphasized the significance of consequences and empirical facts. James probably overemphasized them, but his defense of the empirical method was nevertheless a valuable contribution to the philosophical thought of the last twenty-five years.

Pragmatism meant, further, a definite theory of truth which may be stated briefly in a preliminary form as follows:

True ideas are those that we can assimilate, validate, corroborate and verify.
False ideas are those that we cannot.³

This definition implies the dependence of truth upon the individuals in whom the verifying process takes place, and therefore makes truth relative and growing.

A third formulation of the pragmatic principle, from the same volume, is an application of the theory to religious truth, though James also applied it in this sense to truth in

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general.

If theological ideas prove to have a value for concrete life, they will be true, for pragmatism, in the sense of being good for so much. For how much more they are true, will depend entirely on their relations to the other truths that also have to be acknowledged.⁴

Three different elements in the pragmatic doctrine are brought out by these definitions: first, its concern for the practical empirical starting point in philosophy and for a just interpretation of empirical detail; secondly, its view of truth as in the making; and thirdly, its acceptance of satisfactory consequences as an important (some critics have said, the only) element in the pragmatic criterion of truth. We shall consider these points in detail.

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1. Empiricism

James's contribution to empiricism is not to be underestimated. His pragmatism is a demand that attention be given to human experience as it is actually lived through and that no philosophy be accepted which does not meet the facts of this actual everyday experience. James particularly rebelled against philosophies like that of Bradley which substitute conceptual abstraction for the living reality of the perceptual world and so "lose the inner secret of its wholeness."⁵ In this he is consciously in harmony with the thought of Bergson.⁶ Bradley's theory makes immediate experience illusory, a mere "patchwork" rather than a "unity like that which the living perception gave."⁷ Bradley escapes skepticism by assuming

beyond the vanishing point of the whole conceptual perspective, an 'absolute' reality, in which the coherency of feeling and the completeness of the intellectual⁸ ideal shall unite in some indescribable way.

But such a vague Absolute only serves to contradict the most real thing we have, our own experience, and must be given up as a useless and untrue metaphysical monster. James's loyalty to experience compelled him to reject such logic as that employed by Bradley and others to prove the Absolute.⁹

Taking the empirical attitude seriously, the pragmatist tests the truth of his ideas about experience by acting upon them and seeing whether they lead to the consequences predicted. When two rival theories are compared, we can judge their truth by considering what consequences for future action flow from each. In the Varieties, James adopts from British

I. Introduction

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this he is consciously in harmony with the thought of Hegel.
Hegel's theory makes immediate experience illusory, a mere
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world is given. Hegel's theory is characterized by assuming
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ceptual structure, an "absolute" reality,
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Behind this empirical attitude, however, the firmness
that tests the truth of his ideas about experience by seeing
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dicted. When two rival theories are compared, we can judge
their truth by considering what consequences for future action
flow from each. In the Pragmatic, James would free himself

philosophy the principle that, if no differences can be found in the consequences, the theories may be judged indistinguishable if not identical. He says,

The guiding principle of British philosophy has in fact been that every difference must make a difference, every theoretical difference somewhere issue in a practical difference, and that the best method of discussing points of theory is to begin by ascertaining what practical difference would result from one alternative or the other being true.¹⁰

James applies this test vividly in his Pragmatism to the question whether the world is run by matter or by spirit. The future alone can offer a solution, James holds, and the experiment must be an inductive testing of experienced facts, not a "logical" deduction from abstract categories and first principles. The question which the pragmatist asks is, What practical difference does it make if the world is run by matter rather than by spirit?

It makes not a single jot of difference so far as the past of the world goes, whether we deem it to have been the work of matter or whether we think a divine spirit was its author.¹¹

Assuming the world to have come to an end, a person looking back over its course would find all the values that have been experienced.

The actually experienced world is supposed to be the same in its details on either hypothesis matter or spirit ... Calling matter the cause of it retracts no single one of the items that have made it up, nor does calling God the cause augment them.¹²

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It, however, there is a future, the idea of God as usually

active makes all the difference in the world.

It guarantees an ideal order that shall be permanently preserved. A world with a God in it to say the last word, may indeed burn up or freeze, but we then think of him as still mindful of the old ideals and sure to bring them elsewhere to fruition; so that, where he is, tragedy is only provisional and partial, and shipwreck and dissolution not the absolutely final things.¹³

James later revised his thought somewhat and granted that by the hypothesis of a God, even in a world which had come to an end, positive values would be added which would have been impossible if matter had been the ultimate principle. Matter is as impotent as an "automatic sweetheart" to respond with personal interest and sympathy to human love and worship. It simply does not "work" pragmatically. Therefore, regardless of the future, the hypothesis of a God is pragmatically true in so far as it makes a difference which is empirically verifiable.¹⁴

James made a very important contribution to philosophy by his insistence on the search for significant consequences.

Yet there is a difficulty in the method of interpreting ideas by tracing their practical consequences. Some ideas have no practical consequences for future action unless the conception is taken in a very broad sense. Such ideas, James would say, would have practical consequences if a situation ever arose in which we needed to use them. Facts of ancient history, for instance, may function practically by giving our thinking a wider orientation and helping us to a better understanding of the present.

It guarantees an ideal order that shall be permanently preserved. A world with a God in it to say the least word, may indeed turn up or freeze, but we then think of him as still standing at the old ideal and sure to bring about elsewhere to fulfill; so that, where he is, there is only provision and partial, and mischeck and dissipation not the absolutely final things.¹³

James later revised his thought somewhat and granted that by the hypothesis of a God, even in a world which had come to an end, positive values would be added which would have been impossible if matter had been the ultimate principle. Matter is as important as an "automatic sweetener" to respond with personal interest and sympathy to human love and sympathy. It simply does not "work" pragmatically. Therefore, regardless of the future, the hypothesis of a God is practically true in so far as it makes a difference which is practically verifiable.¹⁴

James made a very important contribution to philosophy by his insistence on the search for significant consequences. Yet there is a difficulty in the method of interpreting ideas by tracing their practical consequences. Some ideas have no practical consequences for future action unless the conception is taken in a very broad sense. Such ideas, James would say, would have practical consequences if a situation ever arose in which we needed to use them. Facts of ancient history, for instance, may function practically by giving our thinking a wider orientation and helping us to a better understanding of the present.

James's view of the empirical character of relations is also of great significance. It is the insistence that human experience be taken as a whole and interpreted so that no empirically given elements are ignored or referred with undue haste to some metaphysical Absolute. Relations are experienced and those philosophies which regard this experience as not empirically given simply have not been empirical. This whole question of James's treatment of relations has been taken up in Chapter I and will be referred to again in Chapter V.¹⁵ It is mentioned here simply as showing the empirical demands of pragmatism.

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matism.

2. Truth in the Making

This formulation of the pragmatic position is very difficult to understand fairly because of the ambiguity in the use of the word "truth." In most ordinary thought truth is regarded as reference to objective reality. When our ideas describe an object correctly they are said to be true. When they fail to agree with the object they are untrue. But there is a true judgment which may always be made and by which our imperfect judgments are criticized. Truth, according to this view, is a logical quality of our ideas as tested by whatever objective reality they may refer to. James is not satisfied with this account of truth which seems to make it a static matter. He wishes to analyze the situation further and define just what quality it is that belongs to ideas when we call them true. This quality seems to be verifiability. An idea is true when it is verifiable, when it leads to the results predicted.

Against this view it may be argued that verification adds nothing to the truth of an idea. It merely shows us that the idea was in the beginning true - or false. If any change had to be made in the idea in order to make verification possible, that really amounts to admitting that the original idea was false and that only a new idea can fulfill the conditions. Thus the idea has not changed in the process of verification, but rather our knowledge of its fitness to describe the object which we mean has grown. Truth is no quality added to the idea, but rather our knowledge of the truth of an idea is another

judgment, intimately associated with the first.

One reason for James's advocacy of this view of truth was the fact that all our knowledge is admittedly so hypothetical. He thought by his definition to allow for a growing truth. But it seems to the writer, as to many others, that it is better to describe our present knowledge as largely hypothetical than to misuse so valuable a conception as that of truth.

The natural inference from the pragmatic theory of a growing truth is the assertion that truth is purely an individual affair, to which reality need not conform. It is a subjective account of truth based upon the way in which it is arrived at. But James did not accept this inference from his theory and did his best to convince his critics that his theory, like theirs, rested on a belief in objective reality. He was an epistemological realist.¹⁶

His realism dominated his dynamic view of nature and of truth. He did not go to the extreme of denying that there were many facts which were true objectively and independently of their verification. He says,

The future movements of the stars or the facts of past history are determined now once for all, whether I like them or not. They are given irrespective of my wishes, and in all that concerns truths like these subjective preference should have no part; it can only obscure the judgment.¹⁷

This view is true not only of his early thought as expressed in The Will to Believe¹⁸ but also of his mature statement of pragmatism. In The Meaning of Truth, he says that wherever the verifying process between idea and object is possible

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that idea will both be true, and will have
been true of that object, whether fully de-¹⁹
 veloped verification has taken place or not.

In saying this James makes the possibility of verification rather than the actual carrying out of the verifying process the test of truth. With this most of his critics would have agreed if they had understood him. James does not mean to deny that there is objective reality or that there is objective truth. But, as Perry says,²⁰ his interest is in such truth as is humanly attainable, and that is admittedly a relative and growing truth. No two persons agree completely and it is folly to talk of perfect objective certainty. Some of our beliefs are better established than others but all are to a certain extent hypothetical. We may, of course, give up to skepticism when we find that absolute truth is beyond our reach. But the practical, and at the same time the rational, attitude to take is one of faith, a faith that our present knowledge is partly true and that by thinking we can gain a higher degree of certainty. This empirical attitude toward the problem of knowledge is defended by James in The Will to Believe. He says,

When as empiricists we give up the doctrine of objective certitude, we do not thereby give up the quest or hope of truth itself. We ... still believe that we gain an ever better position towards it by systematically continuing to roll up experiences and think.²¹

In so far as James is asserting the hypothetical char-

acter of finite truth, he is clearly right. The objectionable aspect of his doctrine of truth as in the making lies in his confusion of truth with verification.

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agent of his doctrine of truth as in the making lies in his
conclusion of truth with verification.

3. Practical Consequences

The classical definition of truth as tested by consequences is:

The true ... is only the expedient in the way of our thinking.²²

Expediency must, however, be qualified by common sense. It cannot be based on the immediate facts alone but must be that sort of thinking which in the long run serves best to interpret our experience. Elsewhere James brings the idea out more clearly when he says that satisfaction

is assumed to consist of such satisfactions (in the plural) as concretely existing men actually do find in their beliefs. As we humans are constituted in point of fact, we find that to believe in other men's minds, in independent physical realities, in past events, in eternal logical relations, is satisfactory. ... Above all we find consistency satisfactory, consistency between the present idea and the entire rest of our mental equipment, including the whole order of our sensations, and that of our intuitions of likeness and difference, and our whole stock of previously acquired truths.²³

The inclusion of consistency among the necessary satisfactory consequences is overlooked by many critics of pragmatism.

James felt emphatically that no belief based on hasty generalizations could be regarded as defensible. It must be tested in the light of "the entire rest of our mental equipment" in order to give the type of satisfaction which arises from the feeling of consistency.

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the grounds for belief and practical action as James first conceived it.²⁴ The argument is as follows: In many situations in life there is a genuine alternative between positions where no amount of reasoning will prove conclusively which is true and right. In such instances it is the duty of the individual to act and to believe in the one that best satisfies his whole nature. In many cases faith actually creates the truth believed in. A man is, for instance, in doubt about his own power of resisting a particular temptation. If he maintains this attitude of doubt, he is practically certain to yield. If, on the other hand, he firmly believes in his own powers, he will in all probability have the necessary moral strength.

There are then cases where faith creates its own verification. Believe, and you shall be right, for you shall save yourself; doubt, and you shall again be right, for you shall perish. The only difference is that to believe is greatly to your advantage.²⁵

This method is undeniably valid in many moral situations and also in some physical situations where the effort of the individual is involved.

Its application to religion is questionable when it is made a criterion of religious truth. Religion by its very nature demands complete sincerity on the part of its adherents. But religious pragmatism may hold that more satisfactory consequences follow from belief in God than from disbelief and that therefore God's existence may be regarded as a true idea, i.e., satisfactory or expedient. Or it may hold that it is good for men to believe that God exists, whether there be any objective

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ceived it. The argument is as follows: In many situations
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There are two cases where faith creates
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self-evident or expected. Or it may hold that it is good for
men to believe that God exists, whether there be any subjective

reality which corresponds to the belief or not. But we must not charge James with holding the theory in this extreme form. He says explicitly that he does not mean to urge a comfortable faith which nevertheless contradicts present knowledge.²⁶ In the definition which we have already quoted,²⁷ he does say that ideas will be true for pragmatism - but in the sense of being good in some of their effects. That is, pragmatism admits that even false ideas may do some people good. But it does not assert that ideas can be true and false at the same time. Just how far they are to be regarded as true depends on their relation to other acknowledged truths.²⁸ This demand for a consideration of all acknowledged truths is an indication that, with all his pluralism, James yet felt the need to take reality as a whole and not merely piecemeal.

Some sort of belief about religion is necessary, for absolute demonstration in this sphere is impossible. Men must either accept the hypothesis that there is a God or that there isn't or suspend judgment forever. In the case of some hypotheses it is permissible to remain in uncertainty until the evidence is in.

Throughout the breadth of physical nature facts are what they are quite independently of us, and seldom is there any such hurry about them that the risks of being duped by believing a premature theory need be faced.²⁹

But in a matter like belief in God, a man's duty is to examine the evidence as far as it is possible for him to do so and then to commit himself to the view that seems most reasonable. The point which James wishes to emphasize is the duty of men to

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Throughout the opening of *Pragmatic Theology*
James says that they are quite independently
of us, and religion is not a mere matter
about which the risks of being judged by
believing a premature theory need be feared.
But in a matter like belief in God, a man's duty is to examine
the evidence as far as it is possible for him to do so and then
to commit himself to the view that seems most reasonable. The
point which James wishes to emphasize is the duty of men to

make definite choices in those "living options" which are of fundamental significance to their lives and in which no amount of waiting will bring absolute demonstration and where all prolonged waiting means so much loss of possible value. In the light of this situation James constructed what he called his "faith-ladder."³⁰

This phase of pragmatism has much in common with Kant's primacy of the practical reason and Karl Busch says,

Der Pragmatismus ... ist ein Stiefbruder
des Primats der praktischen Vernunft.³¹

Kant had showed the hypothetical character of the deliverances of the pure theoretical reason and asserted the supremacy of the practical or moral. Fichte, Lotze, and Ritschl all emphasized this same imperative character of moral reason, and Wobbermin also lays great weight on moral concepts.

In a recent article on "Wagnis im Glauben,"³² Wobbermin has given an appreciative statement of James's pragmatism with which we shall close this section.

William James hat einst eine kleine Schrift unter dem Titel *The Will to Believe* ... veröffentlicht, die zu dem Besten gehört, was der berühmte Psychologe überhaupt geschrieben hat. Der Glaube, von dem James hier spricht, ist nicht der spezifisch religiöse, geschweige denn der spezifisch christliche Glaube. Es ist vielmehr der Glaube, wie er in aller Weltanschauung wirksam ist, auch wenn sie keine bewusste Beziehung zu Religion hat - der Glaube als willensmässige Entscheidung in lebenswichtigen Angelegenheiten. Solch willensmässige Entscheidung existentieller Art ist aber auch im religiösen, zumal im christlichen Glauben ein bedeutsames Element. So sehr der Glaube im Sinne des Christentums seiner eigenen Überzeugung gemäss reines Gnadengeschenk Gottes ist, so gewiss ist er doch andererseits immer zugleich freier Akt des Gläubigen.³³

make definite choices in those "living options" which are of
fundamental importance to their lives and in which no amount
of waiting will bring about a desirable result and where all
prolonged waiting means so much loss of valuable value. In
the light of this situation James constructed what is called
his "first ladder" - 30

This game of pragmatism has much in common with Kant's
theory of the practical reason and Kant's own says,
"Der praktische Vernunft... ist ein kategorischer
Befehl, der Vernunft zu handeln zu lassen."
Kant had shown the hypothetical character of the maxims of
the pure theoretical reason and asserted the supremacy of
the practical or moral. Right, justice, and wisdom all re-
sulted from the same imperative character of moral reason, and
Kant's law of duty was not an ethical concept.
In a recent article on "We are in the gutter," J. W. Wobber-
min has given an original and valuable statement of Kant's position
with which I shall close this section.

William James hat nicht eine kleine Anzahl
von Tugenden, die er als Tugenden bezeichnet, wie
Gerechtigkeit, die zu dem besten Resultat, was
der Vernunft ethische Überlegung erreichen kann,
führt. Von Gerechtigkeit, von dem besten Resultat,
hat nicht der Vernunft ethische Überlegung, sondern
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B. THE PLACE OF PRAGMATISM IN JAMES'S PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

Wobbermin believed that James's pragmatism not only could but also must be separated completely from his psychology of religion if the latter was to serve as an adequate method for philosophy of religion.³⁴ Wobbermin felt that in the Varieties James's psychological methodology stood in no necessary relation to his pragmatism, and he omitted from his translation the "Postscript" which sketched James's pluralistic-pragmatic metaphysics. He has been very generally criticized for this omission which seems to be based on personal prejudice against the thoughts expressed and not to have scientific justification.³⁵ Wundt in particular criticized him most harshly both for seeking to introduce pragmatism into German philosophy of religion and for omitting the "Postscript" which, according to him, is the very key to the entire work. In explaining the second, Wundt writes,

Deutsche Theologen ... haben dem Pragmatismus, wenn nicht in jeder Beziehung, so doch vor allem in dem, was man seine Religionspsychologie genannt hat, ihre Anerkennung gezollt. Nun ist freilich weder die Psychologie im allgemeinen noch die Religionspsychologie insbesondere ein aus der gesamten Philosophie des Pragmatismus loszulösendes Gebiet. Sie ist das eigentlich ebensowenig, wie man etwa Hegels Lehre vom "subjektiven Geiste" aus seinem System herausnehmen und als selbständige Psychologie behandeln darf.³⁶

Wobbermin's originally stated purpose of arousing interest in psychology of religion did not commit him to James's pragmatic philosophy and his introduction to the translation

of the Varieties clearly stated his anti-pragmatic sentiments.³⁷ Therefore Wundt's first criticism is certainly unjust.

Wundt's further criticism that it is only through pragmatism that an adequate understanding of James's psychology can be gained and that the two cannot be separated, is, if true, more important. According to Wundt's claim,

die deutschen Theologen, die den Pragmatismus gleichzeitig rezipierten und von ihm abstrahierten, haben daher selbst erst jene Materialiensammlung zu einer Religionspsychologie gemacht, was sie weder ihrem Ursprung nach sein sollte, noch ihrem Wesen nach sein kann.³⁸

Two questions are involved in the problem set by Wundt: first, as to James's intention in the Varieties; and secondly, as to the possibility of deriving from the book a psychological methodology which is independent of pragmatism.

In regard to the first we may ask whether James really meant to make the entire Varieties an exposition of his philosophy of religion rather than a psychological study. A reference to his Letters is significant here. In 1899, while he was working on the Gifford Lectures, he wrote that he intended the first series to be an objective study and the second

my own last will and testament, setting forth the philosophy best adapted to normal religious needs.³⁹

His intention, therefore, was to fulfill both the psychological and the philosophical objectives but, in the actual working out of the lectures, his psychological material went beyond his original expectations and his "Postscript" is the only clear indication of the philosophy of religion which he hoped to present there but had to reserve for later exposition.⁴⁰

Wobbermin is therefore right in so far as James failed to fulfill his second purpose in these lectures. He does not deny that James himself had a distinct interest in the philosophical outcome of his psychology of religion. Yet, as Wobbermin says, it is The Will to Believe which furnishes the point of transition between the psychology of the Varieties and James's later pragmatic philosophy.⁴¹ Wobbermin is, however, at fault in so far as he ignores other pragmatic-pluralistic elements which appear scattered through the Varieties. These are included in the translation and, in some cases, are given a more pragmatic coloring than the original seems to demand.⁴²

Wobbermin is also right in holding that is it possible to derive from James a psychological methodology which is consistent and which may be used independently of his metaphysical conclusions. The empirical method of studying the data of immediate religious experience, sketched in the preceding chapter, is in general a fair interpretation of James's psychological intent as expressed in the Varieties. There is no objective necessity for reading this empirical methodology pragmatically. The pragmatic element is a very minor point, and William Stern is correct in saying,

Zweifelloos liegt der eigentliche Wert des
Werkes im Psychologischen.⁴³

Wundt's criticisms cannot be maintained.

There remains, however, the further question as to the relation of pragmatism to James's philosophy of religion. There

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Wobbermin's criticism of James's psychology of religion is not a criticism of his philosophy of religion.

Wobbermin's criticism cannot be maintained.

There remains, however, the further question as to the relation of pragmatism to James's philosophy of religion. There

is little doubt that, although James agreed to the omission of the "Postscript,"⁴⁴ it contained suggestions of the metaphysical interest which was central in his thought on religion. The pragmatic aspect was particularly prominent in his earlier writings but is also to be seen in his "faith-ladder" and in his assertions about "life exceeding logic,"⁴⁵ both of which appear in A Pluralistic Universe.

James hoped by the objective psychological method of the Varieties to discover the common needs of the religious life and so to make possible a philosophy "best adapted" to meeting these needs.⁴⁶ The pragmatic emphasis on the adaptation of philosophy to needs is unfortunate but doubtless should be taken in connection with the argument, in The Will to Believe, that our religious needs as well as our scientific needs may point to real aspects of the structure of the universe.

The inner need of believing that this world of nature is a sign of something more spiritual and eternal than itself is just as strong and authoritative in those who feel it, as the inner need of uniform laws of causation ever can be in a professionally scientific head. The toil of many generations has proved the latter need prophetic. Why may not the former one be prophetic, too? And if needs of ours outrun the visible universe, why may not that be a sign that an invisible universe is there? What, in short, has authority, to debar us from trusting our religious demands? Science as such assuredly has no authority, for she can only say what is, not what is not; and the agnostic "thou shalt not believe without coercive sensible evidence" is simply an expression (free to any one to make) of private personal appetite for evidence of a peculiar kind.⁴⁷

This is far from a dogmatic assertion that we should believe practically in a world which we know theoretically to be unreal.

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The first need of believing that the world
of nature is a sign of something more spiritual
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and authoritative as those who feel it.
The latter need of uniform laws of causation
ever can be in a philosophical and scientific
sense. The belief of many generations ago was that
the latter need was a hypothesis, why not the
former and be a hypothesis, too? And if needs of
our nature the visible universe, why not
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Believe as much as we can, but not what is
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practically in a world which we know theoretically to be unreal.

Wobbermin reaches the same conclusion by a more critical route in his argument for the moral proof of the existence of God.⁴⁸

We may conclude, then, that, while the psychological method of the Varieties may justifiably be taken in isolation from the metaphysical aspects of the volume, for James the purpose of the book was not exhausted in its psychology of religion but was essentially the purpose to lay the foundations for a pragmatic-pluralistic philosophy of religion.

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C. WOBBERMIN'S CRITIQUE OF PRAGMATISM

Wobbermin did not distinguish between the various emphases in James's pragmatism but considered it as a whole and felt himself completely out of sympathy with the theory involved. He did not regard James's empiricism as pragmatic, though it was clearly a phase of the pragmatic philosophy in James's own thought. Wobbermin thoroughly agreed with James on the importance of experience as over against dogma of any kind. Yet he felt a difficulty in the use of the term "empirical" to describe the method of either James or Schleiermacher. Both were unclear on the matter.

James James spricht auch von "rein empirischer Philosophie" und fühlt sich mit seinem Pragmatismus als Vertreter solcher empirical philosophy. Dieser in seinem strengen Wortlaut völlig widersinnige Begriff lässt aber andererseits erkennen, was James in beiden Fällen mit dem Terminus empirisch zum Ausdruck bringen will. Es ist das grundsätzliche Zurückgehen auf die Erfahrung, das er durch jenen Begriff festzulegen sucht. Und dieser Grundsatz gestaltet sich dann also für das religiöse Gebiet zu dem des Rückganges auf die religiöse Erfahrung.⁴⁹

In so far as pragmatism means appeal to inner experience, Wobbermin accepts it. But he felt that James laid too great weight on the empirical, particularly in drawing his pluralistic metaphysical conclusions.

Wobbermin adds little to the general criticism of James's conception of a relative and growing truth. He recognized, of course, the relativity of human knowledge but was unwilling to abandon absolute truth as an ideal or to confuse truth and

knowledge. In discussing his view of faith as ethically conditioned personal conviction he says,

Von dieser Position aus ... muss ich allen Dogmatismus ablehnen, andererseits aber auch allen endgültigen und absoluten Relativismus ablehnen, so sehr ich den empirischen Relativismus schätze und überall durchzuführen entschlossen bin.⁵⁰

He admits the importance of empirical relativism but rejects absolute relativism. James, on the other hand, finds the conception of a growing universe and a growing God more acceptable.

But it was with the concept of practical consequences as a test of religious truth that Wobbermin felt the greatest difficulty. He interpreted James's view of truth as that which satisfies in the narrow sense of immediate satisfaction of desires. But truth, he said, must not be confused with any subjective interest in its attainment. A concept may be practical and yet be totally false. In his criticism of Haeckel, Wobbermin expresses this criticism, showing that the theoretical interest in truth and the ideal of truth grow gradually in the race but that, once the ideal is recognized, it stands forever afterward in its own right and independent of practical interests.⁵¹ Pragmatism, however, according to Wobbermin, is willing to take the interest in truth without any epistemological criticism and make it constitutive for religion.⁵²

Die methodische Verwertung des Wahrheitsinteresses darf also nicht ohne Weiteres in irgend eine Art philosophischer Wahrheitsbegründung umgesetzt werden. In diesen Fehler ist z.B. William James verfallen, indem er die besprochene Verwechslung benutzt, um seinen sog. Pragmatismus in die religionsphilosophische Arbeit einzutragen.⁵³

... in discussing his view of truth as ethically con-
ditioned personal conviction he says:

Von dieser Position aus ... wie ich schon
begegnung und Leben, andererseits aber
auch die Erfahrung und die Erkenntnis der
Welt als gegeben, so ist die Welt
nicht relativ, sondern absolut und dauerhaft
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allgemeine Wahrheit.

This treatment of the problem of truth is not, Wobbermin holds, a necessary consequence of the psychological method but results from a certain confusion in James's thought.

James will durch seine religionspsychologischen Untersuchungen sogar einen ganz direkten Beitrag zur Wahrheitsfrage liefern, so dass bei James gerade diese direkte Art, sozusagen eine "religionspsychologische" Entscheidung der Wahrheitsfrage zu versuchen, zu beanstanden ist. Denn diese einfache Einschiebung des ganzen Problems der Wahrheitsfrage in die Religionspsychologie beruht auf jenem von James so befürworteten Pragmatismus, der eine unklare Grenzvermischung zwischen Psychologie, Erkenntniskritik und Metaphysik bedeutet.⁵⁴

Wobbermin is clearly right in holding that James's treatment of pragmatism sets no clear boundaries. The various definitions discussed earlier in the present chapter are an indication of this fact. But it seems to the writer that Wobbermin is wrong in asserting that James puts his psychology in the service of his pragmatism.⁵⁵ He derives from his psychological study certain metaphysical implications but in so doing he is consciously going beyond the realm of psychology. Wobbermin does the same thing in his "transcendental psychology" and so must all metaphysics unless psychology is to be left as an isolated science with no contributions to make to our knowledge of reality. Wobbermin's difficulty may in part arise from his laying too exclusive emphasis on James's psychological phase. James intended his account of truth to be purely logical,⁵⁶ and did not mean his theory of interest to be taken in the sense of an illusionism which substitutes practicality for

truth.

James felt in the end that his choice of the word "pragmatism" was unfortunate and tried in a letter to Dickinson Miller to explain what he meant, using beans on a table toward which various possible attitudes that may be taken, depending upon interest and yet equally true. He concludes by saying,

All that Schiller and I contend for is that there is no "truth" without some interest, and that non-intellectual interests play a part as well as intellectual ones. Whereupon we are accused of denying the beans, or denying being in anyway constrained by them! It's too silly!⁵⁷

Wobbermin recognized this objective demand in James's pragmatism and defended him against the charge of holding to such illusionism as, for example, is found in Vaihinger's als-ob theory.

Die entschiedene Geltendmachung des Kriteriums der Brauchbarkeit und Nützlichkeit rückt diese Philosophie des als-ob in die nächste Nähe des Pragmatismus. Sie unterscheidet sich von letzterem aber durch das Gewichtlegen auf die bewusste Falschheit der betreffenden Annahme. Speziell für das Gebiet der Religion überwiegt dieser Unterschied die formale Analogie durchaus. Aus persönlicher Berührung mit William James weiss ich, dass seine eigene Stellung zur Religion und seine ganze Denkweise in Sachen der Religion eine total andere war, als diejenige der Philosophie des als-ob. Er meinte, durch seinen an der Frage nach der praktischen Bewährung orientierten Pragmatismus zugleich auch die Wahrheit der Religion wissenschaftlich vertreten zu können.⁵⁸

Although James did not go so far as the als-ob philosophy, Wobbermin still felt that he laid too great weight on practical verification, and explicitly rejected the pragmatic

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account, although he saw in it a distinct improvement on the irrational position of Vaihinger and said,

In dieser Hinsicht hat William James mit seinem scharfen Blick für die Lebenswirklichkeit viel klarer gesehen, und er vertritt mit seinem Pragmatismus eine zwar anfechtbare, weil einseitige, aber praktisch viel bedeutsamere Position als der Begründer der Philosophie des "als-ob."⁵⁹

This interpretation and partial defence of James is evidence of a growing understanding of James. It appears in the second volume of the Systematische Theologie (1921). Wobbermin's attack on pragmatism in his introductions to the Varieties and in his polemic writings between 1907 and 1914 shows much less appreciation of James's insistence on sincerity in belief. Both James and Wobbermin felt that religious experience would be of no value whatever to the individual if he were convinced of its objective illusoriness. As Wobbermin puts this,

Religiöse Erfahrung ohne diesen Wahrheitsanspruch ist nicht mehr religiöse Erfahrung im Sinne echter Religion. Eine Erfahrung, die sich als religiöse bezeichnen oder bezeichnen lassen wollte, ohne dass sie einen solchen Anspruch auf Wahrheitsgeltung erhöhe, die wäre wie ein Messer ohne Klinge.⁶⁰

With this James would have agreed perfectly although Wobbermin and other critics have not always recognized the fact.⁶¹ James does not deny the necessity of belief in the truth of religion in order that it may have value. His fundamental thought is not that we should believe in religion because it gives us temporary and superficial satisfaction but rather because it gives the most reasonable satisfaction as an explanation of all our experience. He says,

Philosophy and Religion have to interpret the total character of the world.⁶²

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Müller-Freienfels has defended James against the charge of cheap practicalism in his book on Die Philosophie des 20. Jahrhunderts.

In der Tat hat James sicherlich nie an die gemeine Nützlichkeit bei seiner Theorie gedacht, sondern vor allem an jene feineren, seelischen Notwendigkeiten und Befriedigungen die uns einer Theorie geneigt machen, und zu denen z.B. auch der Wunsch nach Aufhebung von Widersprüchen und der nach möglichster Klarheit der Begriffe gehört. Auch die geistige Harmonie zählt ja zu den vitalen Bedürfnissen, und so lassen sich die feinsten Probleme des Denkens, die weitab von allem banalen Nutzen liegen, in die pragmatistischen Theorie einordnen.⁶³

Wobbermin comes nearer to James's position on belief than he seems to realize when, in his early writings, he analyzes sense experience and religious experience and points out the gaps in each which must be bridged by faith. He admits also, in the quotation given above,⁶⁴ that in religious experience we have a truth-claim (Wahrheitsanspruch) rather than objective certainty. Nevertheless he goes beyond James in his feeling of the certainty of the religious consciousness of God as opposed to the hypothetical knowledge which we have of the external world.

Der religiöse Glaube ist in keiner Weise eine Hypothese. Sondern er ist eben eine innerlich-persönliche, ethisch bedingte Überzeugung. Und zwar eine Überzeugung, die - wenigstens der Überzeugung nach - gerade herausführt aus dem ganzen Gebiet des Hypothetischen und hineinführt in die Sphäre der absoluten Wahrheit, weil der absoluten Wirklichkeit.⁶⁵

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Die metaphysische Weltanschauung sucht die Wahrheit; und wo sie sich der Grenzen menschlichen Denkens bewusst wird, sucht sie nur teilweise Wahrheit und Annäherung an die Wahrheit. Die Religion aber lebt - ihrer Überzeugung nach - in der Wahrheit und aus der Wahrheit heraus. Religiöse Erfahrung will, soweit ihr eigentlich religiöser Charakter reicht, Erfahrung der Wahrheit sein.⁶⁶

The parenthetical "ihrer Überzeugung nach" is a suggestion that in this context all the evidence for the conviction had not been given, but it does not indicate any real doubt on the part of Wobbermin as to its truth. Metaphysics only seeks truth and is limited by the nature of finite consciousness. But religion is an immediate experiencing of truth and reality. The transcendent world of religious faith is the true world, the world of absolute reality and absolute value. Compared with this realm the ~~external~~ world is only phenomenal.⁶⁷

While Wobbermin believes that he has rejected pragmatism he has incorporated in his own thought some of its important ideas.

1. The first part of the report is a general
introduction to the subject of the study.
It is a very important part of the report
and should be written in a clear and concise
manner. It should state the purpose of the
study and the objectives of the research.
It should also state the scope of the study
and the limitations of the research.

2. The second part of the report is the
literature review. This part of the report
should provide a comprehensive overview of the
current state of knowledge on the subject of
the study. It should identify the key
issues and debates in the field and provide
a critical analysis of the existing literature.
It should also identify the gaps in the
literature and provide a justification for the
current study.

3. The third part of the report is the
methodology. This part of the report should
describe the research design and the methods
used to collect and analyze the data. It
should provide a detailed description of the
sample and the data collection procedures.
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a justification for the choice of methods.

SUMMARY

In the present chapter we have analyzed the concept of pragmatism. Three phases are evident in James's thought. In the first place, pragmatism is that philosophical method which seeks to take all of experience into account. It is, secondly, the theory that all our present truth is relative and growing. And finally, it is the view that our truth is tested by consequences.

While Wobbermin intended to reject James's pragmatism, he adopted its empirical aspect, accepted relative truth so far as the empirical order was concerned, and appealed to satisfactory consequences in the sense of those beliefs which meet religious needs.

In regard to the omission of the "Postscript" from Wobbermin's translation, the critics are right in saying that it represented James's primary interest and that a translation should be as complete as possible. But Wobbermin is correct in holding that James's psychological methodology can be taken independently of his pragmatism.

James's pragmatism is to be criticized for confusing truth with knowledge and for not distinguishing clearly his transitions from psychology to epistemology and from epistemology to metaphysics. But James does not hold to illusionism or practicalism. His demand for satisfactory consequences is a demand that every truth-claim be tested by the whole system of experience, including moral consciousness, and that nothing be regarded as true which does not satisfactorily meet the conditions set by the whole system of ideas.

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CHAPTER V

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On the question of metaphysics James and Wobbermin differed. James's point of view was pluralistic, although in his later thinking he made some concessions to absolutism. Wobbermin's metaphysics is essentially monistic, in spite of his objection to this terminology.¹ Both James and Wobbermin avoid the term "idealism" as descriptive of their thought because of its absolutistic connotations. James often speaks of idealism, meaning absolute idealism, and criticizes it most vigorously. He distinguishes his own point of view from naturalism or materialism by calling it spiritualism² or radical empiricism.³ He rejects a dualistic spiritualism which separates God from the world and spirit from matter.⁴ In place of this view, which he ascribes to orthodox theism,⁵ he takes the pantheistic position which puts God and man in relations of intimacy.⁶ But a further distinction must be made in order to give room to pluralism. Pantheistic spiritualism must be divided into monistic and pluralistic types.⁷ What James seems to be trying to say is that reality is all of the same character (vs. dualism), that this character is mental (vs. materialism), but that within this substantial homogeneity there must be recognized a plurality of individual forms - "eaches," persons, and things-(vs. absolutism). James is vague as to the status of things, sometimes describing his view as natural realism.⁸ The same is true of Wobbermin's account of things. He claims empirical dualism within an

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is vague as to the status of things, sometimes describing his
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account of things. He claims empirical realism, which is

ontologically mentalistic monism,⁹ but does not give a clear metaphysics of nature. They agree in accepting mentalism, in opposing monistic pantheism, and in regarding personality as of supreme importance.

The present chapter will consider these two metaphysical positions with special reference to their implications for philosophy of religion. It will propose through this study to discover the nature and extent of the influence of James's metaphysics on Wobbermin.

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A. JAMES'S PLURALISTIC METAPHYSICS

Pluralism was originally a protest against absolutism of all kinds. It declares reality to be made up of many individual parts which could never be included in any "all-one" or absolute. It is an assertion of the externality of relations as opposed to the internality of relations claimed by monistic philosophies. James says,

Everything you can think of, however vast or inclusive, has on the pluralistic view a genuinely 'external' environment of some sort or amount. Things are 'with' one another in many ways, but nothing includes everything, or dominates over everything. The word 'and' trails along after every sentence. Something always escapes. 'Ever not quite' has to be said of the best attempts made anywhere in the universe at attaining all-inclusiveness. The pluralistic world is thus more like a federal republic than like an empire or a kingdom. However much may be collected, however much may report itself as present at any effective centre of consciousness or action, something else is self-governed and absent and unreduced to unity. ... For pluralism, all that we are required to admit as the constitution of reality is what we ourselves find empirically realized in every minimum of finite life. Briefly it is this, that nothing real is absolutely simple, that every smallest bit of experience is a multum in parvo plurally related ... 10

James's pluralistic philosophy had its origin in his general empirical attitude, but he also found support for it in epistemology and metaphysics.

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1. Empirical Basis

Experience as it comes to us is made up of particulars which seem to stand out against each other as distinct individuals. James speaks of the "empirical sand-heap of the world,"¹¹ and feels that philosophy must account for this multiplicity and distinctness as well as for the order which is revealed in its relations. Absolutism fulfills the latter function at the expense of the former.

James's rebellion against all absolutisms is well shown in his attitude toward absolute pluralism. In his Pragmatism he asserts that the pragmatic philosophy

must equally abjure absolute monism and
absolute pluralism.¹²

An absolute pluralism or positivistic empiricism would fail as badly as an absolute monism or idealism in reaching the real truth about the world we live in. We find countless differences and yet we have to go beyond mere empiricism for the adequate explanation of them. Simply centering attention on particulars as they come leads to chaos and not to philosophy.

All the magnificent achievements of mathematical and physical science - our doctrines of evolution, of uniformity of law, and the rest - proceed from our indomitable desire to cast the world into a more rational shape in our minds than the shape into which it is thrown there by the crude order of our experience. The world has shown itself, to a great extent, plastic to this demand of ours for rationality. How much farther it will show itself plastic no one can say. Our only means of finding out is to try; and I, for one, feel as free to try conceptions of moral as of mechanical or of logical rationality.¹³

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This is a modified empiricism but one that can be rationally defended. It makes no dogmatic assertions about the nature of reality but offers a hypothetical method which has proved successful in the ordering of our experience. This method is particularly significant for religion since it suggests that we may start from the empirical basis of our moral experience and test the realities which it implies. This attitude has much in common with Wobbermin's interpretation of the place of the empirical in religion and its implications for a science of religion.¹⁴

Much empiricism is materialistic but James opposes materialism as strenuously as does Wobbermin. He says,

Pragmatism, devoted though she be to facts, has no such materialistic bias as ordinary empiricism labors under.¹⁵

Materialism is just as one-sided as rationalism. Both ignore part of experience; the one leaving out the facts of inner consciousness while the other overlooks the external world and much of the experience of finite persons. James and Wobbermin are keen critics of any partial philosophy. They take personal consciousness as the key to philosophy and analyze it rigorously, but not atomistically.¹⁶ The philosophy which they construct on the basis of their psychological methodology mediates between the two absolutistic extremes.

James's pluralism seems to lead to a "multiverse" in which unity is problematic. Things exist distributively and are in innumerable and changing relations which, according to him, are of "the strung-along type." But even on this view,

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Such empiricism is scientific but James opposes materialism as strenuously as does Woberman. He says:

Pragmatically, devoted though we be to facts, we have no such scientific bias as ordinary empiricism. Facts underlie.

Materialism is just as one-sided as rationalism. Both ignore part of experience; the one leaving out the facts of inner consciousness while the other overlooks the external world and much of the experience of finite persons. James and Woberman are keen critics of any partial philosophy. They take personal consciousness as the key to philosophy and analyze it rigorously, but not atomistically. The philosophy which they

construct on the basis of their psychological methodology makes a distinction between the two scientific extremes.

James's pluralism seems to lead to a "multiplicity" in which unity is problematic. Things exist distributively and are in themselves and changing relations which, according to him, are of "the strong-along type." But even on this view,

which makes the "each-form" fundamental, unity is possible.

If the each-form be the eternal form of reality no less than it is the form of temporal appearance, we still have a coherent world, and not an incarnate incoherence, as is charged by so many absolutists. Our 'multiverse' still makes a 'universe'; for every part, tho it may not be in actual or immediate connexion, is nevertheless in some possible or mediated connexion, with every other part however remote.¹⁷

James holds that this view preserves the manyness of concretely felt experience and at the same time provides through its "radical" empiricism the unity which rationalists have claimed to be "a property only of the absolute whole of things."¹⁸

James also differs both from monistic materialism and monistic idealism on the score of determinism. Monism logically leads to complete determinism. Materialism gives a causal determinism in which the whole future can unroll only as the past has ordered. The chain can nowhere be broken. Absolute idealism, on the other hand, teaches a block-universe within a timeless Absolute. But any type of determinism contradicts experienced facts (our feeling of choice, free will, etc.) and cannot be accepted without further evidence. The problem of freedom as such will be considered in greater detail later in this chapter. The point which is relevant in the present connection is that experience counts against belief in determinism.

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in this chapter. The point which is relevant in the present

connection is that experience counts against belief in deter-

minism.

2. Epistemological Arguments

Absolutism has based its argument for monism largely upon epistemological reasoning. It has held that relations among the objects of our experience can be explained only if we assume an Absolute in which those relations exist. Otherwise, they argue, it would be impossible for us to experience them at all for they are admittedly not always present in our experience and many of them we never have experienced. But, according to idealism, nothing exists outside conscious experience. Therefore an Absolute is necessary to preserve the rational order of the universe. The absolutists are, says James, too much influenced by the empiricist, Hume. They believe him when he says that relations are not experienced. As a matter of fact, Hume's analysis of experience is false. We experience relations just as truly as terms related. No absolute is needed, therefore, to make relations possible. And the very multiplicity of the relations so experienced makes pluralism more probable.¹⁹

James is an epistemological dualist, holding that in the act of knowing our ideas refer to objects which are external to our consciousness, known by inference and not immediately. In his famous "Tigers in India,"²⁰ James illustrates this point. Our ideas are one set of facts and the tigers are another. The pointing of the former to the latter is what is meant by knowing and demands no identity of idea and object so long as a connecting world of experience is granted.

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The ideas and the tigers are in themselves as loose and separate, to use Hume's language, as any two things can be; and pointing means here an operation as external and adventitious as any that nature yields.²¹

Some of our experience is, of course, immediate. Our feelings are immediate though the recognized cause of them is often objective rather than subjective. The case for absolutism depends on the acceptance of an ultimate epistemological monism, the view that idea and object are identical for absolute knowledge. However, since James and Wobbermin agree in rejecting epistemological monism, a discussion of it is not relevant in this connection.

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3. Religious Significance of Pluralism

Busch points out that there are two lines of thought that led James toward pluralism. We have just considered the empirico-logical and we now turn to the voluntaristic-ethical.²²

Ethical and religious considerations were very significant in James's earliest formulation of a pluralistic metaphysics, and he never gave up this position. As he tried to interpret experience he felt that certain demands were made by the moral nature which the universe must satisfy or show very good reasons for denying. Freedom is one of these demands, and there are some philosophies which either deny its reality or make it seriously problematic. While most thinkers have given freedom some place, monistic philosophies have had to hedge it in with so many limitations that it ceases to have much moral significance. James, on the other hand, shows that determinism destroys the meaning of such distinctions as that between good and evil. It is only by the hypothesis of freedom that we are justified in dividing the world into good and bad parts and in standing by the former.²³ If it were completely determined, we could not call anything bad for it would be merely what had to be under the circumstances.

Yet James does not argue for a universe of complete chance. That would be to exclude the possibility of a wise and loving God, to which objection he replies,

The belief in free-will is not in the least incompatible with the belief in Providence, provided you do not restrict the Providence

3. Religious Significance of Philosophy

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The belief in free-will is not in the least incompatible with the belief in Providence, provided you do not restrict the Providence

to fulminating nothing but fatal decrees. If you allow him to provide possibilities as well as actualities to the universe, and to carry on his own thinking in those two categories just as we do ours, chances may be there, uncontrolled even by him, and yet the end of all things may be just what he intended it to be from all eternity.²⁴

The last phrase grants more certainty of the outcome than James was usually willing to admit and is not fully representative of his later thought.²⁵

Theism has presented much this view for religious faith. Its God is a wise and good person who wills the moral development of finite persons and finds such development best achieved through the exercise of choice on the part of these finite persons. The provision of such genuine alternatives for finite choice does not necessarily mean a universe of chaos. For traditional theism, the final outcome is determined and all things gradually work toward it. And even for revised theism of the kind James accepts, there are certain fields in which choice is practically impossible, as for instance in the case of natural laws. Here man cannot choose to have things different from what they are, but he may still choose whether to obey or not to obey them. The consequences of either type of conduct are inevitable.

In moral and social fields alternatives are far more numerous and varied, effects less easily predictable, and ultimate consequences generally more significant. An individual or a group may decide upon a social policy and carry it out to

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In moral and social fields alternatives are far more
numerous and varied; effects less easily predictable, and im-
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or a group may decide upon a social policy and carry it out to

the extent of bringing social disaster. The present world situation offers suggestive material for such reflection. Choices are being made freely which lead to militarism in France, to Fascism in Italy, to internal friction in Germany, and to provincialism in America. The absolute God of traditional theism is difficult to reconcile with such a world situation. Considerations similar to these led James to the conclusion that, if there be a God, he must be finite.

James regarded God as limited not only by human free will, as theism has readily admitted, but also by nature. In The Will to Believe, he says explicitly,

We of the nineteenth century, with our evolutionary theories and our mechanical philosophies, already know nature too impartially and too well to worship unreservedly any God of whose character she can be an adequate expression. Truly, all we know of good and duty proceeds from nature; but none the less so all we know of evil. Visible nature is all plasticity and indifference, - a moral multiverse, as one might call it, and not a moral universe. ... If there be a divine Spirit of the universe, nature, such as we know her, cannot possibly be its ultimate word to man.²⁶

This same problem recurs in James's Pluralistic Universe where he describes the difficulties which arise from every form of monism and which "a frankly pluralistic theism escapes." Monism

introduces a speculative 'problem of evil' namely, and leaves us wondering why the perfection of the absolute should require just such particular hideous forms of life as darken the day for our human imaginations.²⁷

Orthodox theology has been content only when it could claim for its God perfection in every attribute. It has thought that God must be omnipotent, omniscient, and omnipres-

the extent of bringing social disaster. The present world situation offers suggestive material for such reflection. Choices are being made freely which lead to millenarianism in France, to Bolshevism in Italy, to internal friction in Germany, and to pro-vincialism in America. The absolute God of traditional theism is difficult to reconcile with such a world situation. Con-siderations similar to those led James to the conclusion that if there be a God, he must be finite.

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We of the nineteenth century, with our evolutionary theories and our mechanical philosophy, already know nature too imperially. It is too well to worship unreservedly any God of whose character we can be so sure. Henceforth, truly, all we know of good and duty proceeds from nature; but none the less so all we know of evil. What the nature is all this is, and indiffer-ence, - a moral indifference, as you might call it, and not a total universe. There is a divine Being at the universe, nature, such as we know not, cannot possi-ble be its ultimate word to man.

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Orthodox theology has been content only when it could claim for its God perfection in every attribute. It has thought that God must be omniscient, omnipotent, and omnires-

ent as well as perfectly good. It is evident that some of these attributes are overdrawn if the facts of experience are to be taken seriously. Many sincerely religious people have declared that these four attributes must be true and have, therefore, maintained that the world of experience was merely phenomenal in so far as it raised contradictions. But if the divine power is absolute and if the divine being is all-wise, he must know and will the evils of our existence, and no intellectual aid is offered by relegating these experiences to a phenomenal order. The omnipotence of God can be maintained only at the expense of his perfect goodness.²⁸

Yet goodness, in James's thought, is the essential attribute of God, if there be a God; and the choice, so far as religion is concerned, must be between a moral God and no God at all. To try to maintain the attribute of omnipotence is, he feels, either to give up reasoning in religion and to rest on blind faith,²⁹ or else it is to give up the God of religious experience for some philosophical conception of the whole of things, possessing unlimited power but seriously limited in goodness. In stating this moral critique of traditional theology, James is consciously reiterating Mill's criticism of the notion of omnipotence, which he says must be given up if God is to be maintained as a religious object.³⁰ Though James was never dogmatic regarding the existence of God, he thought that his philosophy gave reason for believing in the existence of a morally good but finite God. To critics of pragmatism he said,

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When I tell you that I have written a book on men's religious experience, which on the whole has been regarded as making for the reality of God, you will perhaps exempt my own pragmatism from the charge of being an atheistic system. I firmly disbelieve, myself, that our human experience is the highest form of experience extant in the universe. ... We may well believe, on the proofs that religious experience affords, that higher powers exist and are at work to save the world on ideal lines similar to our own.³¹

Among the proofs which religious experience gives, James listed the mystic's direct evidence of God which is, for the mystic, authoritative.³² For non-mystics the best evidence is to be found in the demands of moral insight and the differences which can be found in experience on the hypothesis of a God.³³

Only a pluralistic philosophy offers a God worthy of worship, James believes.³⁴ Pluralism is compatible with the view that God is one among many finite beings, more powerful and good than the others, to be sure, but of the same nature.³⁵ James writes,

The philosophy of the Absolute agrees with the pluralistic philosophy ... in that both identify human substance with divine substance.³⁶

But they differ widely in their views of the relations of these substances. For absolutism, the relation is that of inclusion of parts within a whole; while for pluralism, the world is a republican banquet

where all the qualities of being respect one another's personal sacredness, yet sit at the common table of space and time.³⁷

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the common table of reason and law.

The rights and values of human personality are recognized by a pluralistic philosophy more adequately than by monism. James even goes so far as to say,

Whether a God exists, or whether no God exists, in yon blue heaven above us bent, we form at any rate an ethical republic here below. ... 'The religion of humanity' affords a basis for ethics as well as theism does.³⁸

While this exaggerates the significance of positivism as a religion, it truly sets forth the independence of ethics from religion. Many have held that without religious sanctions there would be no moral duties, but such a view incorrectly ignores the universal character of the feeling of obligation.³⁹ It can arise and function independently of religion. Moral criticism is a basic factor in the construction of religious concepts, and no religion can endure which fails to meet moral demands. Yet ethics may maintain its autonomy against any existing religion. This thought is implicit in James's moral critique of religion.

One of the most persistent and difficult problems for philosophy of religion is that of evil. James holds that this problem is artificially created by absolutistic philosophies and that

the so-called mystery of evil and error, from which pluralistic metaphysics is entirely free⁴⁰

is the result of an abstract speculative view which demands more than the facts can grant. The "healthy-minded" are apt to ignore the assertions of the "sick souls." The typical

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answer of the former is that all seeming evils are for the development of moral character and therefore are good. To this easy optimism James puts the question of the moral value of the wild beasts' life of prey, of rattlesnakes, and the like. These cannot be lightly passed by.

It may be that no religious reconciliation with the absolute totality of things is possible. Some evils, indeed, are ministerial to higher forms of good, but it may be that there are forms of evil so extreme as to enter into no good system whatsoever ...⁴¹

Facts like these are serious and, many think, conclusive arguments against the position of absolutism and in favor of the pluralistic hypothesis. Humanism, which James reads theistically and pluralistically,

gets rid, not only of the standing 'problems' that monism engenders ('problem of evil,' 'problem of freedom,' and the like), but of other metaphysical mysteries and paradoxes as well.⁴²

Evil is not a problem to pluralistic philosophy of religion because it is accepted as a fact of experience which is not freely chosen by God, but which is something which he has to join us in combatting. Likewise freedom is not a problem, for it is granted that men are free and responsible for their choices. Their acts are not predetermined by God but are the results of human free will.

God's moral character is thus preserved at the expense of his omnipotence. The result is the conception of a finite God, primus inter pares,⁴³ who works with men in the achieving of ends. There is real hazard in the battle of the world

answer of the latter is that all seeming evils are for the advancement of moral character and therefore are good. To this many optimists have given the question of the moral value of the wild beasts' life of prey, of robberies, and the like. These cannot be lightly passed by.

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There is, not only of the standard 'problem' but moral evils (problem of evil), but of 'problem of freedom' and the like, but of other metaphysical questions and paradoxes as well.

Evil is not a problem to pluralistic philosophy at all. It is because it is accepted as a fact of experience which is not freely chosen by God, but which is something which he has to join us in committing. Likewise freedom is not a problem, for it is granted that men are free and responsible for their choices. Their acts are not predetermined by God but are the results of human free will.

God's moral character is thus preserved at the expense of his omnipotence. The result is the conception of a finite God, James later writes, who works with men in the achievement of ends. There is real hazard in the battle of the world.

and the final goal depends on human endeavor. We share in creating the world's salvation⁴⁴ or, if we so choose, its ultimate destruction. The significance of human activity is greatly enhanced by this view which is particularly characteristic, as Bixler has pointed out, of James's later thought.⁴⁵

God is not to be thought of as any transcendental Absolute who keeps his hands clean while men struggle.

His menial services are needed in the dust of our human trials, even more than his dignity is needed in the empyrean.⁴⁶

James's doctrine of meliorism expresses this active cooperation of the divine and the human in the overcoming of the evils of present existence.⁴⁷

As we noted in the introduction to the present chapter, James holds to a theory of divine immanence which he rather paradoxically characterizes as pluralistic pantheism. Its insight is

the vision of God as the indwelling divine rather than the external creator, and of human life as part and parcel of that deeper reality.⁴⁸

Immanence is paralleled by transcendence in the theistic as contrasted with the pantheistic view, and it is this theistic position which James defines as his own in The Will to Believe.

First, it is essential that God be conceived as the deepest power in the universe; and, second, he must be conceived under the form of a mental personality. ... God's personality is to be regarded, like any other personality, as something lying outside of my own and other than me, and whose existence I simply come upon and find. ... In whatever other respects the

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divine personality may differ from ours or may resemble it, the two are consanguineous at least in this, - that both have purposes for which they care, and each can hear the other's call.⁴⁹

Some of James's later statements are more monistic. This is particularly true of the discussion of the co-conscious in the Pluralistic Universe. Here he remarks,

The absolute is not the impossible being I once thought it. Mental facts do function both singly and together, at once, and we finite minds may simultaneously be co-conscious with one another in a super-human intelligence.⁵⁰

This panpsychistic view, adopted largely from Fechner, makes great concessions to absolutism. James even goes so far under its influence as to say,

We are indeed internal parts of God and not external creations, on any possible reading of the panpsychistic system.⁵¹

Yet this particular passage appears in a context where James is asserting the intimacy of the world when it is considered pluralistically and its foreignness when seen from the monistic point of view. Just how he can hold that finite persons are "internal parts of God" and yet that they remain individual and free is not perfectly clear.

Two phases of panpsychism seem to be confused here, the qualitative and the numerical, to use a distinction made by Miss Calkins.⁵² James holds that God and man are qualitatively of the same stuff, namely, consciousness, and that there is a continuity between the individual spirit and the "wider spiritual environment"⁵³ which surrounds him. This

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This phrase, "mental facts," applied largely from memory, means

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"water universal environment" which surrounds him. This

spiritual environment may be interpreted by analogy with the experience of a finite self.

My present field of consciousness is a centre surrounded by a fringe that shades insensibly into a subconscious more.⁵⁴

There is constant interchange of center and margins and the "full self is the whole field."⁵⁵ We may be related to some great central self in the same way that parts of our conscious life are related to our whole self.

Every bit of us at every moment is part and parcel of a wider self, it quivers along various radii like the wind-rose on a compass, and the actual in it is continuously one with the possibles not yet in our present sight. And just as we are co-conscious with our own momentary margin, may not we ourselves form the margin of some more really central self in things which is co-conscious with the whole of us? May not you and I be confluent in a higher consciousness, and confluent active there, tho we now know it not?⁵⁶

Applied to religion this means that

the believer finds that the tenderer parts of his personal life are continuous with a more of the same quality which is operative in the universe outside of him and which he can keep in working touch with, and in a fashion get on board of and save himself, when all his lower being has gone to pieces in the wreck.. In a word, the believer is continuous, to his own consciousness, at any rate with a wider self from which saving experiences flow in.⁵⁷

The second statement, taken almost verbatim from the Varieties, asserts more consciousness of the wider self than is granted in the first. The former view, that we are not now conscious of our confluent relation to the wider self, is more empirical

and seems to fit better with James's later view.⁵⁸ James does not, however, meet the difficulty of explaining how consciousness can be unconsciously confluent with another consciousness. This very difficulty has been an important argument against absolute idealism, and James's assertion that even the divine consciousness is finite and has an environment is not an escape from the problem, particularly since James makes no clear statement as to the nature of the environment.

Nevertheless James maintained his faith in pluralism to the last. Reference to the place of the doctrine in Some Problems of Philosophy, the book on which he was working at the time of his death, will show how certain he was of its significance. It was, however, a numerical rather than a qualitative pluralism which James was concerned to defend. Qualitative pluralism would mean that the universe was composed of many ultimately unique kinds of being and the problem of interaction and of knowledge would be practically insoluble. Quantitative pluralism, on the other hand, regards the universe as made up of many unique individuals who are nevertheless of the same quality - for James, consciousness. He believed that God was "the experiencer of the widest possible conscious span,"⁵⁹ but that not even he could be identified with the whole of reality. Every being in the pluralistic system must have an external environment upon which to work.

There is no doubt that James felt the consciousness of human beings to be present in some way in the divine conscious span, but the significant question is whether this presence is

and because it is better with James' theory of the universe. But, however, most of the difficulty of explaining the universe lies in the fact that it is not possible to explain it in terms of the universe itself. This very difficulty has been an important argument against the value of the universe, and James' assertion that even the universe is not an escape from the problem, particularly since James makes no claim of it, is not so to the nature of the universe.

Nevertheless James maintained his faith in the universe as the last. He argued by the fact of the universe in James' theory of the universe, the fact that it was a part of the universe of his own mind, with which he was certain he was of the universe. It was, however, a more difficult matter than a qualitative distinction which James was concerned to uphold. Qualitative distinction would mean that the universe was the same as many of the things and the laws of nature and the process of interaction and of knowledge would be qualitatively different. Qualitative distinction, on the other hand, regards the universe as made up of many things and individuals who are nevertheless of the same quality - for James, consciousness. He believed that God was the experience of the widest possible consciousness, and that not even he could be identified with the whole of reality. Every being in the universe is a part of the universe, and every being is a part of the universe, and every being is a part of the universe.

There is no doubt that James left the consciousness of human beings in the present in some way in the divine consciousness, but the significant question is whether this question is

to be regarded as inclusion in or as knowledge about. Many of James's statements imply the former and are in so far very little superior to monism. On the other hand, James never gave up his belief in freedom and it is impossible to think that his theory of co-consciousness was meant in any way to disqualify the reality of finite choices. In the criticism of monism in Some Problems of Philosophy, he defines the meaning of the postulate of freedom.

Our sense of 'freedom' supposes that some things at least are decided here and now, that the passing moment may contain some novelty, be an original starting-point of events, and not merely transmit a push from elsewhere. We imagine that in some respects at least the future may not be co-implicated with the past, but may be really addable to it, and indeed addable in one shape or another, so that the next turn in events can at any given moment genuinely be ambiguous, ⁶⁰ i.e., possibly this, but also possibly that.

James accepts this notion of freedom, a notion which is necessarily rejected by monism, he believes.⁶¹

Inclusiveness certainly is not to be taken as the distinctive characteristic of God. The constant and extremely intimate intermingling of conscious streams, human and divine, is accepted by James. But there is purpose and individuality in the human stream which is not determined by divine choices but which may be influenced by divine as well as by human means. James suggested that this contact with the divine might be via the subconscious, a suggestion for which he was seriously criticized by many. But, however one may decide on this issue, it is only a hypothetical part of James's theory. What he is

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cized by many. But, however one may decide on this issue, it

is only a hypothetical part of James's theory. What he is

determined to say is that faith in God is the most rational attitude to take toward the data of experience and that the God revealed in experience is the active co-worker with men in the development of an infinitely growing universe.

In criticizing the monism of Fechner, James gives what is really an unusually clear statement of his own view of a finite personal God. Fechner, in trying to meet the problem of evil, places God

under conditions of 'metaphysical necessity' which even his omnipotence cannot violate. His will has to struggle with conditions not imposed on that will by itself. He tolerates provisionally what he has not created, and then with endless patience tries to overcome it and live it down. He has, in short, a history. Whenever Fechner tries to represent him clearly, his God becomes the ordinary God of theism, and ceases to be the absolutely totalized all-enveloper. In this shape, he represents the ideal element in things solely, and is our champion and our helper and we his helpers, against the bad parts of the universe.⁶²

We conclude that, while James makes too many concessions to absolutism and is unclear in his account of the relations of finite minds to God and of God to the total universe, he never gives up his essential mentalistic and humanistic pluralism. Much of James's thought supports Wobbermin in his conclusions. They agree in the empirical attitude, taken in the sense of James's radical empiricism as an inclusive study of all the data of conscious experience. They reject materialism and Hegelian absolutism but interpret the universe in terms of consciousness. They emphasize the category of morality as of primary importance for religion and assert

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the necessity of belief in finite freedom. They differ chiefly in their defence of freedom and in their final view of the divine attributes, James regarding God as finite while Wobbermin holds that he is absolute. These differences were critical for Wobbermin's rejection of pluralism, and, in the following section, we shall consider his arguments against pluralism.

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Woolsey's rejection of Unitarianism, and, in the following sec-
tion, we shall consider his arguments against Unitarianism.

B. WOBBERMIN'S PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION AS A
CRITIQUE OF JAMES'S PLURALISM

Wobbermin's appreciation of James is, as we have frequently said, limited almost entirely to his psychological methodology. He has given no careful study to James's later writings, several of which he has not read.⁶³ Except for a few scattered remarks and for the omission of the pragmatic-pluralistic "Postscript" from the translation of the Varieties, Wobbermin's attack on pluralism is incidental, growing out of his own treatment of the issues involved.

Wobbermin's reasons for his much-discussed omission of the "Postscript" are stated as follows in his introduction to the first edition of the Varieties:

Ausser manchen sonstigen Kürzungen, die ich im Interesse grösserer Übersichtlichkeit vorgenommen habe, habe ich James' Nachwort fortgelassen, da dieses eine metaphysische Position (diejenige eines religiös-metaphysischen Pluralismus) vertritt, die ich für meine Person vollständig ablehnen muss, die aber auch mit dem übrigen Inhalt des Buches in keinem direkten Zusammenhang steht und die in der Kürze dieses Nachworts nur verwirrend wirkt.⁶⁴

The claim that the brevity of James's pluralistic statement in the "Postscript" only makes for confusion rather than understanding is to be questioned. James there asserted definitely the need of taking the pluralistic hypothesis more seriously, referring back to his discussion of monism and pluralism earlier in the book and also repeating his polytheistic suggestion.⁶⁵ Wobbermin includes the earlier material⁶⁶ and also the chapter

of "Conclusions" with its affirmation of metaphysical as well as methodological pragmatism. The "Postscript," while fragmentary, certainly adds to the understanding of these elements in a volume which is predominantly psychological.

Because of the lack of any systematic critique of pluralism, Wobbermin's objections have to be derived from the positive statement of his philosophy of religion. In his attitude toward metaphysics in general and toward monistic metaphysics in particular, and in his personalism, his criticism of James's views of freedom and of a finite God are to be found, as well as many points of close agreement. In conclusion some suggestions will be made as to the extent of James's influence on Wobbermin's metaphysics.

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ian metaphysics.

1. Metaphysics: Definition

Wobbermin's insistence on the importance of metaphysics for a science of religion is to be seen in his statement that "Theologie ohne Metaphysik ist unmöglich."⁶⁷ He defines metaphysics in his book on Theologie und Metaphysik as the discipline which has to do with those things which lie beyond experience.⁶⁸ It is "Nachdenken über das Transcendente."⁶⁹ This last statement gives the key to the correct understanding of Wobbermin's conception of metaphysics. It is derived from Kant's use of transcendent as contrasted with immanent principles. Kant said,

Wir wollen die Grundsätze, deren Anwendung sich ganz und gar in den Schranken möglicher Erfahrung hält, immanente, diejenige aber, welche diese Grenze überfliegen sollen, transzendent Grundsätze nennen.⁷⁰

As Wobbermin puts it, the positive sciences have to do with the world of sense experience but cannot raise the question of ultimate (transcendent) reality.⁷¹ Metaphysics must go further than this sense world and treat the objects which lie beyond empirical science - God, life, the world-view, etc. He says,

Metaphysik bezeichnet für mich zunächst ausschließlich eine bestimmte Richtung oder Tendenz einer Gesamtweltanschauung und Lebenshaltung. Nämlich die über den Gesamtbereich der uns unmittelbar gegebenen, von uns empirisch vorgefundenen Welt hinausweisende Tendenz, die Tendenz über die empirische, naturhaft vorzufindende Wirklichkeit hinaus.⁷²

Philosophy of religion must be based on transcendent principles for religion is a relation of man to super-empirical reality.

Theologie ist ohne Metaphysik deshalb unmöglich, weil die Religion, jedenfalls die christliche Religion, Glaube an eine Welt der Jenseitigkeit ist, Glaube an eine über die naturhaft gegebene empirische Wirklichkeit hinausliegende jenseitige Welt oder Wirklichkeit.⁷³

The task of philosophy of religion, however, is unique. It is not, like metaphysics, a general attitude toward reality but is a special investigation of the validity of religious concepts. Wobbermin sometimes calls it Glaubens-Metaphysik to bring out this point.⁷⁴

There is nothing in Wobbermin's general metaphysical approach to religion which stands in necessary opposition to James. They agree on the validity of a super-empirical method for the study of religion. They also hold that the view which regards metaphysics and religion as contradictory concepts is absurd.⁷⁵ Metaphysics has much to contribute to the study of religion although, naturally, it is not to be identified with religion.

2. Monistic Metaphysics

Wobbermin's metaphysics, like James's, is a protest against extremes or absolutisms. On the one hand, it rejects the absolute monisms of materialism (Haeckel) and idealism (Hegel) but on the other it objects equally to pluralism (James).

In "Das Wesen des Christentums"⁷⁶ where the general metaphysical problem is treated, Wobbermin discusses two types of monistic pantheism: the spiritualistic and what he admits is incorrectly called the naturalistic or materialistic pantheism. The latter considers mechanical natural law and material entities as ultimate and subordinates spiritual life and values to this materialistic level.⁷⁷ Spiritualistic pantheism, on the other hand, has much in common with the Christian world view, and is particularly dangerous for this very reason. It is the view of reality as an "unbestimmte und undifferenzierte All-Eine."⁷⁸ But just here lies the difficulty for within the "All" are to be found two sets of facts: the mental and the physical. Spiritualistic pantheism

stellt das materielle Sein und das geistige Leben einfach auf eine Linie nebeneinander, betrachtet sie als gleichwertig und sieht in der noch undifferenzierten Einheit beider das eigentlich-letzte Grundprinzip des Universums.⁷⁹

The ideal point of view is one which recognizes both the physical and the mental factors, yet subordinates the physical to the spiritual in accordance with the evidence of epistemological criticism and value experience. Both

Wissenschaft's metaphysics, like Hegel's, is a protest against extremes of idealism. On the one hand, it rejects the absolute monism of idealism (Hegel) and idealism (Hegel) but on the other it subjects equally to criticism (Hegel).

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stellt das materielle Sein und das geistige Leben einander auf eine Weise nebeneinander, betrachtet die als gleichwertig und gleich in der noch unentwickelteren Menschheit, das eigentliche-ideale Grundprinzip des Lebens vernachlässigt.

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natural events and mental life are facts, but there is a difference in our knowledge of the two series and also a difference in their value.

Nur das geistige Leben - das eigene Bewusstsein - ist uns unmittelbar gegeben, alles Materielle allein durch Vermittlung des Geistigen. Für uns ist also das Materielle jedenfalls etwas Sekundäres. Dann ist es aber auch von vornherein das Wahrscheinlichste, dass es überhaupt etwas Sekundäres ist, dass es nicht Selbstzweck, sondern nur Mittel zum Zweck ist, wie der christliche Gottes- und Schöpfungs-Glaube voraussetzt.⁸⁰

This is one of the clearest statements Wobbermin gives of his view of material things. His view seems to be an empirical dualism of matter and spirit subordinated to a metaphysical monism of divine purpose.⁸¹

In support of this interpretation we may quote again from the same source. He says the Christian world view is monistic

insofern sie die materielle Welt als Schöpfung Gottes und als Mittel zur Verwirklichung seiner Zweckabsichten ~~betrachten~~ betrachtet, und sofern sie weiter als Ziel dieser seiner Zweckabsichten das "Reich Gottes," d.h. die Lebensgemeinschaft freier persönlicher Geister untereinander und mit Gott ansieht.⁸²

This society of free persons is not the "undifferentiated" Absolute of pantheism. Wobbermin believes God to be absolute, but in the sense of being an absolute Person, which is not necessarily a pantheistic view. His criticism of James is directed against the view of God as finite. In the rejection of the two types of pantheism cited by Wobbermin they are in harmony.

material events and mental life are taken, but there is a difference in our knowledge of the two series and also a difference in their value.

Wir das gesamte Leben - das eigene Bewusstsein - ist eine unauflösliche Einheit, alles Materielle ist nur eine Veräußerung des Geistes. Der Geist ist das Absolute, das Unveränderliche, das Ewige. Das Materielle ist nur ein Vorübergehendes, ein Vergängliches. Der Geist ist das Wesentliche, das Dauerhafte, das Unvergängliche. Das Materielle ist nur ein Vorübergehendes, ein Vergängliches. Der Geist ist das Wesentliche, das Dauerhafte, das Unvergängliche. Das Materielle ist nur ein Vorübergehendes, ein Vergängliches.

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Insoweit die die materielle Welt als Schöpfung Gottes und als Mittel zur Verwirklichung seiner Zweckbestimmung betrachtet wird, und sofern sie weiter als Mittel seiner Zweckbestimmung das "Religion" ist, die Lebensgemeinschaft ist, ist der Dualismus aufgehoben und mit Gott vereinigt.

This society of free persons is not the "anti-religious" Absolute of pantheism. Wobbermin believes God to be absolute, but in the sense of being an absolute Person, which is not necessarily a pantheistic view. His criticism of James is directed against the view of God as finite. In the rejection of the two types of pantheism cited by Wobbermin early in the

3. Personalism

Wobbermin prefers to call his philosophy ontological personalism,⁸³ and the high evaluation of personality is one of the most persistent and striking traits of his thought. In this he is influenced in the first place by Schleiermacher's emphasis on the importance of the individual and personal. Ritschl was also influential and Lotze is mentioned occasionally. Teichmüller, the first German to call his system personalism,⁸⁴ received special attention in the Theologie und Metaphysik, where the interest in personality is central. Wobbermin was much more explicit as a personalist than James, and James cannot be counted as a unique influence in this field. Nevertheless James's interest in the individual and personal, especially as shown in his psychology, played its part in strengthening the tendency which was already present. The self-psychology applied to religion in the Varieties is largely taken over by Wobbermin in his "religio-psychological" method for the study of theology.

Wobbermin traces the development of the interest in personality from ancient philosophy to modern thought and shows that it is one of the most unique Christian contributions.

Die antike Philosophie kennt den Wert der Persönlichkeit nicht; ja sie kennt eigentlich den Begriff der Persönlichkeit gar nicht, wenigstens nicht den Begriff der Persönlichkeit im heutigen Sinne des Wortes, den Begriff der individuell selbständigen Persönlichkeit. Dieser Begriff der Persönlichkeit ist der Centralbegriff der neueren

Robertson's letters to all his family are of great value.

Personalities, and the high value of his letters to his family.

of the most personal and intimate friends of his family. In

this he is interested in the lives of his family and

especially in the lives of his children and grandchildren.

His letters are of great value to his family and to his

children, and his letters to his family are of great value.

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Denkweise, die von Kant inauguriert ist. Durch nichts wird die letztere so sehr charakterisiert wie durch die Wertschätzung persönlichen Lebens.⁸⁵

The doctrine of personalism, for Wobbermin, finds its empirical basis in psychology and epistemology. But the Christian emphasis on the value of personality and especially its view of divine personality are the most important sources for Wobbermin's thought. For James, the empirical is the primary source for the high estimate of personality, and religious tradition as such plays a minor part.

176
The doctrine of personhood, for Wollstein, finds its
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experience as such, lays a minor part.

a. Psychology and Epistemology

In self-psychology Wobbermin found empirical evidence for personalism. Psychological investigation reveals a unitary self as the most immediately given fact of experience. It is not necessary to assume a substantial soul to account for unity, nor is such a soul given in any analysis of self-consciousness. Consciousness comes, not in isolated bits, but as a unitary activity, "ein dauerndes wirkendes Reales."⁸⁶ This is not, however, a denial of the multiplicity of its functions.

Gewiss, jeder Bewusstseinszustand ist ein Komplex, eine einheitliche Verbindung von Funktionen verschiedener Art. Aber darüber hinaus liegt einmal jenes schon besprochene Selbigkeitsbewusstsein, das zwar vielfach mit der Erinnerung gleichgestellt wird, tatsächlich aber nach dem Zeugnis der inneren Erfahrung das Bewusstsein der Selbigkeit im Verlauf der Zeit, das Bewusstsein kontinuierlichen Fortbestandes des Selbst im Wechsel der Zeit einschliesst. - Und dasselbe gilt sodann von jener Einheit des höheren - begrifflichen - Denkens, in der nicht nur zusammengehörige Vorstellungen zusammengeschaut, sondern in der auch einander ausschliessende Inhalt aufeinander bezogen werden. Auch hier haben wir eine Einheit in der Koexistenz, die über die einfache Synthese des Bewusstseins hinausliegt.⁸⁷

This capacity of selfhood to maintain its continuity in different relations and through the course of a life-time is a basic postulate of the self-psychology which Wobbermin affirms. Other theories, he holds, make the self merely the form to which the various moments of consciousness attach,

but the content of consciousness is not to be thus separated from consciousness itself or the self; rather they are identical.⁸⁸

The epistemological question also rests on empirical evidence. All knowledge, including religious knowledge, must be derived from the study of the experience of selves.

Denn abgesehen vom Bewusstsein existiert
für uns überhaupt nichts.⁸⁹

This is not meant as subjectivism but only as an indication of the central place of inner experience. Wobbermin writes,

Die objektive Offenbarung ist nicht anders
als durch Vermittlung der eigenen inneren
Erfahrung fassbar und verwertbar zu machen.⁹⁰

This is true of all revelation - not of religious alone, and it is necessary to make its universal validity evident for religious experience is often discriminated against on the ground of its supposed unique subjectivity. In inner experience objects are given which are not mere appearances but real facts.⁹¹ Conscious experience is self-transcendent. Only so can it give us facts even of the sense world, for these facts transcend the self. Our knowledge of other persons is also a step beyond the immediate.

Streng genommen bedeutet sogar schon das
Rechnen mit fremden Personen ... ein Hin-
ausgehen über die unmittelbar gegebene Er-
fahrung, ein hineingreifen in das Trans-
cendente.⁹²

Self-psychology thus points to epistemological dualism.

James, as we have seen in our previous study,⁹³ was also a self-psychologist and an epistemological dualist.

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us facts even of the same world, for those facts transcend the
self. Our knowledge of other persons is also a step beyond
the immediate.

Wenn jemand behauptet, dass schon das
Bewusstsein mit Transzendenz... in sich
ausgedrückt über die unmittelbare Erfahrung...
Fahrung, die hineingeworfen in das Trans-
zendente.

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a self-psychologist and an epistemological dualist.

b. The Value of Persons

For Wobbermin, as we have said, the Christian evaluation of human personality is a very important factor. He defines the Christian view of the self in the following passage from Theologie und Metaphysik.

Es muss aber das Ich-Problem in der That als eins der Grundprobleme der systematischen Theologie angesehen werden. Denn es betrifft das Wesen der Religion in seinem innersten Kern. Die Religion des Christentums basiert auf der Voraussetzung, dass der Mensch als ein persönliches Ich existiert. In welchem Masse das Evangelium mit dieser Voraussetzung rechnet, braucht nicht im einzelnen ausgeführt zu werden. Der Wert jeder einzelnen Menschenseele vor Gott: das ist gerade das "Evangelium." Nicht um die Bedeutung, um den Wert des Geistes gegenüber dem Stoff, der Materie, handelt es sich hier, sondern um den Wert persönlicher individueller Iche.⁹³

Through the existence of human beings a purpose and plan are given to the universe which would not otherwise be possible. This purpose is the achieving of a Kingdom of God which is to be composed of free persons who recognize their obligation to God, the supreme ethical person.⁹⁴

The question of freedom is of particular pertinence in this connection for on it depend the significance of human moral endeavor and also, as we have seen in the study of James, the question of the goodness of God. The problem of freedom is clearly defined by Wobbermin.

Ob auch das menschliche Innenleben lediglich ein mit mechanischer Notwendigkeit ablaufendes Geschehen aufweise, oder ob das menschliche Ich frei von sich aus zu wirken vermöge, das ist also die entscheidende Grundfrage, auf die sich das ganze Problem zuspitzt.⁹⁵

James's treatment of freedom in The Will to Believe is repeatedly referred to in this connection and Wobbermin tried to meet the objections raised by James, and at the same time to preserve the omnipotence of God. The question of freedom is inseparably connected with the problems of the nature of God and the explanation of evil. Wobbermin's solution of these problems is to be found in his personal theism.

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...treatment of freedom in the ...
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time to preserve the ... of ... The question of
freedom is inseparably connected with the problem of the ...
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c. Personal Theism

Wobbermin, like James, rejects the "block-universe" conception of a completely determined divine plan for the course of history. On any such scheme human freedom would of course be impossible, for man could act only as he was determined to act and all his struggles with evil or with goodness would be tragically useless. From the religious point of view, as Wobbermin shows, this is the doctrine of predestination. If God is the actual cause of every event in the world, he wills that some individuals shall be saved and others lost.⁹⁶ But this is to discredit the divine character. It implies partiality toward some individuals and it means that God has created some beings whom it is not his will to save. Wobbermin, like most theists, solved the problem by saying that God gives to man freedom of choice,⁹⁷ and therefore, while it is God's will to save all men, he will not force them to choose the good if they prefer the evil. He may foreknow their choices without causing them. The limitation due to human freedom is a self-limitation of God and therefore, for Wobbermin, does not make him less absolute than traditional theology has maintained.

There are other difficulties, however, of which the explanation of evil in a world controlled by a good God is the hardest. Many thinkers have held that all the evils are due to free choices of human beings or to God's judgment of the means which will most successfully develop character. It is possible to account for many evils in this way. Men choose

...the "highest values" ... of a completely rational ... of history. On any such ... of doctrine be impossible, for man could not only ... to act and his ... these would be ... of view, as ... of view. It ... world, he ... others ... it ... means that God ... will ... last ... therefore, while it is ... not ... my ... then ... for ... rational ...

There are other difficulties, however, of which the explanation of evil in a world controlled by a good God is ... many ... to the ... means ... possible to ...

things which are individually and socially harmful and the consequences may be far-reaching. Some hardships may be chosen by God as the best means to an end. But it is very difficult to accept Wobbermin's conclusion that all evil can be accounted for in terms of human choice or teleological value.⁹⁸

We may admit that God can derive good out of natural evils at the same time that we deny that he chose just those evils freely. James's finite God who is struggling in a difficult and growing universe, is a more satisfactory solution of the problem of evil than is an omnipotent God such as Wobbermin presents.

In spite of their differences, James and Wobbermin laid great stress on the intimacy and personal character of the relation between God and man. The intimacy is, however, combined with the recognition of the supreme moral worth of the divine Being and worship is natural and necessary. James says that God must be our higher self and Wobbermin, in his theory of transcendence and immanence, preserves the awe which is present in the worship experience at the same time that he gives place to the intimacy which James demanded. They agree that God must be ethical personality if he is to be God at all. Wobbermin says,

Nur die theistische Ausprägung des Gottesglaubens, nur der lebendige geistig-persönliche Gott befriedigt wirklich das religiöse Bewusstsein und das religiöse Bedürfnis. Zu einem unpersönlichen Absoluten kann man kein persönliches Vertrauensverhältnis gewinnen.⁹⁹

things which are individually and essentially different from the
consequences which are the result of them. Some individuals may be con-
sidered by God as the best means to an end, but it is a very diffi-
cult to decide whether a condition that will not be ac-
counted for in terms of human choice or teleological value.
We may admit that God is a being who is not of natural order, but
the same time that we deny that he knows just those evils that
St. Thomas's Fifth Way is designed to eliminate in a difficult and
growing universe, is a more satisfactory solution of the prob-
lem of evil than the one suggested by such as Hobbes and
Spinoza.

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gives place to the intimacy which James demands. They agree
that God must be ethically, especially if he is to be God at all.
Hobbes says,

But die theistische Auffassung des Gottes-
begriffs, der die I-mannigfaltigkeit der religi-
ösen Vorstellungen mit sich bringt, ist die religi-
öse Vorstellung des religiösen Gottes. In
dieser Vorstellung ist die absolute Wahrheit
verankert, die die menschliche Vernunft nicht
erschaffen kann.

James might have said this, so pragmatic does it sound with its emphasis on needs.

Wobbermin found in mysticism another point of contact with James and regarded the treatment of mysticism in the Varieties as one of the most distinctive contributions of the book.¹⁰⁰ For James, mystical experience has an authority for those to whom it comes that cannot be questioned. He also sees in it a pragmatic test of the validity of religious concepts, for a study of the lives of the great mystics shows that in most cases their experiences have produced those changes in character and activity which would be expected if the God claimed by mystical experience existed. Belief in God may therefore be taken as a reasonable hypothesis for human action. James's pantheistic view of a world-consciousness offered support to his mysticism. If men are at all times in co-conscious relation with God, mysticism can be explained as the experience of moments of greater luminosity when the individual becomes aware of this relation.

Wobbermin, on the other hand, was strenuously opposed to pantheism and held that the mystical experience in no way demanded it.¹⁰¹ Pantheism thinks of God exclusively as immanent and ignores his transcendent character.¹⁰² Wobbermin unites immanent and transcendent elements in the notion of the ethical personality of God. Mysticism is for him "monotheistisch-personalistische Mystik."¹⁰³ James's pantheism, like Wobbermin's personalistic mysticism, is strongly individualistic, as is brought out by his insistence on pluralism.

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herent and ignores the transcendental character. He was
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of the ethical development of man. Mysticism is for him a
testament to the power of the mystical. James's pantheism,
like Roberts's non-mystical mysticism, is strongly in-
fluenced, as is brought out by the introduction on mysticism.

Immortality is treated rather incidentally by both thinkers. Neither tries to offer any conclusive proof of life after death, but it is accepted as a reasonable belief, based on the conception of the worth of personality. James says that he believes in it more as he grows older because he is "just getting fit to live,"¹⁰⁴ and Wobbermin stresses the religious value of this faith.¹⁰⁵

In conclusion we may point out from these various sources certain general relations. James and Wobbermin differ fundamentally on monism. Wobbermin is a monistic personalist in the sense of believing that the total universe is under the control of an absolute ethical personal God. He admits self-limitation through purpose but no external limit to divine power. James is a pluralistic pantheist, holding that all reality is of the nature of consciousness but that no one consciousness is all-inclusive. Rather, there are many cooperating consciousnesses which limit each other but which may work together in the achieving of value. Wobbermin rejects pantheism and lays more stress on transcendence than does James. Their difference on the explanation of evil grows out of the original monistic-pluralistic opposition. Wobbermin largely ignores the problem of natural evil and accounts for moral evil on the basis of human free will. The question of natural evil is, however, crucial in James's thought and forces him to the conclusion that God must be finite. Other differences are chiefly in emphasis .

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The points of agreement are much more striking than Wobbermin has realized. James and he take the same empirical and methodological starting point for metaphysics and agree on the place of metaphysics in the study of religion. They oppose absolutism and materialism. Neither is clear on the doctrine of matter but both subordinate nature to personality and see its main function as a means to the realization of personal values. And finally, they unite in viewing God as a supremely ethical Person whose purpose is expressed in a community of ethical persons joining with him in the struggle for perfection. They differ also on some points and particularly on the question whether God is absolute and perfect or finite and growing.

4. The Influence of James on Wobbermin's Metaphysics

Wobbermin is not consciously influenced to any large extent by James's metaphysics. He felt that he very largely rejected its fundamental principles and he has never given it any thorough study. Such influence as exists is in the form of the strengthening of views derived originally from other sources. This is true of the emphasis on personality and even of the empirical psychological methodology, which is his greatest debt to James and which nevertheless came to him first through Schleiermacher. The most obvious direct influence, other than the psychological, is in the treatment of freedom.

In Wobbermin's recent writings much less emphasis is placed on God as absolute, while his ethical and personal character are maintained as strongly as ever. This suggests that the special weight placed on the attribute of absoluteness in the writings from 1904 to 1914 may have been only a temporary reaction against James's finite God.¹⁰⁶

The pragmatic argument of The Will to Believe is appealed to occasionally in the form of an assertion of the reasonableness of faith, but this appeal is never an explicit recognition of pragmatism on Wobbermin's part.

Our conclusion is that James's metaphysics is an unconscious intensifying influence upon Wobbermin's thought but that none of Wobbermin's ideas are derived from James alone.

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the writings from 1906 to 1914 may have been only a temporary
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The dramatic argument of The Will to Believe is ap-
plied to occasionally in the form of an assertion of the
responsibility of faith, but this appeal is never an explicit
recognition of opposition to Woburn's part.
Our conclusion is that James's methodology is an in-
directly influential influence upon Woburn's thought and
that none of Woburn's ideas are derived from James alone.

CONCLUSIONS

SECRET

1. Wobbermin's primary interest in James is methodological, and he has used James's psychology as a theological method but has not been interested in James for his own sake. (87)
2. Wobbermin regards James's psychology of religion as a continuation and supplementation of Schleiermacher's method in theology and intends, in his own method, to combine and correct the Schleiermacher-James methodology. (99)
3. Wobbermin's methodology as transcendental (108) and as "religio-psychological" (109) owes much to James, but as the method of the "religio-psychological" circle it is derived chiefly from Schleiermacher. (113f)
4. Wobbermin regards the influence of James's psychology as implicit in all his thought, but the period of active interest in James ended about 1913. (115)
5. Wobbermin's translation of the Varieties contributed greatly to the reading and discussion of the work in Germany. (53)
6. Wobbermin has shown that James has had an indirect influence in Germany toward a new understanding of Schleiermacher's psychological phase. (54)
7. Wobbermin is right in thinking that a psychological method can be derived from the Varieties without accepting either its pragmatism or its pluralism. (133ff)

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8. Wobbermin does not understand James's pragmatism and pluralism and has rejected them without making a thorough study of them. (75, 169)
9. Wobbermin is justified in criticizing James for vagueness in his definition of the pragmatic theory of truth. (140)
10. Wobbermin accepts the pragmatic method as far as it is empirical and points toward relative truth in the empirical world, and uses the pragmatic criterion of truth when, from human needs, he makes inferences regarding the nature of God, but he does not recognize in these factors an affiliation with James. (138, 182)
11. Wobbermin bases his judgment of James's philosophy of religion on the material in The Will to Believe and the Varieties (117), but the "Postscript" shows that James did not regard his philosophy of religion as yet written. (134)
12. James's advocacy of self-psychology influenced Wobbermin from the start and intensified his belief in the central importance of personality. (60, 68f, 175)
13. Both men regard reality as composed of many free individuals related to an ethical personal God. (82ff)
14. Neither gives a clear metaphysics of nature. (185)

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15. James's treatment of freedom in The Will to Believe influenced Wobbermin. (180)
16. The agreement of Wobbermin and James on the place of the moral argument for God does not indicate influence since it appears in Wobbermin's writing before the publication of The Will to Believe and the Varieties. (60, 70f, 182)
17. James and Wobbermin differ as to whether God is to be regarded as finite or absolute. (182)
18. Wobbermin does not fully meet the difficulty raised by James regarding the problem of evil if God is held to be omnipotent. (181f, 184)
19. James's implicit personalism was a confirmation of Wobbermin's explicit personalism, but James is only a minor source of Wobbermin's view. (175)
20. James's influence upon Wobbermin may be regarded as an initial impetus in methodology (115) but, in spite of the similarities in their metaphysical positions (185), not as a unique metaphysical stimulus. (186)

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SUMMARY

TRADE

The problem of this dissertation is to study the influence of William James on Georg Wobbermin's psychology and philosophy of religion and to examine Wobbermin's criticisms of James's epistemology and metaphysics.

James's first teaching was in the field of anatomy and physiology but he soon turned to psychology. His psychological interest was developed in a psychology of religion as well as in the general field. His philosophical writing followed later. The religious interest pervaded all his writing and expressed itself through a new treatment of empiricism and humanism.

James's empiricism is a reaction against rationalism and it insists that every element in experience be taken into account in the final reckoning. His empiricism is radical in the sense of including relational and value experiences as well as sense experiences as its data. Radical empiricism combined with human moral demands points toward pluralism and a finite God, according to James. He feels that on any other view God is made responsible for evil and therefore limited in goodness. James chooses limitation in power in preference to moral limitation of the divine Being.

James's humanism appears in his concern for human personality. His psychology and metaphysics and particularly his philosophy of religion stress the importance of the individual. He defines religion in individualistic terms and defends finite

The problem of religious freedom is a complex one, involving the rights of individuals to practice their faith without interference from the state. This is a fundamental principle of democracy, and it is one that has been the subject of much debate and discussion in recent years. The issue is particularly acute in countries where the state is closely intertwined with religion, and where the government has the power to restrict or even ban certain religious practices. In such cases, the rights of individuals are often sacrificed to the interests of the state, and this is a situation that is far from ideal. The problem of religious freedom is also a global one, and it is one that affects people in all parts of the world. In some countries, religious freedom is a well-established right, and it is protected by law. In other countries, however, it is a much less secure right, and it is often subject to government interference. This is a situation that is far from ideal, and it is one that needs to be addressed if we are to achieve a truly democratic world. The problem of religious freedom is a complex one, and it is one that requires a careful and thoughtful approach. It is a problem that involves the rights of individuals, the interests of the state, and the values of a democratic society. It is a problem that has been the subject of much debate and discussion in recent years, and it is one that will continue to be a subject of debate and discussion for many years to come.

persons against absorption or loss of freedom in any Absolute. James's view is not completely personalistic because he fails to relate things to persons.

James's influence is widespread. His work was early recognized in England and France and his writings have been translated into many languages. His personal relations with foreign philosophers were cordial and in many cases intimate, but least so in the case of German philosophers.

Wobbermin's interest in James began with the reading of the Principles of Psychology in 1893 and Wobbermin's dissertation of 1894 shows traces of James's functional approach. Like James, Wobbermin takes personal experience (but supplemented by history) as the basis for the study of religion. He also emphasizes the moral argument for God. His conclusion, however, is monistic for he regards God as absolute in power, knowledge, and goodness. This monism is to be interpreted personalistically. The relation of God to the world and to human persons combines transcendence and immanence in divine personality. Wobbermin asserts the duality of nature and spirit and the pluralism of many finite beings, but regards the dualism as phenomenal and the pluralism as subordinated to the divine purpose of achieving an ethical society of free persons in loving allegiance to God.

Wobbermin develops a unified method for the scientific study of religion from the combined methodology of Schleiermacher and James. This method seeks to avoid the one-sidedness

of historicism and psychologism but to include the truth of both. As first conceived, his method is a protest against a narrow empiricism and an assertion that the study of religion must be transcendental in the Kantian sense. In this Wobbermin finds support in James's interpretation of empiricism.

The second formulation - the "religio-psychological" method - also shows the influence of James for the psychological approach through the individual to the problem of religion is central and the historical element is relatively subordinate. In its final form as the "religio-psychological" circle, the method is an application of Schleiermacher's principle of giving equal weight to experience and history.

James's pragmatism and pluralism were rejected by Wobbermin, and the fact that they played such a large part in the development of James's later thought was influential in Wobbermin's turn back to Schleiermacher. James remains as an implicit impetus but not as a guiding force in Wobbermin's later thought.

Pragmatism, for James, means the empirical consideration of ~~these~~ facts which make a difference in the lives of human beings. It also means the view that human truth is in the making, that the world is growing, and that human effort makes a difference. In so far as James is not clear in his statements of the growing truth, his theory is a confusion of verification and truth and therefore false to the accepted meaning of the latter. Pragmatism means, finally, the view that truth

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is tested by practical consequences. James includes consistency among the necessary consequences of a satisfactory view and so escapes the charge of holding to illusionism or mere satisfaction of passing desires. As applied to religion, the view means for James that it is man's duty, in the absence of conclusive demonstration, to act on that principle which gives the greatest satisfaction to man's higher nature when considered as a whole.

Wobbermin rightly criticizes James for vagueness in defining pragmatism. But he does not fully understand James at this point and does not recognize the pragmatic elements in his own thought. He rejects pragmatism but asserts the necessity of the empirical approach, accepts relative truth so far as the empirical order is concerned, and appeals to religious needs as one of the tests of religious truth.

The metaphysical issue between monism and pluralism is of particular interest for religion because on it rests the interpretation of the nature of God and his relations to the universe. James and Wobbermin reject materialistic and absolutistic monism. James, however, tends toward a pluralistic pantheism, regarding reality as an extensive conscious experience with which human beings are co-conscious. Wobbermin rejects all types of pantheism and accepts a monistic personalism in which many finite persons are united under the controlling purpose of a personal God.

Both men recognize freedom as essential to human morality and morality as a necessary basis for religion. James is more deeply concerned over the problem of evil and it, combined with the question of freedom, forces him to the view that God is finite. Wobbermin's emphasis on God as absolute grows partly out of his religious and philosophical traditions and the influence of Schleiermacher. But it is due more to his feeling that the only adequate explanation of the causal order of nature, man's moral and religious experience, and the cosmos as a whole, must be absolute.

NOTES

1. The following notes were taken by the author during his visit to the University of California, Berkeley, California, U.S.A. in 1961. The notes are intended to be a summary of the information obtained from the various sources mentioned in the notes. The notes are not intended to be a complete record of the information obtained from the various sources mentioned in the notes. The notes are not intended to be a complete record of the information obtained from the various sources mentioned in the notes.

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NOTES

(N.B.: In the following notes reference will be made in abbreviated form to books and articles which appear in the bibliography. The writings of James and Wobbermin have been chronologically arranged in the bibliography. References to them will therefore be identified by date and title initials, which appear in the bibliography at the right hand side, after the bibliographical data. E.g. J-WB (1897) equals James The Will to Believe, New York: Longmans, Green, 1897; W-TM (1901) is Wobbermin, Theologie und Metaphysik, Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1901. References to Wobbermin's translation of the Varieties of Religious Experience will appear as W/J-VRE (1914). All references will be to the second edition unless otherwise specified. References to other authors will be by last name and abbreviated title.)

MAGAZINE ABBREVIATIONS

AgPs	Archiv für die gesamte Psychologie
ARel	Archiv für Religionswissenschaft
ArR	Archiv für Religionspsychologie
ChF	Christliche Freiheit
ChW	Christliche Welt
ChWiss	Christentum und Wissenschaft
DtEvM	Deutsch-Evangelische Monatsblätter
DtLZ	Deutsch Literaturzeitung
JrPhil	Journal of Philosophy
K-St	Kant-Studien
LCB	Literarisches Centralblatt
PrJ	Preussische Jahrbücher
RevHR	Revue de l'Histoire des Religions
RG	Religion und Geisteskultur
MM	Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale
ThB	Theologische Blätter
ThLB	Theologische Literatur Bericht
ThLZ	Theologische Literatur Zeitung
ThR	Theologische Rundschau
ZaPs	Zeitschrift für angewandte Psychologie
ZGym	Zeitung des Gymnasialenwesens
ZPpK	Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik
ZPs	Zeitschrift für Psychologie
ZR	Zeitschrift für Religionspsychologie
ZThK	Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche

INTRODUCTION

1. Cf. this Dissertation, 231, for corrections of the Perry Bibliography.
2. Cf. J-MS (1911) and J-CER (1920). The latter volume is of particular importance for the present study.
3. The Appendix (349-378) is entitled: "A Synopsis of the Philosophy of William James." Note that this volume is dedicated to James.
4. Moore, Pragmatism and its Critics,
5. Pratt, Psychology of Religious Belief,
6. Lovejoy, "Pragmatism and Theology" (1908); "The Thirteen Pragmatisms" (1908); "Pragmatism and Realism" (1909).
7. Cf. Bradley, "On the Ambiguity of Pragmatism" (1908); Lande, "Pragmatisme, Humanisme et Vérité" (1908); Parodi, "Le Pragmatisme d'après W. James et Schiller" (1908); Lorenz, "Das Verhältniss des Pragmatismus zu Kant" (1909); Stein, "Der Pragmatismus" (1908); and Waibel, "Studien zum Pragmatismus."
8. Cf. Preface, v.
9. Ueberweg, Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie, 12. Aufl. Herausg. von T.K. Oesterreich. The section by Cell is Bd. V, 368-413, "Die Philosophie in Nordamerika."
10. The book by Busch appeared in 1911 while Bixler's is a 1926 publication.
11. Cf. Busch, op. cit., title page.
12. Busch, "William James" (1911): "Ich hatte das Glück noch in seinem letzten Jahre in seinem Hause ein- und ausgehen zu dürfen. Ich werde sie nicht vergessen, die Stunden in seinem Bibliothekszimmer ... in Cambridge, oder die Stunden am Tisch beim Thanksgivingturkey oder die wenigen Minuten, als er schon zu seiner letzten Europafahrt die Koffer schloss," 301.

INTRODUCTION (cont'd)

13. The 1929 volume of this journal was dedicated to Otto and Wobbermin on their sixtieth birthdays.
14. Most of the information on James's life is derived from the introductory chapter to the Letters (Vol. I, 1-30) written by his son, and from later explanatory notes in the same.
15. J-LET, I (1920), 12.
16. Ibid., 17ff.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid., 20.
19. Ibid., 31.
20. Ibid., 53.
21. Ibid., 54f.
22. Ibid., Ch. V.
23. Ibid., 139.
24. Cf. ibid., 142-3n.
25. Ibid., 194.
26. Ibid., 193, 196, et passim.
27. Ibid., 320-323.
28. Published the following year with the same title, ibid., II, 17.
29. Ibid., 300n.
30. The material which James had already written was published in Some Problems of Philosophy (1911).
31. J-LET, II (1920), 350.
32. The data on Wobbermin's life are derived chiefly from the German Wer ist's? (1928). A few details were corrected in conversation with Professor and Mrs. Wobbermin, Feb. 9-11, 1931.

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INTRODUCTION (cont'd)

33. W-SuR (1927), 3f.

34. W-IEG (1894), 88. It reads as follows:

"Scholas audiui virorum clarissimorum:

1. Beyschlag, Benno Erdmann, Gunkel, Haym, Haupt, Hiller, Kautzsch, Kähler, A. Kirchhoff, Loofs, A. Müller, Rothstein, Uphues, Vaihinger Halensium;

2. Dillmann, Dilthey, v.d. Goltz, Harnack, Kaftan, Kleinert, Scheffer-Boichorst, Simmel, v. Soden, Strack, Weiss Berolinensium.

Seminariis theologicis intereram cum aliis tum Berolini ecclesiastico - historico, cuius ad exercitationes Adolfus Harnack benigne mihi aditum concessit.

Viris doctissimis, quorum scholas audiui, omnibus gratiam debitam habeo semperque habebo. Praeter ceteros vero theologorum Adolfo Harnack et Julio Kaftan, philosophorum Guilelmo Dilthey, viris doctissimis et humanissimis, qui in studiis meis summa me adiuverunt benevolentia et benignitate, gratias ago quam maximas."

35. The Nathaniel William Taylor Lectures, "The Theology of Albrecht Ritschl and its Significance for the Present Day," and the Germanistic Society Lectures on "Das geistige Leben Deutschlands in dem letzten fünfzig Jahren." Cf. Yale Divinity Review, Jan. 1908.

36. Conversations, Feb. 9-11, 1931.

37. Cf. W-TM (1901), 180, 230f, 238, 244, 280f.

38. Conversations, Feb. 9-11, 1931.

39. Cf. W/J-VRE (1914), xxix-xxxi.

40. Wobbermin has written a great many book reviews for this journal.

41. Wobbermin was associate editor from 1907 to 1917.

42. 1908-1913.

43. Founded in Vienna in 1928 and edited by Karl Beth. It is the organ of the Internationale religionspsychologische Gesellschaft.

44. Cf. Kant, Werke, Prussian Academy Edition, Vol VI.

1930-1931 (cont'd)

1931-1932 (cont'd)

1932-1933 (cont'd)

1933-1934 (cont'd)

1934-1935 (cont'd)

1935-1936 (cont'd)

1936-1937 (cont'd)

1937-1938 (cont'd)

1938-1939 (cont'd)

1939-1940 (cont'd)

1940-1941 (cont'd)

1941-1942 (cont'd)

1942-1943 (cont'd)

1943-1944 (cont'd)

1944-1945 (cont'd)

1945-1946 (cont'd)

1946-1947 (cont'd)

1947-1948 (cont'd)

1948-1949 (cont'd)

1949-1950 (cont'd)

1950-1951 (cont'd)

1951-1952 (cont'd)

1952-1953 (cont'd)

1953-1954 (cont'd)

1954-1955 (cont'd)

1955-1956 (cont'd)

1956-1957 (cont'd)

1957-1958 (cont'd)

1958-1959 (cont'd)

1959-1960 (cont'd)

1960-1961 (cont'd)

1961-1962 (cont'd)

1962-1963 (cont'd)

1963-1964 (cont'd)

1964-1965 (cont'd)

1965-1966 (cont'd)

1966-1967 (cont'd)

1967-1968 (cont'd)

1968-1969 (cont'd)

1969-1970 (cont'd)

1970-1971 (cont'd)

INTRODUCTION (conc.) CHAPTER I

45. The general editor of the series is Arthur Liebert.
46. Six of these studies have now appeared, of which Wobbermin has written two: Richtlinien evangelischer Theologie and Wort Gottes und evangelischer Glaube.
47. "Aufgabe und Bedeutung der Religionspsychologie."
48. Cf. note 35 above.
49. "Religionsphilosophie als theologische Aufgabe." Published in 1928.
50. The title of this lecture is as yet undecided.
51. Wobbermin objects to calling his view either idealistic or monistic on account of the Hegelian connotation of both words. Cf. conversations, Feb. 9-11, 1931.
52. W/J-VRE (1914), iv.

INTRODUCTION (cont.)

43. The General Editor of the series is Arthur Liebert.
44. Six of these studies have now appeared, of which Woburn has written two: Stellen in evangelischer Theologie and Wort Gottes und evangelischer Glaube.
45. "Aufgabe und Bedeutung der Religionspsychologie."
46. Cf. note 33 above.
47. "Religionspsychologie als theologische Aufgabe," published in 1928.
48. The title of this lecture is as yet undecided.
49. Woburn objects to calling his view either idealistic or material on account of the Hegelian connotation of both words. Cf. correspondence, Feb. 8-11, 1931.
50. W/1-VII (1934), iv.

CHAPTER I

1. J-LET,I (1920), 87f.
2. Ibid., 138. James wrote, "I began the other day Kant's 'Kritik,' which is written crabbedly enough, but which strikes me so far as almost the sturdiest and honestest piece of work I ever saw. Whether right or wrong (and it is pretty clearly wrong in a great many details of its Analytik part, however the rest may be), there it stands like a great snag or mark to which everything metaphysical or psychological must be referred. I wish I had read it earlier."
3. Ibid. This is James's first reference to Renouvier. He speaks of an article "by one Charles Renouvier, of whom I never heard before but who, for vigor of style and compression, going to the core of half a dozen things in a single sentence, so different from the namby-pamby diffusiveness of most Frenchmen, is unequaled by anyone. He takes his stand on Kant."
4. Ibid., II, 54f., cf. 45 and 47.
5. J-VRE (1902), 444.
6. J-LET,I (1920), 118f.
7. Ibid., 179.
8. Boring, History of Experimental Psychology, 494.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid., 507, 494f.
11. J-LET,I (1920), 179n.
12. Ibid., II, 331f.
13. J-PP (1890), vi.
14. Cf. J-CER (1920), 316-327, "A Plea for Psychology as a 'Natural Science,'" 1892.
15. Boring, op. cit., 498ff.
16. Ibid., 498ff.
17. J-CER (1920), 43n.
18. J-PP I(1890), 141.

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19. J-PP,I (1890), 11.
20. J-PR (1907), 109.
21. J-LET,II (1920), 127.
22. Ibid., 170.
23. J-VRE (1902), 520.
24. J-PP,II (1890), Ch. XXI, "The Perception of Reality."
Cf. Perry, Annotated Bibliography, 21.
25. Ibid., 321.
26. Cf. Perry, op. cit., note under 1878-2.
27. Ibid.
28. J-CER (1920), 406-437. The reference to Peirce is 410ff.
29. J-PR (1907), 201.
30. Ibid., 47.
31. Cf. the book by that title.
32. Cf. Bixler, Religion in the Philosophy of William James, 198.
33. J-PU (1909), 328f. Cf. the classification of ideals in Brightman, A Philosophy of Ideals, Ch. III.
34. J-WB (1897), xiii.
35. Cf. J-VRE (1902), 4, where existential judgments are contrasted with spiritual judgments.
36. In a letter to F.C.S. Schiller (J-LET,II (1920),270ff.), James said that it was too late to call his book "humanism" and that he greatly disliked the term "pragmatism." Reference to The Meaning of Truth and later writings will show that he adopted "humanism" wherever possible.Cf. 295.
37. J-MT (1909), 125.
38. J-PU (1909), 124f., et passim; this Dissertation, Ch. V.
39. J-LET,II (1920), 2.
40. Ibid., I, 147.

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19. J-B, (1980), 11.
20. J-B (1980), 109.
21. J-B, II (1980), 127.
22. Ibid., 170.
23. J-B, (1980), 120.
24. J-B, II (1980), Ch. XII, "The Perception of Reality".
25. J-B, Abstracts, 21.
26. Ibid., 221.
27. J-B, Abstracts, 21.
28. J-B, (1980), 408-417. The reference to nature is 417.
29. J-B (1980), 201.
30. Ibid., 47.
31. J-B, Abstracts, 21.
32. J-B, Abstracts, 21.
33. J-B (1980), 220. Cf. the classification of ideas in
Bergson, A Philosophy of Ideas, Ch. III.
34. J-B (1980), 211.
35. J-B (1980), 211. Abstracts, 21.
36. J-B (1980), 211. Abstracts, 21.
37. J-B (1980), 211. Abstracts, 21.
38. J-B (1980), 211. Abstracts, 21.
39. J-B (1980), 211. Abstracts, 21.
40. J-B (1980), 211. Abstracts, 21.
41. J-B (1980), 211. Abstracts, 21.
42. J-B (1980), 211. Abstracts, 21.
43. J-B (1980), 211. Abstracts, 21.
44. J-B (1980), 211. Abstracts, 21.
45. J-B (1980), 211. Abstracts, 21.
46. J-B (1980), 211. Abstracts, 21.
47. J-B (1980), 211. Abstracts, 21.
48. J-B (1980), 211. Abstracts, 21.
49. J-B (1980), 211. Abstracts, 21.
50. J-B (1980), 211. Abstracts, 21.

CHAPTER I (cont'd)

41. J-SPP (1911), 165n.
42. In Mind, 7(1882), 186-208.
43. J-LET,I (1920), 205; cf. J-PU (1909), 138.
44. J-LET,I (1920), 305.
45. Cf. this Dissertation, Ch. V.
46. J-PU (1909), 98.
47. Ibid., 90.
48. Ibid.
49. Ibid., 92.
50. J-PR (1907), 222.
51. J-MT (1909), 155, et passim.
52. J-PR (1907), 58; cf. Ch. IV of this Dissertation.
53. J-MT (1909), 295ff for this general discussion.
54. J-WB (1897), vif.
55. J-PU (1909), 90.
56. Cf. Perry, op. cit., 47.
57. J-RE (1912), 41.
58. Ibid., 42ff.
59. J-PU (1909), 280.
60. J-LET,I (1920), 158; cf. Royce, Studies in Good and Evil, 28.
61. J-PU (1909), 314.
62. Ibid., 124.
63. J-LET,II,(1920), 269.
64. J-VRE (1902), 491.
65. Ibid., 30ff. Cf. Wundt's criticism of James's exclusion of institutional religion, Probleme der Völkerpsychologie,

CHAPTER I (cont'd).

66. J-VRE (1902), 31; cf. Whitehead's definition of religion in Religion in the Making (1926), 17.
67. Cf. note 36.
68. J-VRE (1902), 498.
69. Cf. J-LET (1902) and also the recently published "Correspondance de Charles Renouvier et de William James," (1929).
70. Cf. James's review of Royce, The Religious Aspect of Philosophy (published in 1885 and reprinted in J-CER (1920), 276-284).
71. William James and Other Essays on the Philosophy of Life, 7f.
72. Ueberweg, 401.
73. Boring, op. cit., 498.
74. Cf. C.M. McConnell, Is God Limited? and E.S. Brightman, The Problem of God.
75. Op. cit.
76. J-LET, II (1920), 222.
77. The following is a list of the articles which appeared in the Critique Philosophique in the ten years, 1878-88. The first article was written in French by James but the others are translations of articles published elsewhere.
 - "Quelques Considérations sur la methode subjective" (1878).
 - "The Sentiment of Rationality" (1879).
 - "Great Men, Great Thoughts and their Environment." (1881).
 - "The Feeling of Effort" (1880).
 - "Reflex Action and Theism" (1881-82).
 - "Rationality, Activity and Faith" (1882).
 - "The Dilemma of Determinism" (1884).
 - "What the Will Effects" (1888).

A critical exposition of James's "Brute and Human Intellect" (J. sp. Phil. 12(1878), 236-276) was written by Renouvier for the Critique (1879) and "Quelques remarques sur la théorie de la volonté de M. W. James" is Renouvier's comment on James's "What the Will Effects," both in the Critique for 1888. James's reply in a later issue of the same year is "Réponse de M. W. James aux Remarques de M. Renouvier sur sa théorie de la volonté."
78. Boutroux, William James (1911) and Flournoy, La Philosophie de William James. (1911). Both have been translated into German.

CHAPTER I (continued)

66. J. V. (1902), 31; of W. (1902), 12.
Religion in the Making (1902), 12.

67. Cf. page 31.

68. J. V. (1902), 12.

69. Cf. J. V. (1902) and also the recently published "Gospel
according to the Gospel" of W. (1902), 12.

70. Cf. J. V. (1902), 12. The Religion in the Making of 1902
revised (published in 1902 and reprinted in 1902).

71. William James and Other Essays on the Philosophy of 1902.

72. Religion in the Making, 1902.

73. Religion in the Making, 1902.

74. Cf. J. V. (1902), 12. Religion in the Making and J. V. (1902).

75. Cf. 1902.

76. J. V. (1902), 12.

77. The following is a list of the articles which appeared in
the Religion in the Making in the two years, 1902-03. The
first article was written in 1902, and the others
the remainder of the year. The articles are:
"The Religion of the Future" (1902), 12.
"The Religion of the Future" (1902), 12.
"The Religion of the Future" (1902), 12.
"The Religion of the Future" (1902), 12.
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78. The following is a list of the articles which appeared in
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"The Religion of the Future" (1902), 12.
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"The Religion of the Future" (1902), 12.
"The Religion of the Future" (1902), 12.
"The Religion of the Future" (1902), 12.

79. Religion in the Making (1902), 12. Religion in the Making
and Religion in the Making (1902), 12. Both have been reprinted in
1902.

CHAPTER I (conc.)

79. Cf. review of Bain and Renouvier, Nation, 22(1876), 367-369 and the review of Renouvier's Principes de la Nature, Phil. Rev., 2(1893), 212-218.
80. J-SPP (1911), 165n.
81. James corresponded with Wobbermin, but none of the letters have been preserved (cf. conversations, Feb. 9-11, 1931). One letter to Jerusalem is included in the published Letters (II, 297f).
82. Troeltsch, Gesammelte Schriften, II, 364.
83. Cf. G.C. Cell, Lecture notes, 1927-28.
84. Wundt, Probleme der Völkerpsychologie, 2. Aufl., 107.
85. W- "Religion" (1921), 34ff.
86. Busch, op. cit., 4f.
87. Busch, "William James" (1911), 300-303.
88. William James als Religionsphilosoph, (1911).
89. Translated by Bruno Jordan.
90. Translated by H. Baumgarten.
91. Op. cit., 4.
92. Conversations, Feb. 9-11, 1931.
93. Note in this connection James's sympathetic preface to Thilly's translation of the Introduction to Philosophy by Paulsen.
94. Cf. Goldstein's preface. Cf. also J-LET, II (1920), 339f.

79. Cf. review of John and Mary's, London, 1917, 1917.
80. John and Mary's, London, 1917, 1917.

81. John and Mary's, London, 1917, 1917.

82. John and Mary's, London, 1917, 1917.
83. John and Mary's, London, 1917, 1917.
84. John and Mary's, London, 1917, 1917.

85. John and Mary's, London, 1917, 1917.

86. John and Mary's, London, 1917, 1917.

87. John and Mary's, London, 1917, 1917.

88. John and Mary's, London, 1917, 1917.

89. John and Mary's, London, 1917, 1917.

90. John and Mary's, London, 1917, 1917.

91. John and Mary's, London, 1917, 1917.

92. John and Mary's, London, 1917, 1917.

93. John and Mary's, London, 1917, 1917.

94. John and Mary's, London, 1917, 1917.

95. John and Mary's, London, 1917, 1917.

96. John and Mary's, London, 1917, 1917.
97. John and Mary's, London, 1917, 1917.

98. John and Mary's, London, 1917, 1917.

CHAPTER II

1. W-ST, I (1913), 246.
2. W-ST, II (1921), 139.
3. W-ST, I (1913), 248n.
4. Ibid., 249n.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid., 247f.
7. Ibid., 251n. Cf. also the following articles by Vorbrodt: "Zur Religionspsychologie: Prinzipien und Pathologie," Th-StKr, 79(1906), 237-303; "Stellung der Religionspsychologie zur Theologie," ZThK, 20(1910), 431-474; "William James' Philosophie," ZPpK, 151(1913), 1-27. Vorbrodt wrote the preface to Flournoy's Observations de psychologie religieuse when it appeared in German (1911) and edited the German edition of his Experimentaluntersuchungen zur Religions- Unterbewusstseins- und Sprachpsychologie in the same year. He also assisted Beta in the translation of Starbuck's Psychology of Religion.
8. Cf. "The Sentiment of Rationality" (1879), "Reflex Action and Theism" (1881), "Rationality, Activity and Faith" (1882), and "The Psychology of Belief" (1889). Wobbermin refers to the last named in ST, I (1913), 251.
9. ST, I (1913), 251.
10. Cf. Zeitschrift f. Religionspsychologie, 4(1911), 217-223.
11. W-ST, I (1913), 246.
12. Conversations in Göttingen, Feb. 9-11, 1931.
13. W-IEG (1894), 30; cf. J-PP, I (1890), 196ff.
14. Cf. this Dissertation, 67ff.
15. Cf. W-ST, I (1913), 249f.
16. ThLZ, 25(1900), 526..
17. It appears under the title: Bishop Serapion's Prayer-Book; cf. Bibliography W-AS (1898).
18. W-TM (1901), 27f.
19. Ibid., 130ff.

CHAPTER II

1. W-B, I (1913), 245.

2. W-B, II (1921), 139.

3. W-B, I (1913), 245n.

4. Ibid., 245n.

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid., 247.

7. Ibid., 247. Cf. also the following articles by Vorobchik:
 "Die Psychopathologie: Prinzipien und Pathologie," in:
Die Psychopathologie, 247-250; "Stellung der Selbstpsychologie
 zur Theologie," ETP, 3 (1910), 431-471; "William James
 und die Psychologie," ETP, 10 (1913), 1-27. Vorobchik wrote the
 preface to Vorobchik's Observations de psychologie religieuse
 which is reprinted in German (1911) and edited the
 German edition of his Experimentell-psychologische und
 klinische Untersuchungen und Versuche in the
 same year. He also assisted in the translation of
 Vorobchik's Psychologie of Religion.

8. Cf. "The Gentilism of Rationality" (1879), "Relig. Action
 and Theism" (1881), "Rationality, Activity and Faith" (1902),
 and "The Psychology of Religion" (1903). Vorobchik refers to
 the last named in ET, I (1913), 241.

9. ET, I (1913), 241.

10. Cf. Religionswissenschaft, 4 (1911), 217-227.

11. W-B, I (1913), 245.

12. Conversations in Göttingen, Feb. 9-11, 1931.

13. W-123 (1934), 30; cf. J-F, I (1930), 193ff.

14. Cf. this Dissertation, 27ff.

15. Cf. W-B, I (1913), 245f.

16. ETP, 25 (1902), 223f.

17. It appears under the title: Blanc's Religion's Revival
 of Religiosity 2-25 (1902).

18. W-B, I (1913), 247.

19. Ibid., 190ff.

CHAPTER II (cont'd)

20. Cf. Preface of 1902 edition.
21. W-CG (1902), 15. Wundt and Paulsen are listed with James as the chief voluntarists.
22. Ibid., 106. The note reads: "William James an der Harvard-Universität zu Cambridge-Boston vertritt den bezeichneten Standpunkt vor allem in seinen "Principles of Psychologie", 2 Bde., 1890. Für uns kommen hauptsächlich in Betracht seine Essays unter dem Titel: The Will to Believe, 1897; deutsch (in Auswahl) von Th. Lorenz, 1899. Neuestens: The Varieties of Religious Experience, 1902."
23. Cf. W/J-VRE (1914), xiii.
24. The English translation is by D.S. Robinson (Yale, 1918).
25. W/J-VRE (1907), iii. This introductory paragraph is omitted in the second and later editions.
26. Conversations with Wobbermin, Feb. 9-11, 1931.
27. Cf. W/J-VRE (1914), xxxi.
28. Ibid., xxx.
29. Ibid.; cf. Royce, William James and Other Essays.
30. Ibid., iv.
31. Only six volumes of this journal appeared (1908-1913). A new journal of the same name was founded in 1928 as the organ of the Internationale Religionspsychologische Gesellschaft. Wobbermin is a contributing editor of the latter as of the former.
32. Cf. Note 10.
33. Since Wobbermin was especially influenced by Kaftan, it is interesting to note two early psychological studies of Kaftan's: Examenarbeit: "Die religiöse Erfahrung im Anschluss an Kant und Schleiermacher als Erkenntnis Prinzip untersucht;" and Habilitationsvorlesung: "Bedeutung der Psychologie für die Theologie." Cf. ZThK, 21(1911), 385.
34. Cf. W/J-VRE (1914), vi-vii.
35. The program of the Keplerbund as given in W-MM (1911), 56

CHAPTER II (cont'd)

is as follows: "Der Keplerbund steht auf dem Boden der Freiheit der Wissenschaft und erkennt als einzige Tendenz die Ergründung und den Dienst der Wahrheit an. Er ist dabei der Überzeugung, dass die Wahrheit in sich die Harmonie der naturwissenschaftlichen Tatsachen mit dem philosophischen Erkennen und der religiösen Erfahrung trägt. Von dieser Grundlage ausgehend und in diesem Sinne ist der Zweck des Vereins die Förderung der Naturerkenntnis in der Gesamtheit unseres Volkes."

36. W-ST,II (1921), vi.
37. W-ST,I (1913), 332.
38. W-ST,III (1925), 483.
39. Conversations, Feb. 9-11, 1931.
40. Wobbermin wrote the article on "Religionspsychologie" in Hauck, Realenzyklopädie für die protestantische Theologie und Kirche (1913); the article on "Die Methoden der religionspsychologischen Arbeit" in Abderhalden, Handbuch der biologischen Arbeitsmethoden (1921); and has articles on "Religionspsychologie" and "Schleiermacher" in the forthcoming volumes of the second edition of Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart.
41. Richtlinien evangel. Theologie (1929) will be considered in part since it is an important presentation of Wobbermin's development of the psychological methodology.
42. Cf. J-"Psych. of Belief." Note that James later felt that his essay on "The Will to Believe" should have been called "The Right to Believe," J-LET,II (1920), 207.
43. W-IEG (1894), 8.
44. W-MM(1911), 101. "Wir können nicht aus unserem Bewusstsein heraus, um uns direkt von der Existenz der Aussenwelt zu überzeugen."
45. W-IEG (1894), 7.
46. J-WB (1897), 327.
47. W-IEG (1894), 26ff.
48. J-PP,I (1890), Ch. VII.
49. W-IEG (1894), 51.
50. Ibid., 55.
51. Ibid., 51.

In an earlier paper (1931) the author has shown that the concept of "self-organization" is not a new one, but has been used in various forms by many writers. The present paper is a survey of the literature on this subject, with particular reference to the work of von Bertalanffy and his associates. The author will discuss the various meanings of the term "self-organization" as used by different writers, and will attempt to show how the concept has been developed and refined over the years. The paper will conclude with a discussion of the implications of the concept for the study of the living organism.

1. W-10 (1931), 1.

2. W-10 (1931), 2.

3. W-10 (1931), 3.

4. W-10 (1931), 4.

5. W-10 (1931), 5. The author will discuss the various meanings of the term "self-organization" as used by different writers, and will attempt to show how the concept has been developed and refined over the years. The paper will conclude with a discussion of the implications of the concept for the study of the living organism.

6. W-10 (1931), 6. The author will discuss the various meanings of the term "self-organization" as used by different writers, and will attempt to show how the concept has been developed and refined over the years. The paper will conclude with a discussion of the implications of the concept for the study of the living organism.

7. W-10 (1931), 7. The author will discuss the various meanings of the term "self-organization" as used by different writers, and will attempt to show how the concept has been developed and refined over the years. The paper will conclude with a discussion of the implications of the concept for the study of the living organism.

8. W-10 (1931), 8.

9. W-10 (1931), 9. The author will discuss the various meanings of the term "self-organization" as used by different writers, and will attempt to show how the concept has been developed and refined over the years. The paper will conclude with a discussion of the implications of the concept for the study of the living organism.

10. W-10 (1931), 10.

11. W-10 (1931), 11.

12. W-10 (1931), 12.

13. W-10 (1931), 13.

14. W-10 (1931), 14.

15. W-10 (1931), 15.

16. W-10 (1931), 16.

CHAPTER II (cont'd)

52. Cf. ibid., 73f. and W-GT (1899), 18.
53. W-IEG (1894), 6.
54. Ibid., 69f; cf. KdrV, A446-448.
55. Cf. W.R. Sorley, Moral Values and the Idea of God, 7. "Just as the data of sense-experience are found to manifest certain regularities from which 'laws of nature,' ... may be inferred, so also in our moral experience a certain law or order can be discovered, with a claim to be regarded as objective, which may be compared with the similar claim made on behalf of natural law."
56. W-MM (1911), 147.
57. J-PU (1909), 125, etc.
58. This Dissertation, Ch. V.
59. W-ST,I (1913), 6.
60. W-SR (1913), 32.
61. Cf. this Dissertation, Ch. III, and Knudson, 187f.
62. W-ST,I (1913), 353.
63. J-RE (1912), 42.
64. Ibid., 90.
65. J-LET,I (1920), 82; cf. J-PR (1907), 93, 106f.
66. Cf. also J-WB (1897), 83 and J-VRE (1902), 140.
67. Cf. Note 55 above.
68. W-MM (1911), 4.
69. Ibid., 5.
70. Ibid., 3.
71. Note James's estimate of Haeckel in PR (1907), 15f.
72. Cf. W-MM (1911), 74.
73. J-VRE (1902), 14.
74. W-MM (1911), 8f.
75. Ibid., 18.

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CHAPTER II (cont'd)

76. Ibid., 113.
77. Ibid., 11.
78. Ibid.
79. Ibid., 150.
80. Ibid.
81. The demand that God be regarded as ethical personality is to be found throughout Wobbermin's writings.
82. Op. cit., 148.
83. Ibid., 23.
84. Cf. ibid., 86f.
85. Ibid., 28ff.
86. Ibid., 39.
87. Ibid., 135. "Die christliche Weltanschauung ist selbst monistisch, aber sie ist monistisch auf dualistischer Grundlage, sie setzt den Dualismus der empirischen Wirklichkeit voraus. In dreifacher Stufenfolge der Differenzierung erscheint ihr dieser Dualismus als der Gegensatz des Unorganischen und Organischen, als Gegensatz des Unbewussten und Bewussten, als Gegensatz des ethisch-Indifferenten und des ethischBestimmten."
88. W-ST,I (1913), 12, cf. 9.
89. W-MM (1911), 137.
90. Ibid., and conversations, Feb. 9-11, 1931.
91. Conversations, Feb. 9-11, 1931.
92. W-ST,II (1921), 290, 273.
93. Conversations, Feb. 9-11, 1931.
94. W-SR (1913), 53.
95. Ibid., 54.
96. Ibid., 55.
97. Ibid.; cf. W-ST,III (1925), 175ff.

CHAPTER II (conc.)

98. J-VRE (1902), 525.

99. J-VRE (1902), 515; J-PU (1909), 290, 292, 318, et passim.

CHAPTER III

1. W-ST,I (1913), 174.
2. W-SuR (1927), 21.
3. W-ST,I (1913), 99; cf. W-RT (1929), 26.
4. Note Wobbermin's rejection of this authority in his treatment of immortality, TM (1901), 159. Cf. Knudson, Doctrine of God, Ch. IV.
5. Ibid., 27 et passim.
6. W-SR (1913), 57; cf. W-ST,I (1913), 246.
7. Cf. J-LET,II (1920), 170 and J-VRE (1902), "Postscript." Cf. also this Dissertation, Ch. IV.
8. W-ST, I (1913), 328, 231f.
9. W-RT (1929), Vorwort.
10. Ibid.
11. W-ST,I (1913), 289.
12. W-RT (1929), 2.
13. W-ST,I (1913), 272ff.
14. W-RT (1929), 2; cf. W-ST,III (1925), 14.
15. W-ST,I (1913), 330.
16. This Dissertation, 110-112.
17. W- "Geschichte und Historie" (1911), 5f.
18. W-RT (1929), 3.
19. For comparison of Hegel and Schleiermacher on religion cf. Knudson, The Doctrine of God, 113f.
20. Leuba's early article on "The Psychology of Religious Phenomena" (1896) is frequently referred to. Cf. also his Psychological Study of Religion, Belief in God and Immortality, Psychology of Religious Mysticism.

1. The first part of the report is a general introduction to the subject of the study. It discusses the importance of the problem and the objectives of the research. It also mentions the scope of the study and the limitations of the data.

2. The second part of the report is a detailed description of the methodology used in the study. It includes information about the sample size, the selection criteria, and the data collection methods. It also describes the statistical techniques used to analyze the data.

3. The third part of the report is a presentation of the results of the study. It includes tables, figures, and graphs that illustrate the findings. The results are discussed in the context of the research objectives and the existing literature.

4. The fourth part of the report is a conclusion and a discussion of the implications of the findings. It summarizes the main results and discusses their significance for the field of study. It also suggests areas for further research and provides recommendations for practice.

CHAPTER III (cont'd)

21. W-ST,II (1921), 14. "So übernimmt Leuba die Rolle eines modernen Feuerbach. Ja die Theorie des Illusionismus wird von Leuba noch ungleich straffer und geschlossener durchgeführt als von Feuerbach."
22. W-SR (1913), 35.
23. Ibid., 38.
24. Cf. W-MM (1911), 123f.
25. W-ST,I (1913), 229, and W/J-VRE (1914), xvi.
26. W/J-VRE (1914), xvf.
27. Cf. Knudson, op. cit., 120.
28. W-ST,II (1921), 217.
29. Ibid., 220f.
30. Lecture notes, 1930-31, Berlin University.
31. J-VRE (1902), 431.
32. W-ST,II (1921), 69.
33. Glaubenslehre, 2. Aufl. sec. 3; quoted in W-ST,II (1921), 62.
34. W-ST,II (1921), 69.
35. J-WB (1897), 15.
36. W-SR (1913), 32.
37. Cf. especially J-VRE (1902), 486.
38. Cf. W-SR (1913), 33f.
39. J-VRE (1902), 30.
40. W-ST,I (1913), 278; cf. J-VRE (1902), 274.
41. Busch, William James als Religionsphilosoph, 27; cf. J-VRE (1902), 27.
42. J-VRE (1902), 35, 38.
43. W-ST,I (1913), 278.

CHAPTER III (cont'd)

44. W-ST,II (1921), v, 139.
45. W-SR (1913), 5.
46. W-ST,I (1913), 279f.
47. Ibid., viif.
48. Ibid., 412f.
49. Op. cit., 187f.
50. W-SR (1913), xiii.
51. "Der gegenwärtige Stand der Religionspsychologie" (1910).
52. W-SR (1913), ix.
53. Ibid., xi.
54. Ibid., xii; cf. 84.
55. Ibid., 46.
56. Ibid., 83ff.
57. Ibid., 15f.
58. Ibid., 19.
59. Cf. ibid., 83, 91.
60. W/J-VRE (1914), xvi.
61. W-ST,I (1913), 314, 351f.
62. Ibid., 351f.
63. Cf. note 50 above.
64. W-ST,I (1913), 424.
65. W/J-VRE (1914), iv.
66. W-SR (1913), xiii.
67. Cf. note 51 above. This trend is noticeable in the three volumes of Systematische Theologie. It is discussed twice each in Volumes I and II, and five times in Volume III.

CHAPTER III (Cont'd)

40. W-27, 11 (1913), p. 108.

41. W-28 (1913), p. 1.

42. W-27, 1 (1913), p. 108.

43. Ibid., 1913.

44. Ibid., 1913.

45. Op. cit., 1913.

46. W-28 (1913), p. 1.

47. "Der gegenwärtige Stand der Kollisionspsychologie" (1913).

48. W-28 (1913), p. 1.

49. Ibid., 1913.

50. Ibid., 1913; cf. 28.

51. Ibid., 1913.

52. Ibid., 1913.

53. Ibid., 1913.

54. Ibid., 1913.

55. Cf. Ibid., 1913, p. 1.

56. W-28 (1913), p. 1.

57. W-27, 1 (1913), p. 108.

58. Ibid., 1913.

59. Cf. Ibid., 1913.

60. W-27, 1 (1913), p. 108.

61. W-28 (1913), p. 1.

62. W-28 (1913), p. 1.

63. Cf. note 51 above. This trend is noticeable in the entire volume of Psychologische Studien. It is especially noticeable in Volumes I and II, and also in Volume III.

CHAPTER III (Conc.)

68. Cf. W-ST,II (1921), 139.
69. W-ST,I (1913), 406. Cf. also W- "Gegenwärtige Stand" (1910), 506.
70. W- "Gegenwärtige Stand" (1910), 533. "Von der eigenen religiösen Erfahrung aus fremdes religiöses Seelenleben verstehen lernen, so den Blick für die Eigentümlichkeiten des spezifisch Religiösen schärfen, mit geschärftem Verständnis zur Beobachtung des eigenen religiösen Bewusstseins zurückkehren und diesen Prozess wechselseitiger Förderung im Erfassen, Verstehen und Deuten der eigenen und fremden Ausdruckformen religiösen Lebens immer weiter und weiter ausdehnen: das und das allein ist die gewiesene Methode religionspsychologischer Forschung."
71. W-ST,I (1913), 428.
72. Ibid., 437.
73. W-RT (1929), 27 and a lecture by Wobbermin in Göttingen, Feb. 11, 1931.
74. Cf. W-IEG (1894).
75. Cf. this Dissertation, Ch. II, note 33.
76. Starbuck's Psychology of Religion (1899) is omitted because its statistical character limited its scope.
77. Conversations, Feb. 9-11, 1931.
78. Cf. this Dissertation, Ch. I, 34; Ch. II, 67ff.
79. W-ST,II (1921), vi.
80. W-ST,III (1925), 483.
81. Ibid., vi, 8f, 23, 129, 374.
82. W-ST,II (1921), 11ff.
83. Cf. note 61 above.
84. W-ST,III (1925), 11.
85. Conversations, Feb. 9-11, 1931.

CHAPTER IV

1. Pragmatism is mentioned in W-ST,I (1913), 275n and 282n. The Meaning of Truth is cited ibid., 283n. A Pluralistic Universe is mentioned in Wobbermin's article on "Der gegenwärtige Stand der Religionspsychologie" (1910), 535n. The writer has found no references to posthumous books.
2. J-PR (1907), 54f.
3. Ibid., 201.
4. Ibid., 73.
5. J-SPP (1911), 93.
6. Ibid., 96.
7. Ibid., 94.
8. Ibid.
9. Cf. J-PU (1909), 212, 329.
10. J-VRE (1902), 443; cr. J-RE (1912), 72.
11. J-PR (1907), 96.
12. Ibid., 98.
13. Ibid., 106; cr. J-VRE (1902), 517, which gives practically the same statement.
14. Cf. note on J-MT (1909), 189f. This argument was used first in the California address on "Philosophical Conceptions and Practical Results;" cf. J-CER (1920), 414-418.
15. Cf. This Dissertation, 37-39; 153.
16. Karl Groos rightly says, "Der Pragmatismus von James wirkt auch dadurch paradox, dass James 'Wahrheiten' sagt und 'Ueberzeugungen' meint." Die Sicherung der Erkenntnis, 19n. Wobbermin tends to do the same in the religious field.
17. J-MT (1909), 195 and note.
18. J-WB (1897), 97.
19. J-MT (1909), 165.
20. Present Philosophical Tendencies (1912), 203.

CHAPTER IV

The following is a list of the names of the persons who have been mentioned in the preceding chapters, in the order in which they are mentioned in the text. The names are given in the order in which they are mentioned in the text, and not in the order in which they are mentioned in the text.

1. John Doe (1901), 100.

2. John Doe (1901), 100.

3. John Doe (1901), 100.

4. John Doe (1901), 100.

5. John Doe (1901), 100.

6. John Doe (1901), 100.

7. John Doe (1901), 100.

8. John Doe (1901), 100.

9. John Doe (1901), 100.

10. John Doe (1901), 100.

11. John Doe (1901), 100.

12. John Doe (1901), 100.

13. John Doe (1901), 100.

14. John Doe (1901), 100.

15. John Doe (1901), 100.

16. John Doe (1901), 100.

17. John Doe (1901), 100.

18. John Doe (1901), 100.

19. John Doe (1901), 100.

CHAPTER IV (cont'd)

21. J-WB (1897), 17.
22. J-PR (1907), 222.
23. Ibid., 192; cf. J-VRE (1902), 18, 19.
24. Cf. The Will to Believe.
25. Ibid., 97; cf. 100.
26. Ibid., 29.
27. This Dissertation, 120.
28. J-PR (1907), 73; cf. note 23 above.
29. J-WB (1897), 20.
30. J-PU (1909), 328f.; cf. Bowne's principles of reason and vision.
31. William James als Religionsphilosoph, 6; cf. also Knudson, Doctrine of God, 153f.
32. "Wagnis im Glauben" (1928).
33. Ibid., 1188.
34. Cf. W-SR (1913), 67; W-ST, I (1913), 316, 322, et passim.
35. Oesterreich states this objection in just form in his review of the second edition: "In der neuen Auflage ist nichts Wesentliches geändert. Zu einer Mitaufnahme einiger seiner Zeit fortgelassener Stücke des englischen Originals hat sich Wobbermin auch dies Mal nicht zu entschliessen vermocht. Es kann ihm natürlich nicht das Recht bestritten werden, nur das zu veröffentlichen, was ihm zugesagt und wovon er wertvolle Beeinflussung des deutschen wissenschaftlichen Lebens erwartet, aber es scheint mir vom wissenschaftlichen Standpunkt nach, wie vor ganz prinzipiell wünschenswert zu sein, dass eine Uebersetzung den ganzen und vollen Gehalt des Originals wiedergibt, ohne es einer Zensur zu unterwerfen." K-St, 20 (1915), 441.
36. Probleme der Völkerpsychologie, 2. Aufl., 88.
37. Cf. W/J-VRE (1914), x, xix, et passim.
38. Op. cit., 109.
39. J-LET, II (1920), 112.

CHAPTER IV (cont'd)

21. 1-WB (1937), IV.
22. 1-PR (1937), 328.
23. Ibid., 193; cf. 1-VKE (1932), 18, IV.
24. Cf. The Will to Believe.
25. Ibid., 97; cf. 100.
26. Ibid., 29.
27. This Dissertation, 190.
28. 1-PR (1937), 93; cf. note 23 above.
29. 1-WB (1937), 30.
30. 1-WU (1932), 328f.; cf. Bowne's principles of reason and vision.
31. William James and Religious Philosophy, cf. also Kammann, Doctrine of God, 193f.
32. "Wegweis im Glauben" (1932).
33. Ibid., 118.
34. Cf. 1-WB (1937), 97; 1-VKE (1932), 318, 322, cf. passage.
35. Oesterreich states this objection in just form in his review of the second edition: "In der neuen Auflage ist nicht wesentliches geändert. In einer Hinsicht ist es seiner Zeit fortgeschritten. Statt des englischen Originals hat sich Oesterreich auch hier nicht zu entschließen vermocht. Er kann ihm natürlich nicht das Recht bestritten werden, nur das zu veröffentlichen, was ihm sagt und wovon er wertvolle Bestimmungen des deutschen wissenschaftlichen Lebens erwartet, aber es scheint mir vom wissenschaftlichen Standpunkt aus, wie vor uns, nicht wünschenswert zu sein, dass eine Übersetzung den ganzen und vollen Gehalt des Originals wiedergibt, ohne es einerkennt zu unterwerfen." 1-32, 20 (1913), 41.
36. Probleme der Volkpsychologie, 2. Aufl., 22.
37. Cf. 1-VKE (1932), x, xix, cf. passage.
38. Cf. cit., 109.
39. 1-VKE, II (1930), 112.

CHAPTER IV (cont'd)

40. Ibid., 170.
41. W-ST,I (1913), 275n.
42. Wobbermin omits "Pragmatismus" from the Index although there are references to it on 353f and 400. The pragmatic turn in the translating is seen in the following: James, "The gods believed in .. agree ... in recognizing personal calls," (491), Wobbermin, "Alle Gottheiten ... haben das gemein, dass sie persönliche Wünsche und Bedürfnisse befriedigen," (385); and in the same paragraph, James, "The divine meets him on the basis of his personal concerns," Wobbermin, "Gott Sorge für seine persönlichen Bedürfnisse."
- Also Wobbermin fails in several cases to bring out James's emphasis on personality. This is particularly strange because of Wobbermin's own interest in the concept. Cf. his failure to italicize the phrase "in den Erlebnissen persönlichen Innenlebens handelt es sich dagegen um Realitäten im strengsten Sinne des Wortes," (388, cf. English, 498). In the closing chapter, he omits all the long notes including those on "personalism" and "Bowne," (English, 501f.).
43. Quoted by Wobbermin in "Der gegenwärtige Stand der Religionspsychologie," (1910), 498.
44. Conversations, Feb. 9-11, 1931. Cf. review of Busch, (1913).
45. J-PU (1909), 329.
46. Cf. note 39 above.
47. J-WB (1897), 56.
48. Cf. W-IEG (1894).
49. W-ST,II (1921), 12f.
50. W-MM (1911), 159.
51. Ibid., 9f. Wobbermin says: "Das theoretische Wahrheitsinteresse und Wahrheitsideal erwächst im Menschen nur ganz allmählich und ist durch mancherlei niedere Motive, solche egoistischer und utilitaristischer Art, bedingt. ... Aber wenn es einmal da ist, dann erhebt es sich absolut und unbedingt über alle diese Motive. Ja gerade darin liegt sein Wesen und sein Wert, dass es sich dann unabhängig von allen diesen Motiven betätigt und durchzusetzen sucht."

40. 1815. 170.

CHAPTER IV (cont'd)

52. W-ST,I (1913), 292; cf. Niemeier, Methoden und Grundauffassungen der Religionsphilosophie, 110.
53. W-RP (1924), 14.
54. W- "Gegenwärtige Stand ..." (1910), 526f.; cf. W-ST,I (1913), 280.
55. W-ST,I (1913), 280.
56. J-MT (1909), 221.
57. J-LET,II (1920), 295f.: quotation from 296; cf. 337.
58. W-ST,II (1921), 447.
59. Ibid., 453.
60. W-SR (1913), 38.
61. Cf. W/J-VRE (1914), x.
62. J-SPP (1911), 223; cf. J-PR (1907), 299.
63. Philosophie des 20. Jahrhunderts, 76f. Cf. Busch, William James als Religionsphilosoph, 48: "Pragmatismus meint also keineswegs: alles, was nützlich ist, ist wahr und wirklich. Das wäre Pseudopragmatismus schlimmster Sorte, sondern das, was sich verifizieren lässt, wird von uns wahr genannt ... Pragmatist sein heisst also, ... den Blick aufs Empirisch-konkrete richten, weg von den Ideen, Prinzipien und Ursprüngen, hin zum Konkreten, Einzelnen, zur Zukunft und aufs Handeln."
64. Cf. note 60 above.
65. W-MM (1911), 101.
66. W-SR (1913), 42.
67. Ibid., 21.

52. W-St, I (1913), 292; cf. Niemöller, Methoden und Grundbegriffe
der Religiöswissenschaften, 110.

53. W-St, I (1913), 14.

54. W-St, I (1913), 290; cf. W-St, I (1913), 290.

55. W-St, I (1913), 290.

56. W-St, I (1913), 291.

57. W-St, I (1913), 291; quotation from 290; cf. 291.

58. W-St, I (1913), 447.

59. Ibid., 401.

60. W-St, I (1913), 38.

61. Cf. W-St, I (1913), 38.

62. W-St, I (1913), 290; cf. W-St, I (1913), 290.

63. Philosophie des 20. Jahrhunderts, Vol. II, Busch, Willen
lassen die Religiöswissenschaften, 45; "Pragmatismus meint also
keineswegs: alles, was nützlich ist, ist wahr und wirksam.
Der wäre fastbegriffen als schlechterer Begriff, sondern das,
was sich verifizieren lässt, wird von uns wahr genannt."
Pragmatismus heißt also: ... den Blick auf die
konkrete Realität, weg von den Ideen, Fiktionen und U-
topien; hin zum Konkreten, Einzelnen, zur Erkenntnis und zum
Handeln."

64. Cf. note 60 above.

65. W-St, I (1913), 101.

66. W-St, I (1913), 42.

67. Ibid., 21.

CHAPTER V

1. Cf. this Dissertation, 82f.
2. J-PR (1907), 93; J-PU (1909), 23, 31.
3. J-PU (1909), 35.
4. Ibid., 24ff.
5. Ibid., 25.
6. Ibid., 30.
7. Ibid., 31.
8. Cf. J-RE (1912), 76, 82ff; cf. also G.C. Cell, Lecture notes in History of American Thought, 1927-28.
9. Cf. W-MM (1911), 137.
10. J-PU (1909), 321f.
11. J-WB (1897), 68.
12. J-PR (1907), 156. Cf. J-SPP (1911), 127 and Busch, William James als Religionsphilosoph, 6.
13. J-WB (1897), 147.
14. Cf. especially this Dissertation, Ch. III.
15. J-PR (1907), 72.
16. Cf. W-IEG (1894); J-PP,I (1890), Ch. IX; and E.S. Brightman, A Philosophy of Ideals, Ch. I.
17. J-PU (1909), 325; cf. 324.
18. Cf. ibid., 326f.
19. Cf. this Dissertation, 37f.
20. J-MT (1909), 43-50.
21. Ibid., 47f; cf. 103, 127.
22. Busch, op.cit., 67.

CHAPTER V

1. Cf. this dissertation, 222.
2. 1-18 (1907), 2-19 (1908), 3-21.

3. 1-18 (1908), 22.

4. Ibid., 222.

5. Ibid., 23.

6. Ibid., 20.

7. Ibid., 21.

8. Cf. 1-18 (1907), 23, 222; cf. also U.C. Coll. Lecture notes in history of American thought, 1907-23.

9. Cf. 1-18 (1907), 222.

10. 1-18 (1907), 222.

11. 1-18 (1907), 22.

12. 1-18 (1907), 222; Cf. 1-18 (1907), 121 and 222; William James and his contemporaries, 2.

13. 1-18 (1907), 222.

14. Cf. especially this dissertation, 22, 111.

15. 1-18 (1907), 22.

16. Cf. 1-18 (1907), 2-19 (1908), 3-21; and U.C. Coll. Lecture notes, A history of thought, 22, 1.

17. 1-18 (1907), 222; cf. 222.

18. Cf. Ibid., 222.

19. Cf. this dissertation, 22.

20. 1-18 (1907), 22-23.

21. Ibid., 222; cf. 222, 121.

22. Ibid., 222, 22.

CHAPTER V (cont'd)

23. J-LET,I (1920), 245.
24. J-WB (1897), 180f.
25. Cf. J-PR (1907), 284ff and J-SPP (1911), 141f.
26. J-WB (1897), 43f. Cf. E.S. Brightman, The Problem of God.
27. J-WB (1897), 117.
28. Cf. this Dissertation, Ch. I, 40ff, and Bixler, Religion in the Philosophy of William James, 123ff.
29. J-VRE (1902), 432: "We are thinking beings, and we cannot exclude the intellect from participating in any of our functions. ... Both our personal ideals and our religious and mystical experiences must be interpreted congruously with the kind of scenery which our thinking mind inhabits."
30. J-PU (1907), 124; cf. Mill, Three Essays on Religion, 176.
31. J-PR (1907), 299f.
32. J-VRE (1902), 422.
33. Ibid., 18, 20, et passim. Cf. Bixler, op. cit., 132.
34. J-LET,I (1920), 238; ibid., II, 155.
35. Note polytheistic suggestions in J-VRE (1902), 131, 526.
36. J-PU (1909), 34.
37. J-WB (1897), 270.
38. Ibid., 198.
39. Cf. W-IEG (1894).
40. J-PU (1909), 124.
41. J-VRE (1902), 164f.
42. J-MT (1909), 125.
43. J-PR (1907), 298; J-SPP (1911), 142.
44. Ibid., 287; J-SPP (1911, 142.

CHAPTER V (cont'd)

45. Op. cit., 134.
46. J-PR (1907), 72.
47. Ibid., 285f. Cf. Bixler, op. cit., 36f, 136.
48. J-PU (1909), 30.
49. J-WB (1897), 122.
50. J-PU (1909), 292.
51. Ibid., 318.
52. M.W. Calkins, Persistent Problems in Philosophy, 9f.
53. J-PU (1909), 300.
54. Ibid., 288.
55. Ibid., 289.
56. Ibid., 289f.
57. Ibid., 307; cf. J-VRE (1902), 508, 515.
58. Cf. J-PR (1907), 300, where he suggests that "we stand in much the same relation to the whole of the universe as our canine and feline pets do to the whole of human life."
59. J-MT (1909), 125.
60. J-SPP (1911), 139f.
61. Ibid., 140f.
62. J-PU (1909), 294f.
63. Conversations, Feb. 9-11, 1931.
64. W/J-VRE (1914), xiii.
65. J-VRE (1902), 526; cf. 131-133.
66. W/J-VRE (1914), 107ff.
67. W-TM (1901), 27 et passim. Note that in this he is opposing Ritschl.
68. Ibid., 42.

CHAPTER V (cont'd)

42. Op. cit., 134.
43. 3-24 (1907), 72.
44. Ibid., 292; Op. cit., 134, 135.
45. 3-24 (1907), 20.
46. 3-24 (1907), 22.
47. 3-24 (1907), 22.
48. Ibid., 215.
49. M. W. Collins, Perennial Problems in Philosophy, 47.
50. 3-24 (1907), 200.
51. Ibid., 200.
52. Ibid., 200.
53. Ibid., 200.
54. Ibid., 200.
55. Ibid., 200.
56. 3-24 (1907), 200.
57. Ibid., 200; Op. cit., 134, 135.
58. Op. cit., 134, 135, 200, where he suggests that "we stand in some sense relation to the whole of the universe as our canine and feline pets do to the world of human life."
59. 3-24 (1907), 190.
60. 3-24 (1911), 190.
61. Ibid., 190.
62. 3-24 (1907), 190.
63. Conversations, Vol. 2-11, 1931.
64. W/3-VK (1914), 211.
65. 3-VK (1902), 22; Op. cit., 131-132.
66. W/3-VK (1914), 107.
67. W/3-VK (1902), 22 of passage. Note that in this he is pointing through.
68. Ibid., 22.

CHAPTER V (cont'd)

69. Ibid., 62.
70. Kritik der reinen Vernunft, A 295f.
71. W-TM (1901), 57.
72. W-MM (1911), 118.
73. Ibid., 121. Cf. W-TM (1901), 12 and W-SR (1913), 53.
74. W-ST,I (1913), 76.
75. W-TM (1901), 30.
76. Essay in Beiträge zur Weiterentwicklung der christlichen Religion (1905), 339-386.
77. Ibid., 374f.
78. Ibid., 363.
79. Ibid., 376.
80. Ibid., 377.
81. Cf. W-MM (1911), 137.
82. W-WC (1905), 375.
83. Conversations, Feb. 9-11, 1931.
84. G.C. Cell, Lecture notes, 1927-1928.
85. W-TM (1901), 6.
86. Ibid., 185.
87. Ibid., 184.
88. Ibid., 171f.
89. Ibid., 131.
90. Ibid., 108.
91. Ibid., 147.
92. Ibid., 52.

CHAPTER V (cont'd)

62. 1914, 22.

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84. 1914, 22. 1914, 22.

85. 1914, 22. 1914, 22.

CHAPTER V (concl.)

93. Ibid., 155.
94. Cf. James on purpose in Bixler, op. cit., 126.
95. W-TM (1901), 218.
96. Cf. ibid., 234ff.
97. Ibid., 229.
98. Ibid.; cf. W-MM (1911), 30ff and W-ST,III (1925), 329ff.
99. W-MM (1911), 147.
100. W/J-VRE (1914), xii.
101. W-ST,II (1921), 269.
102. W-ST,III (1925), 176.
103. W-ST,II, 284.
104. J-LET,II (1920), 214. Cf. Bixler, op. cit., Ch. VIII.
105. Cf. W-TM (1901), 155ff.
106. Note especially his Wesen des Christentums (1905), his prefaces to the two editions of the Varieties, and his Monismus und Monotheismus (1911) for the emphasis on God as absolute.

CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY OF THE WORK

LIST OF PAGES

1. A full bibliography of the author's work is given in the
Bibliography. The following is a list of the author's
publications in the field of the history of the
United States. The list is arranged in chronological
order. The first column gives the year of publication,
the second column gives the title of the work, and
the third column gives the publisher. The list is
intended to be a guide to the reader's study of the
author's work. It is not intended to be a complete
list of the author's work. It is intended to be a
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I. Corrections.

1. 1878-2. The two references to 1882-3 (lines 5 and 8 of note) should be to 1882-2. Cf. 1920-2, 69n.
2. 1905-3. Add: Reprinted also in 1912-1.
Leroux makes this correction, but, by a typographical error, his reference is to 1905-4 instead of to 1905-3.
3. 1906-6. Should read: New York: Macmillan, 1905.
4. Leroux notes that Pragmatism (1907-11) is placed too late and that it should be before 1907-7, but he does not give the evidence. Pragmatism was "in type" on April 19, 1907 (cf. 1920-1, II, 271, 295) and "A Word More about Truth" (1907-7) was dated July 18, 1907 (cf. JrPhil. of that date).

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1. The first part of the book is devoted to a general survey of the history of the subject.

2. The second part is devoted to a detailed study of the various theories of the subject.

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1. Einleitung (1. bis 10. Zeile)

2. Grundlagen (11. bis 20. Zeile)

3. Methoden (21. bis 30. Zeile)

4. Ergebnisse (31. bis 40. Zeile)

5. Diskussion (41. bis 50. Zeile)

6. Fazit (51. bis 60. Zeile)

7. Literaturverzeichnis (61. bis 70. Zeile)

8. Anhang (71. bis 80. Zeile)

9. Index (81. bis 90. Zeile)

10. Abbildung (91. bis 100. Zeile)

11. Tabellen (101. bis 110. Zeile)

12. Formeln (111. bis 120. Zeile)

13. Diagramme (121. bis 130. Zeile)

14. Skizzen (131. bis 140. Zeile)

15. Diagramme (141. bis 150. Zeile)

16. Formeln (151. bis 160. Zeile)

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BIOGRAPHY OF THE WRITER

The writer, Jannette Elthina Newhall, was born in Chester, New Hampshire, on November 28, 1898. She is the daughter of George Martin and Alice Farnham Newhall. She attended the public schools in Fitzwilliam, New Hampshire and in Westboro, Townsend, and Pepperell, Massachusetts. She graduated from Pepperell High School in 1917 as valedictorian of her class. The following year she took the Library Training Course in the City Library of Springfield, Massachusetts. She was an assistant librarian in Springfield from 1918 to 1920.

In the fall of 1920 she entered Boston University School of Religious Education and Social Service, from which she graduated in 1924 with the Bachelor of Social Science degree. She received the degree of Master of Arts from Boston University Graduate School in 1926. She studied at Columbia University during the Fall Semester, 1928-29, and took one course at Radcliffe in the Spring Semester, 1929. She completed her residence requirements at Boston University in 1930 and studied in Berlin, Germany during the year 1930-31, attending some lectures at the University.

The writer taught psychology, sociology, and ethics at Folts Institute, Herkimer, New York in 1925-26. She taught formal logic in the Boston University Summer Session, 1929 and educational ethics at Boston University School of Education in

RECURRING OF THE WINTER

The winter, January through March, was very in

teresting, and especially on the 20th, 21st, and 22nd.

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the Spring Semester, 1929-30. She was Assistant in Philosophy at Boston University in the Spring Semester, 1925 and Borden Parker Bowne Fellow in Philosophy for the year, 1929-30. Since 1928 she has been a Fellow of the National Council on Religion in Higher Education.



the spring semester, 1913-14. The first semester in this course
is conducted entirely in the spring semester, 1913 and 1914.
The second semester is in the fall semester, 1913-14. Since
1913 the first semester is fall semester of the National Council on Health
in the United States.

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